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Napoleon III at the height of his power

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NAPOLEON III

AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER

PIUS IX.

NAPOLEON III

AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER

BY

IMBERT DE SAINT-AMAND

TRANSLATED BY

ELIZABETH GILBERT MARTIN

WITH PORTRAITS

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NAPOLEON III. AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER

CHAPTER I

NEW YEAR'S DAY

THERE were many people who wondered on waking up January 1, 1860, whether the day would pass without some such dramatic stroke as had marked the first day of the year just ended. They remembered the calm and courteous tone in which Napoleon III. had addressed to the Austrian ambassador the phrase that had been the signal for the war of Italy. Was the Emperor again to use language which would agitate all Europe? Nothing of the kind; the reception of the Diplomatic Corps took place at the Tuileries without any striking incident. The Pope's Nuncio, as dean of that body, merely paid the compliments of the season and expressed the good wishes and respects of the Diplomatic Corps. Napoleon III. replied, "I am happy to remember that since my accession to power, I have always professed the most profound respect for all recognized rights, and it will be the constant aim of my efforts to re-establish universal confidence and peace, so far as it

depends on me." This declaration was vague, but contained no menace.

The same day, the Emperor received a letter written by Queen Victoria the day before. Her Britannic Majesty expressed herself as follows: "May the year which is beginning bring you happiness and contentment. That which is just ended was stormy and painful, and has left sorrow in many hearts. I pray God that in the coming one the work of pacification, with all the benefits that brings to the progress and repose of the world, may be accomplished without impediments. There will be many divergent ideas, many apparently hostile interests to conciliate; but, heaven assisting, and we ourselves seeking nothing but the happiness of those whom we are called to govern, there is no room to despair of things turning out well."

The Emperor replied, "I hope the opening year will not be marked by any of those vicissitudes which disturbed the year 1859; and what I especially desire is that in the interest of the progress and peace of the universe, it may draw still closer the bonds of our alliance, which has always been fertile in good results."

But if New Year's Day had given rise to nothing abnormal at Paris, it was otherwise at Rome. The Duc de Gramont, ambassador of France, wrote to the Comte Walewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs: "An incident which was almost painful characterized the reception at the Vatican of the generals and

chiefs of the French army. Yielding to the pre-occupations which have absorbed him for several days, the Holy Father gave way to his feelings in replying to General de Goyon, and some remarks, uttered in a tone and with an energy not usual with him, have made a political event at Rome of an audience which, until to-day, had never been more than an exchange of formal compliments."

General de Goyon had just presented to Pius IX. the respects of the army of occupation. The Holy Father replied: "General, if every year we have received with pleasure the good wishes which you offered in the name of the brave officers and the army you so worthily command, these wishes are doubly dear to-day on account of the exceptional events which have succeeded, and because you assure us that the French division, now in the Pontifical States, is placed there to defend the rights of Catholicity. In that case, may God bless you and all the French army! May He also bless all classes of that generous nation!"

The close of the Pope's allocution bore witness to the alarm and anxiety which he had been suffering, especially since the publication of the brochure entitled *The Pope and the Congress.* With an emotion which communicated itself to his hearers, the Holy Father uttered these ardent and pathetic words: "Prostrate at the feet of that God who was, and is, and will be for eternity, we pray Him, in humility of heart, to send down His graces and

illuminations upon the august head of that army and nation, so that thus enlightened, he may walk with safety in his difficult path and continue to recognize the falsity of certain principles which have lately made their appearance in a little work that one might call a signal monument of hypocrisy, an ignoble tissue of contradictions. We hope, nay more, we are persuaded, that with the aid of these illuminations he will condemn the principles contained in this pamphlet. We are the more fully persuaded of this because he has from time to time sent us several documents which are still in our possession, and which are a real condemnation of those principles. It is with this conviction that we implore God to pour out His benedictions upon the Emperor, his august companion, the Prince Imperial, and all France."

The Pope's allocution deeply impressed the Empress. Prizing as she did above all things the maintenance of peace between the throne and the altar, it seemed to her that the year was beginning badly since it indicated a serious disagreement between the Vatican and the Tuileries. The Holy Father, the godfather of the Prince Imperial, described as "a signal monument of hypocrisy" a publication perfectly well known to have been inspired by the Emperor, and made it plainly evident that his good relations with the Empire depended upon the disavowal of that publication. In spite of her devotion to the Holy See, the Empress could not

hope to obtain such a disavowal, and she dreaded the difficulties of the situation.

The Empress desired to continue the occupation of Rome by the French troops as much as the Emperor desired to put an end to it. Nothing pleased her more than the protection accorded the Sovereign Pontiff by the Emperor, the eldest son of the Church, guarding the patrimony of St. Peter like a modern Charlemagne. To defend the temporal power of the Pope she now began that feverish struggle which she kept up through her husband's reign. She acted on profound conviction, for she believed that the interests of the Church were closely linked to those of the Empire. She understood very well that the French occupation of Rome should offend England, a Protestant power, naturally jealous of the time-honored glories of France; but what she could not comprehend was why the imperial government, which found such efficient support in the clergy, should be willing to alienate them by renouncing a mission which placed the French nation at the head of the Latin races, and gave to the government itself extraordinary prestige and influence with its Catholic clientèle throughout the world. The cause of the Holy Father had a passionate and often eloquent advocate in the Empress.

From this period two opposing camps were formed in the councils of the Emperor — a sort of right and left. Prince Napoleon headed the left, the Empress the right. The sovereign, who in both his external

and internal policy preferred to *divide in order of reign*, sought to hold an even balance between two parties of which he was the arbiter. We shall see him, throughout the year whose story we are about to tell, keeping up and laying stress upon their antagonism. When that year began, the French diplomats, almost without exception, belonged to the party of the right, and their chief, the Comte Walewski, had always opposed the programme of Cavour as far as lay in his power. Hence the Empress regretted his resignation and the transference of the portfolio of Foreign Affairs to a man less unfriendly to the pretensions of Sardinia.

CHAPTER II

THE RESIGNATION OF COMTE WALEWSKI

COMTE WALEWSKI had been at the head of French diplomacy since May 8, 1855. Up to the close of the Congress of Paris, there had been complete agreement between the Emperor and himself; after that epoch it no longer existed. The minister opposed the ideas of Cavour as strongly as Napoleon III. favored them. The interview of Plombières had taken place without the cognizance of Walewski; he was not a partisan of the war of Italy, and had done all in his power to bring it to a speedy close. Belonging to the old school of diplomacy, he had taken in all seriousness the preliminaries of Villafranca, the treaty of Zurich, and the proposition of a congress. But all this had crumbled into dust. What had been accomplished by all those despatches, notes, telegrams, couriers, journeys forth and back of diplomatists? Nothing at all. The revolutionary wind had blown away all this diplomatic waste paper.

The ink with which the plenipotentiaries signed the treaty of Zurich was hardly dry before that painfully elaborated document became null and void.

The contracting parties had not really desired its execution. Victor Emmanuel was no more anxious to be the confederate of Francis Joseph than Francis Joseph that of Victor Emmanuel. The honorary presidency offered to Pius IX. seemed to him an ironical compensation for the loss of the Legations, and so long as these were not restored, the Holy Father declared plainly that he would enter into no negotiations whatever. The prospect of a combination in which the Emperor of Austria should occupy in Venetia a place similar to that taken in the grand duchy of Luxemburg by the king of the Low Countries, had nothing attractive to Francis Joseph. He no sooner beheld a possibility of retaining real dominion in Venetia, than he ceased to attach much value to the execution of a treaty by which he would have been a loser.

As for Napoleon III., after long hesitation he had determined to abandon to Sardinia the whole of central Italy, including the Legations, and did not now desire a Congress in which he would have found it difficult to justify annexations so contrary to the treaties. However, he did not yet divulge his purpose, and the Comte Walewski continued to uphold established rights. But the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was now merely a façade, and diplomacy a fraud. The Duc de Gramont at Rome, the Prince de La Tour d'Auvergne at Turin, suffered from the part they were made to play. Official interpreters of the policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which

had ceased to be that of the sovereign, they were constantly placed in false positions. The despatches they communicated were considered mere formalities, and no one took seriously either their advice, their remonstrances, or their promises.

Up to the end of 1859, the Comte Walewski had hoped for the reunion of the Congress and a solution in conformity with the clauses of the Zurich treaty. In the Fortnightly Chronicle of the *Revue des Deux-Mondes*, January 1, 1860, occurred the following passage: "The mere word Congress had been magical in its quieting effects. This marvellous specific of peace was at last about to be convened. People reassured themselves by system. The Italian questions? They were forgotten, deferred until the consulting physicians of Europe should meet on the Quai d'Orsay. If the Congress were put off from January 5 to January 19, so much the better; it was fifteen days clear gain for that suave and too brief *far niente* policy. Ah well! we should not ourselves have the heart to blame those who, knowing how to rate this truce, have wished to enjoy it at their leisure. It has not lasted as long as they seemed to mean it should."

The diplomatic scaffolding had, in fact, just been upset like a house of cards. All that had been required for this was an anonymous pamphlet, — *The Pope and the Congress*. Inspired by the Emperor, without the knowledge of his Minister of Foreign Affairs, it appeared December 23, and people under-

stood that in publishing it, Napoleon III. intended to render the Congress impossible. Possibly the Comte Walewski may have hoped that as this publication had not an official character, the game was not absolutely lost. But the letter addressed to the Pope by the Emperor on the last day of the year, dispelled the last illusions of his minister.

The conclusion of that letter was as follows: "I say with sincere regret, that however painful the solution may be, what seems to me most in conformity with the interests of the Holy See would be the sacrifice of the revolted provinces. If for the repose of Europe the Holy Father should relinquish these provinces which for the last fifty years have created such embarrassment for his government, and if in exchange he should ask the powers to guarantee him the possession of the rest, I have no doubt that order would be restored. Then the Holy Father would thus assure peace for many years to grateful Italy, and to the Holy See the tranquil possession of the States of the Church. I love to believe that your Holiness will not misunderstand the sentiments by which I am animated; that he will comprehend the difficulties of my situation; that he will put a kindly interpretation on the frankness of my language, remembering all I have done for the Catholic religion and its august head."

Bound by a solemn oath, the Pope considered it a conscientious duty not to cede any portion of the States of the Church. No human force could induce

him to do it. He repelled energetically the idea of having himself represented in a diplomatic assembly whose programme would have been his dispossession. Hence the Congress was abandoned, and the Comte Walewski, a partisan of Tuscan autonomy and the papal claims, resigned his portfolio.

The *Moniteur* of January 5, 1860, published the following decree: "M. Thouvenel, ambassador at Constantinople, is appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs to succeed the Comte Walewski, whose resignation has been accepted." The retirement of the minister was not a disgrace, however, for on the very day his resignation was accepted a special decree awarded to those members of the Privy Council who occupied no paid position a salary of one hundred thousand francs. The Comte Walewski was the only member of that Council in the specified position, and in thus creating a new expense without the concurrence of legislative authority, the Emperor testified his gratitude for the services of his former minister. The Comte Walewski's retirement produced very little sensation, the public at that time knowing very little about what took place behind the diplomatic scenes. The Emperor occupied the whole stage, and nobody concerned himself much about his ministers. Moreover, it was known that M. Thouvenel, a professional diplomatist, was a man of great merit, and people liked to believe that he would be equal to his task. The journals scarcely mentioned the change which had taken place on the

Quai d'Orsay. To understand its significance one must recur to an article in an English paper, the *Morning Post*, reproduced by the *Moniteur* of January 8: "It had been evident for some time that the policy of the Comte Walewski was inclining toward what it has been agreed to call the reactionary party. If he is not himself, absolutely speaking, a legitimist, in the ordinary sense of that word, he has shown himself favorably inclined to the claims of the dispossessed Italian princes. We understand perfectly that with such lofty sentiments as distinguish him, he is unwilling to make himself the instrument of a policy he does not approve." The article went on to eulogize M. Thouvenel, and concluded thus: "There will be no more of those hesitations which have characterized the interval between the interview of Villafranca and the present moment. The head which directs the policy of France will be in accord with the hand which will carry it out. In any case, there will be no intervention, and no opposition to Italy's taking the rank which belongs to her among the nations of Europe, and which will satisfy at the same time the wishes of the Emperor Napoleon and the desires of the English nation."

Thus it was by an English journal that the public was apprised of the diplomatic situation of France. To give no explanation of so serious and delicate a question as the resignation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs except by means of an article from

the *Morning Post*, was by itself a peculiarity worthy of notice. The phrase about Italy might be considered an omen of all the concessions to be made in the peninsula by Napoleon III. to the policy of Italian unity.

CHAPTER III

THE LETTER TO THE MINISTER OF STATE

NAPOLEON III. loved dramatic strokes. It pleased him to surprise his ministers and take unexpected resolutions on his own initiative. He occupied the public mind with dissolving views, and was fond of bringing warlike ideas and peaceful ones successively on the scene. At the moment when the Congress was abandoned and a renewal of war was to be feared, he chose to reassure people by ignoring everything but the victories of commerce, industry, and agriculture. He was getting ready to insist upon the annexation of Nice and Savoy, and knew that he would rouse the suspicions and jealousies of Europe, and be represented as an ambitious sovereign eager for conquests. Hence he devoted himself to seeming absolutely peaceful. On the other hand, he was not unaware that the commercial treaty he was mysteriously preparing with England would call down upon him the keenest and most passionate criticism from French protectionists. Hence he determined to prepare the public mind for this treaty by himself developing ideas akin to those of free trade in a document intended for publication.

Such was the origin of the letter he addressed January 5 to M. Fould, Minister of State, and which the *Moniteur* published on the 15th.

As clear and comprehensible to the peasants as to the working classes, the letter of January 5 bore the impress of the Emperor's character and style. It revealed the philanthropic sovereign, the progressive man determined to prefer the moral and material betterment of the greatest number to all other political preoccupations. It reminded one of the humanitarian writings he had produced in the fortress of Ham to serve as the programme of a reign in which he was the only one to believe. Written the very day after the resignation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, it distracted public attention from the increasingly serious complications to which the Italian questions gave rise. It was a clever and timely diversion. The letter opened thus: —

"M. le Ministre: In spite of the uncertainty still hanging over various matters of foreign policy, a peaceful solution may be confidently expected. The time has therefore arrived in which we may consider the means by which a great impulse may be given to the different branches of our national wealth. With this end in view, I send you the bases of a programme several parts of which ought to receive the approbation of the Chambers, and upon which you will concert with your colleagues in order to prepare the measures best calculated to give a strong impulsion to agriculture, industry, and commerce."

The Emperor then entered into the doctrine of free trade. "For a long time," said he, "men have been proclaiming the truth that in order to render commerce flourishing it is necessary to multiply the means of exchange; that when there is no competition, industry remains stationary and keeps up the high prices which are a bar to the increase of consumption; that agriculture itself must remain in infancy without a prosperous trade which develops capital. Hence everything is linked together in the successive development of the elements of public prosperity."

The sovereign-reformer added: "We must improve our agriculture and enfranchise our trade from all those internal shackles which place it in a condition of inferiority. At present, it is not merely our great works which are hampered by a host of restrictive regulations, but the well-being of those who labor is far from reaching the development it has attained in a neighboring country. Hence there is nothing but a general system of good political economy which can make the working classes comfortable by creating national wealth."

To make agriculture share the benefits of institutions of credit; to clear the plains of trees and reforest the mountains; to appropriate a yearly sum to the great works of draining, irrigation, and clearing; to remove all taxes on the raw materials necessary to industry; to lend it, at a moderate rate, the capital intended to perfect its material; to create as

quickly as possible ways of communication, canals, roads, and railways; to lower the imposts on commodities in great demand: such were the great features of the Emperor's programme. "By these measures," said he, "agriculture will find a market for its products; industry, freed from internal fetters, aided by government, stimulated by foreign competition, will contend advantageously with foreign products, and our commerce, instead of languishing, will take a new departure."

How can these improvements be arrived at without disturbing financial equilibrium? The conclusion of peace has prevented the sum total of the loan contracted for the war of 1859 from being exhausted. A considerable sum remains to be disposed of, and this, united to other resources, amounts to about a hundred millions. By asking the Corps Législatif to authorize the use of this sum in great public works, and dividing it into three annuities, there would be about fifty millions a year to add to the considerable sums already voted in the budget.

The Emperor thinks of moral as well as of material interests. With the extraordinary resources not otherwise engaged, he wishes to build railways, canals, roads, and harbors without delay; but he also wishes to restore churches and cathedrals, and worthily to encourage science, letters, and the arts.

At the end of his letter, Napoleon III. thus sum-

marized his ideas : Suppression of the duties on wool and cottons ; successive reduction of those on sugars and coffees ; energetic and continued improvement of the means of communication ; reduction of the tolls on canals and consequently on the cost of transportation ; loans to agriculture and manufactures ; considerable works of public utility ; suppression of prohibitions ; commercial treaties with foreign powers.

It cannot be denied that the imperial letter had a grand look. It broke with routine and opened entirely new paths to national prosperity. The semi-official press received it with great enthusiasm, but malcontents were numerous. The Emperor had just given a hard blow to the privileges of the great manufacturers. In announcing the negotiation of commercial treaties, he had indicated his willingness to welcome foreign products to French markets on condition of a just reciprocity, and to substitute a rather liberal tariff for prohibition, in order to facilitate international exchanges. Ready to profit by all measures which might diminish their cost prices and increase their profits, the partisans of the prohibitive régime were not at all disposed to accept foreign competition. They would have liked to cut the imperial programme in two, and suppress the latter part, that which foreshadowed the speedy conclusion of commercial treaties with foreign powers.

As to the embellishment of Paris, the economic reforms were to meet still more energetic opposition.

If the Emperor had consulted the Chambers beforehand, he would have received no concurrence. His individual initiative was all that could succeed, and but for his indomitable will, routine would always and everywhere have hindered progress.

CHAPTER IV

GENERAL DE MONTAUBAN

AT the very moment when he was extolling peaceful ideas for Europe, Napoleon III. had decided for the Farthest East upon one of the most venturesome campaigns that was ever made. With his customary audacity and his passion for risky undertakings, he had organized a distant and marvellous expedition, better adapted than any other to impress men's imaginations. He had done so on joint and equal terms with England, as had been the case in the Crimea, and he hoped that this new brotherhood in arms would silence the hereditary jealousies of the English in regard to France. He thought the treaty of commerce and the Chinese expedition would diminish the irritations and suspicions sure to be awakened in London by the annexation of Nice and Savoy.

On the other hand, at a time when serious difficulties were arising between him and the Holy See, the Emperor liked to give a striking pledge of his solicitude for the cause of Christianity, and enjoyed defending the cross in China with the sword of France. The more dangerous an enterprise, the

more it charmed him. The more distant a country, the more it pleased him to deploy his eagles there.

The causes of conflict with China dated back for several years. At the beginning of 1855, a French missionary, M. Chapdelaine, had been tortured and put to death. In 1856, in the waters of Canton, a small vessel carrying the British flag had been captured by the Chinese authorities. France had been unwilling to leave England to avenge herself alone. In 1857, the fleets of the two nations bombarded Canton. In 1858, they forced the defences of the Pei-Ho, and sailed up the stream to Tien-Tsin, a city about thirty-five leagues from Pekin. The frightened Chinese concluded to come to terms. June 27, 1858, a treaty was signed which opened new ports to Europeans, proclaimed the free exercise of the Christian religion, stipulated for a war indemnity for the allies, and provided that the ratifications should be exchanged at Pekin. The following year, the ministers of France and England, MM. de Bourbulon and Bruce, left Shanghai with the intention of going to Pekin to exchange the ratifications of the treaty, as had been agreed upon. On reaching the mouth of the Pei-Ho, they found it blocked. The Chinese forts on either bank covered the gunboats of the two powers with their cross fires. Four hundred and thirty English and fifteen Frenchmen were disabled, and the two diplomats were obliged to return to Shanghai. This hap-

pened June 25, 1859, the very day after the battle of Solferino. The outrage could not go unpunished.

The cabinets of Paris and London concerted together the measures to be taken in order to wreak a signal vengeance on Chinese disloyalty, but did not come at once to an agreement concerning either the importance or the object of the new expedition. Napoleon III. desired the military operations to be pushed as far as possible, so as to leave a lasting impression on the Chinese mind. The Queen's government hesitated. The difficulties it would experience in sending an army corps so far, and the fear of having again to admit the superiority of French arms, as in the Crimea, deterred it from any decisive step. But the Emperor insisted, and after active negotiations, which occupied the months of September and October, his opinion finally prevailed. A naval demonstration was recognized as insufficient, and the Chinese war decided on. France promised a contingent of twelve thousand men, and England one of eighteen thousand, a portion of which was to be demanded from the army of India.

The first idea of Napoleon III. was to confer the command of the French forces on General Trochu, who, at Solferino, had shown himself both clear-sighted and cool at the critical moment when he led one of the brigades of his division to the assistance of the 4th corps. The Emperor had a somewhat unreasoning sympathy for the man who was to be

so fatal to his dynasty. Talking one day very confidentially with General Fleury, he summarized the merits and defects of the generals of the army of Italy, and coming to Trochu, said, "He is the strongest of them all." He offered him the chief command of the army of China, so as to furnish an occasion for giving him the marshal's baton. But General Trochu having declined the flattering offer, General Fleury suggested General de Montauban to the Emperor.

Born in 1796, this general retained at sixty-three all the vigor and activity of youth. He was a man of courage and intelligence, whose happy blending of firmness and kindliness gave him a great ascendency over his troops; moreover, he was a brilliant soldier, a skilful organizer, and had the qualities of a diplomatist. General Fleury says of him in his *Souvenirs:* "He was chief of the squadron of spahis of Oran when I, being then a mere volunteer, was sent to him by my friend, the Marquis du Hallay. He received me like a father, and spared me the annoyances of the first beginnings up to the day when Yusuf, coming to assume command of the regiment, took me for his secretary. A man never forgets the kindness which a commander has shown him during the hard trials of military apprenticeship."

The father of a large family, and without a fortune, the brave African officer had money difficulties which his rivals took advantage of to ruin his career. Arriving at the rank of colonel, the stars had been

several times refused him before the Revolution of 1848. But Fleury becoming powerful at the Elysée, and subsequently at the Tuileries, Montauban was made general of brigade in 1851, and general of division in 1855. After having commanded the province of Oran, he was at the head of the military division of Limoges when, to his great surprise, he was notified of his appointment as commander-in-chief of the army of China. Without the slightest hesitation, he accepted the perilous task before which many a younger man would have quailed.

At that time the French believed themselves invincible. Nothing could daunt the irresistible dash of their heroism. November 7, 1859, a circular from the Minister of War, addressed to the commanders of corps for the recruitment of the expedition, was answered by offers so numerous that the choice could be made from among the best officers and soldiers of the army. Thus was composed an admirable corps of eight thousand men, comprising two regiments of infantry of the line, a regiment of marine infantry, and a battalion of foot chasseurs. It is this little phalanx which is going to do wonders. General de Montauban addresses it in the following proclamation : " Your task is a great and glorious one to accomplish ; but success is assured by your devotion to the Emperor and to France. Returning to your own land some day, you will tell your fellow-citizens proudly that you carried the national flag to countries which imperial Rome, in

the time of her greatness, never dreamed of penetrating by her legions."

The expeditionary French corps embarked at Toulon in December, 1859, and sailed for China by the long route of the Cape of Good Hope. Anxious to precede his troops and make his own arrangements on Chinese soil, General de Montauban with his staff took the more rapid route by way of Egypt. January 12, 1860, he embarked at Marseilles on the *Panthère*, a packet boat of the Peninsular and Oriental Company. He had the official title of commander of the French forces by land and sea of the Chinese expedition. He was besides invested with all diplomatic powers. His instructions left him at liberty to direct the expedition as he thought best for the interests of France, but obliged him to advise with the representative of Queen Victoria and the commander-in-chief of the British forces. Later on, notwithstanding the engagements made with him, some of his powers were taken away and given to an ambassador and an admiral. But General de Montauban accepted without a murmur a decision contrary to the unity of action which would have been so desirable, and in spite of unusual obstacles, conducted successfully an enterprise which surpasses the fabulous exploits of Cortez and Pizarro.

CHAPTER V

THE COMMERCIAL TREATY WITH ENGLAND

JANUARY 23, 1860, eleven days after General de Montauban embarked at Marseilles for China, the treaty of commerce between France and England was signed at Paris by M. Baroche, President of the Council of State, in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pending the arrival of M. Thouvenel, and M. Rouher, Minister of Agriculture, Commerce, and Public Works, on the part of France ; on that of England by Lord Cowley, ambassador to her British Majesty at the court of the Emperor of the French, and Mr. Richard Cobden, member of the House of Commons.

No negotiations had ever been carried on more mysteriously. The enterprise against the protectionists was a real conspiracy, an economic *coup d'etat.* Napoleon III. made a rude break with the traditions of French commercial policy.

The protective system had been systematized by Colbert. The plan of Napoleon I. was not merely to close French ports, but those of the entire world, to English commerce. Under the Restoration, the most rigorous prohibition had been strictly main-

tained. Under the reign of Louis Philippe many great manufacturers and producers had seats either in the Chamber of Peers or that of Deputies, and they would never have permitted any encroachment upon their privileges.

The same doctrines and many of the same men were now to be found in the Corps Législatif, and at first the Emperor feared to wound the interests or provoke the opposition of influential personages whose coöperation had not been lacking to the reëstablishment of imperial institutions. While meditating in captivity at Ham, the future sovereign declared himself in favor of free trade. But on coming to power he had been forced to recoil before the stubborn resistance opposed to his projects of reform and his cosmopolitan ideas. A first attempt, made in 1856, had been fruitless. During the session of the Congress of Paris, the Emperor had said to Lord Clarendon, one of the plenipotentiaries: "I know that you are an ardent free trader. Well! I am happy to say that my Council of State is completing the details of a scheme which will correspond to your tendencies." A bill had, in fact, been sent to the Corps Législatif, July 9, 1856, whose object was to cancel all prohibitions. But the sovereign-reformer had counted too securely on the docility of the Chamber. The bill was received so badly that it was withdrawn, with the promise inserted in the *Moniteur* that it would not be presented again before 1861. Napoleon III. was the embodiment of

perseverance and patience. He never clung more tenaciously to his ideas than at the moment when he seemed to have renounced them.

The chief exponent in France of the doctrine of free trade was M. Michel Chevalier, a former disciple of Saint-Simon, professor of political economy at the College of France in 1840, but now an imperialist, a regular contributor to the *Journal des Débats*, president of the Council General of Hérault, — a vine-growing department, — and a free trader. In England, Richard Cobden occupied a like prominence. These men met in 1859 at Bradford, where the economists of the Manchester school were holding a congress. Mr. Cobden afterward came to Paris, where he had some important interviews with the Emperor, and told him about the statue erected to Robert Peel, with the inscription, "He improved the condition of the laboring and suffering classes by lowering the prices of provisions of prime necessity." To recall such a memory was to touch a sensitive chord in Napoleon III. "Of all rewards," cried the humanitarian monarch, "that is the one I would covet most."

To break the trammels of routine, attack monopolies, appear as the defender of the workmen, the peasants, the indigent classes; to subordinate the interests of the chiefs of financial, commercial, and industrial feudalism to those of the greater number; was a plan conformable to the democratic sentiments of a sovereign more loyal to the people than many

of the republicans, and above all things a philanthropist. Mr. Cobden had no difficulty in convincing him. The cause pleaded by the free trader was gained in advance. The Emperor took an inflexible resolution to make it succeed without delay, in spite of all opposition and of every obstacle. England being the foremost of the industrial powers, a treaty with her would be the type of future ones to be concluded with other states, and free trade would triumph.

Napoleon III. was convinced that no vast reform could be accomplished by assemblies, and that everything great which had been done during his reign had been the result of his initiative and personal will. While the protectionists, resting securely on the promises made them in 1856, were persuaded that no change would be made without consulting them, the Emperor bore in mind that the Constitution recognized in him the right to conclude commercial treaties without concerning himself beforehand about the assent of the Chambers. A senatorial decree dated December 25, 1852, accorded him this prerogative. He thought the time had come to make use of it. He conspired at the Tuileries for commercial liberty with Mr. Cobden, as he had conspired at Plombières with Cavour for Italian independence. Throughout his career one finds the same system of mysterious preparations leading up to daring strokes. The expeditions of Strasburg and Boulogne, the 2d of December,

the war of Italy, the commercial treaty with England, proceed from the same tactics. The motto of Napoleon III. seemed to be: "Take the whole world by surprise."

The treaty of January 23, 1860, which settled for ten years the state of the commercial relations between France and England, was a real revolution in economic matters. The system adopted was that of moderate tariffs on articles formerly prohibited, as well as on all others. Threads, textile fabrics, iron, steel, machines, foreign tools, were introduced into France subject to a tax which could not in any case exceed thirty per cent of their value. These tariffs were to be enforced at different dates, the most remote of which, that on threads and fabrics, was to come into action October 1, 1861. The tax on oils, 3 fr. 60 per tun, was to be suppressed after a brief delay. The French market for the first time opened wide its doors to British products. In return, France obtained a complete exemption from duties on all articles of fancy or fashion, as well as on silks, and a reduction of the duties on wines and spirits. The treaty was definitive for France. For England it had to be submitted to the ratification of Parliament.

Signed January 23, the treaty was kept secret for some days longer. The public was not apprised of it until February 10. In the seaport towns and the vine-growing departments it was well received, but it raised a tumult in the manufacturing

and industrial centres. The producers of oil, iron, threads, and textile stuffs were extremely displeased at the disappearance of a custom-house régime which gave them good profits in the present, and assured them, as they believed, full security for the future. Their surprise and disappointment were as great as their dissatisfaction. They were obliged to admit that the Emperor had acted strictly within his rights. But all the same, was not this an abuse of personal power, a mark of distrust, a piece of bravado where the Chambers were concerned? Did the most faithful of the Emperor's adherents deserve to be the victims of such a proceeding? Why had the negotiations been kept secret? Why had not even the most competent men been consulted? Why had the most difficult and most serious questions been irrevocably settled in a single day, by one stroke of the pen? All sorts of complaints poured in from Rouen and from Lille, from Tourcoing and Roubaix. The iron-masters and the heads of textile industries who occupied seats in the Corps Législatif made themselves especially noticeable by their murmurs.

No opposition is more bitter and impassioned than that based on money interests. Notwithstanding all his power, Napoleon III. could not terminate the violent struggle which began between the protectionists and the free-trade party. It was to continue throughout his entire reign. It continues still. Free trade may possibly end by triumphing

in the world. But at present it is under a cloud. Neither camp has laid down its arms. Each maintains its position. The question is not yet settled. *Adhuc sub judice lis est.*

CHAPTER VI

THE RELIGIOUS AGITATION

THE imperial government had to contend at the same time with two oppositions,—one based on material and the other on religious interests. Sir Charles Greville wrote in his Journal, January 22, 1860, "The Emperor must have extraordinary confidence in his personal prestige to defy both the clerical and the protectionist parties at the same time; it will be interesting to see whether events will justify this audacity."

But for Italy, the most complete harmony would always have existed between the sovereign and the clergy. The only stumbling-block was the Roman question. Napoleon III. recognized that if the Church owed much to him, he owed much to the Church. He had found in her the most loyal and efficient support ever since his election to the presidency of the Republic, and afterward to the Empire. The parish priests had voted for him at the head of their flocks. His good will toward the clergy had contributed more than anything else to secure him the coöperation of the conservative masses. It had earned him the approbation of the Catholics of the

entire world. The loss of such a situation was by no means an insignificant one. The Emperor was perfectly aware of this, and it chagrined him to see the progress of the religious agitation which since the publication of the pamphlet, *The Pope and the Congress*, had been increasing daily.

This movement was from the first directed by the most impetuous, most irascible, most eloquent of the French prelates, Monseigneur Dupanloup, Bishop of Orléans and member of the French Academy. The Abbé Lagrange has described the state of irritation into which the opuscule threw the celebrated bishop. He received it on Christmas Eve, just as he was about going into his chapel to hear confessions, and he was heard to exclaim, "This is frightful, but there is a way of killing it on the spot." That evening he said to the clergymen around him, "Gentlemen, this pamphlet is hell," and he spent the whole night in preparing an indignant refutation. "Do you suppose," he wrote in conclusion, "that French blood has ceased to flow in our veins, that our hearts no longer beat in our bosoms? Beware of that; you will end by offending us: I do not know whether we need to be awakened, but you are succeeding wonderfully in opening our eyes. . . . This morning, the holy day of the birth of the Saviour of the world in a stable, I listened to the fresh, innocent voices repeating in my cathedral, *Gloria in excelsis Deo!* and I said to myself with joy, That will always be chanted upon earth. But at these words,

Et in terra pax hominibus bonæ voluntatis, I said with sorrow, Men do not have peace because they are not men of good will. May it please heaven to give them at last that sincere good will and courage which they need in order to accomplish the work of God and their own destiny!"

A few days later, Monseigneur Pie, Bishop of Poitiers, read from the pulpit of his cathedral a long refutation of the brochure. All the episcopal charges condemned it. The Pope himself spoke. His encyclical of January 19 exhorted the pastors and the faithful of the entire world to coöperate by every effort of their zeal in defending the rights of the Holy See over the Legations. The order from Rome was respectfully obeyed by all Catholics. All previous differences between the defenders of the Church were obliterated. Ultramontanes and Gallicans, absolutists and liberal Catholics, the secular clergy and the regulars, priests and people, vied with each other in their zeal.

In Paris, the *Correspondant* published four articles on the Roman Question: one by M. Cochin, another by Prince Albert de Broglie, the third by M. de Courcelle, former ambassador of France near the Holy See, the fourth by Comte de Falloux, principal author of the law on freedom of education. These four articles, which treated the question in all its aspects, produced a real sensation. In the persons of M. Cochin and Prince Albert de Broglie, the *Correspondant* was given a second official

warning. For a periodical publication, the third warning meant suppression. These warnings went on multiplying, striking the most important journals as well as the simplest of provincial sheets. Three members of the Corps Législatif, MM. de Cuverville, Keller, and Anatole Lemercier, had requested an audience with the Emperor to plead the pontifical cause. The audience having been refused, they summed up their grievances in a collective letter which was published by a journal of Saint-Brieuc, the *Bretagne*. This journal was suppressed.

M. Louis Veuillot's ardently clerical paper, the *Univers*, formerly enthusiastic in its admiration of the Emperor and his government, brusquely changed its attitude. The journal which had so noisily applauded the reëstablishment of the Empire, and which in 1858 had waxed poetic in its account of the pious journey accomplished in Catholic Brittany by the Emperor and Empress, took violently the part of Pius IX. against Napoleon III., and was suppressed January 30.

The French Academy, formerly Voltairian, came out energetically for the Vatican. M. Villemain, who once had a craze for seeing Jesuits everywhere, now published a brochure entitled, *France, the Empire and the Papacy*, in which he defended "in the person of the Pope violated public law." The most celebrated of Protestants, M. Guizot, thoroughly approved the attitude of the Sovereign Pontiff, and thus found himself in perfect agreement with M. Thiers.

Even Père Lacordaire, who in 1859 had declared himself in favor of the war of Italy, adhered energetically to Pius IX. against Victor Emmanuel.

On February 2, the French Academy was to have an election to replace M. de Tocqueville. Monseigneur Dupanloup said to several of his Academicians, "I have never in my life agreed with Père Lacordaire intellectually; but I do not know a nobler heart, nor a man better fitted to do honor to the Academy." The illustrious Dominican was elected by a vote thirty-five to twenty-one (M. Camille Doucet got three votes and M. Henri Martin one). Directly after the election, in which he had taken a great part, the chief of the spiritualistic philosophers, M. Cousin, met Monseigneur Dupanloup on the staircase of the Institute, and spoke to him concerning the rights of the Pope with his customary eloquence. "Would you be willing to write down what you have just said, and authorize me to publish it?" asked the bishop. "Very willing," replied the philosopher, and the next day the prelate received the conversation in M. Cousin's own handwriting. He inserted it in his volume on *The Pontifical Sovereignty*, which he was then composing. Here it is: —

"Materialistic and atheistic philosophy may be indifferent to — it ought even to applaud — the diminution and degradation of the Papacy, for it has no need of the Papacy in order to teach men that the soul results from the body, and that the world is the only God. But spiritualistic philosophy

regards very differently what is going on. If it is not blinded by the most stupid pride, it must know that outside of the schools, in mankind at large, spiritualism is represented by Christianity, that Christianity is excellently represented by the Catholic Church, and that the Holy Father thus becomes the representative of the whole moral and intellectual order."

Lastly, the Catholic liberal by excellence, the friend of nationalities, the new Academician, Père Lacordaire, published the brochure, *Concerning the Liberty of the Church and of Italy*, in which he said: "Italians, your cause is fine, but you do not know how to honor it, and you serve it worse still. What have you done? For an empty system of absolute unity which does not in the least concern either your nationality or your liberty, you have raised between you and two hundred millions of Catholics a barrier which increases daily. You have arrayed against your legitimate hopes something more than men, Christianity itself; that is to say, the greatest of the works of God upon earth. Make no mistake about it; it is God who has made Rome for His Church. Therefore you have arrayed against you an eternal decree of God. Doubtless you will find it out some day."

The imperial government sent out circulars, one of them addressed to the diplomatic agents by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, another to the prefects by the Minister of the Interior, and a third to the

archbishops and bishops by the Minister of Worship. The first of these, dated February 8, attempted to prove that the existence and character of the Holy See were not affected by a simple modification of territory. The second (February 15) ordered prefects to prevent the distribution of non-authorized pamphlets, and to exercise special watchfulness over discourses from the pulpit. The third (February 17) laid stress on the services which the Emperor had rendered to religion as well as to the Holy See, and advised the episcopate to calm the agitation. These circulars were powerless to arrest the movement. The Catholic world abided by the Pope's Encyclical.

The religious agitation, very keen among the clergy and the governing classes, did not extend to the streets, the shops, or the factories. It was none the less redoubtable on that account. Preluding the political opposition, it brought into renewed prominence old parliamentarians tired of silence and repose; it recalled the brilliant struggles of the July monarchy; it revived the love of discussion; it made the persecuted Papacy the rival of the triumphant Empire.

So long as imperial France lived in harmony with the Church, the Comte de Chambord had spoken of Napoleon III. with a certain sympathy. From the moment when the Pope and the Emperor became embroiled, all the legitimist passions, drowsing for many years, waked up again. All the adversaries of

the Empire, whoever they might be, saw at once the advantage to be gained from such a state of things. Nothing is more dangerous for a government than to find itself between two fires—an opposition of the right and an opposition of the left. This was the fate reserved for the Empire. Up to its very end the reign was exposed to a coalition of clericals and republicans.

The old parties took courage. It pleased them to discover that the Chambers were more intractable, the imperial edifice less indestructible, the number of malcontents increasing, and the accord between the throne and the altar less durable than it had seemed.

What aggravated the situation was that even the members of the government, the senators, deputies, diplomatists, were nearly all partisans of the Pope and decriers of the Italian policy.

CHAPTER VII

THE DEATH OF THE GRAND DUCHESS STÉPHANIE

THE difficulties of external and internal policy did not interfere with the social whirl. Paris was for a time as brilliant and animated as in previous winters. But at the end of January the festivities of the court and official society were interrupted for several days by a death which greatly pained the Emperor, that of his near relative, the Grand Duchess Stéphanie of Baden. Few careers have been so curious as that of this princess. During her infancy no one could have foreseen the brilliant destiny which awaited her.

The Marquis de Beauharnais, father of Josephine's first husband, had a brother, the Comte Claude, who was an admiral, and who married Mademoiselle Fanny Mouchard, a writer, concerning whom the poet Lebrun made this malicious epigram : —

> Two little freaks of Aglæ, belle and poet, Fame rehearses;
> She makes her face, indeed, but then she does not make her verses.

Comte Claude and Comtesse Fanny had a son named Claude like his father, who married the

daughter of the Comte de Lezay-Marnésia. From this union was born at Paris, August 28, 1779, Stéphanie de Beauharnais, the future Grand Duchess of Baden. Her father, on becoming a widower, had confided her to his aunt, an aged religious residing at Montauban, and she was living there very modestly, in complete obscurity, when her uncle, M. de Lezay-Marnésia, conceived the notion of taking her to Paris and presenting her to the wife of the First Consul. She pleased Josephine, who sent her to complete her education at Madame Campan's fashionable boarding-school at Saint-Germain. When she left school her grace, wit, and beauty made a sensation at the court of the Tuileries. Napoleon took such a fancy to her that, to the surprise of everybody, he adopted her as his daughter, March 3, 1806. She became an Imperial Highness and took precedence of the Emperor's own sisters, her father, meanwhile, the Comte Claude de Beauharnais, who died in 1819 a peer of France, remaining undistinguished among other members of the Senate.

A month later, April 8, 1806, the adopted daughter of Napoleon was married in the chapel of the Tuileries to Charles Louis Frederic, Hereditary Prince of Baden. Nothing could have proved more amply than such a marriage the fascination exerted by the victor of Austerlitz over Germany. A prince belonging to one of the oldest and most illustrious families in the world, a prince who was brother-in-law of the Emperor of Russia, the King of Sweden,

and the King of Bavaria, and who might have contracted an alliance with the oldest of reigning families, had come to the point of congratulating himself on marrying the daughter of a private individual, a French senator, a person linked to Napoleon only by adoption, that is to say, by a whim !

The prince ascended the throne of Baden in 1811. No sooner had Napoleon fallen than instant measures were taken to induce the grand duke to separate from a wife whose origin had become suspect. But he refused to put away a companion for whom he had both respect and affection. When he died, December 8, 1818, his widow, who was not yet thirty, was unwilling to leave the grand duchy, and took up her residence in the castle of Manheim, leaving it in the summer to go either to Baden or Umkirch, an estate she had bought near Fribourg. She had lost two sons in infancy, but there remained three daughters whom she brought up with the utmost care. Well educated and intelligent, she assembled around her a little court of artists, men of letters, and scientists.

The Grand Duchess Stéphanie remained French in her memories and attachments. Equally linked to her two countries, France and Germany, she did all that lay in her power to avert a collision between two great races which, instead of contending with each other on battlefields, ought to know no other strifes but those of progress and civilization. Napoleon III., who wanted to live in peace with

Germany, where he had spent a part of his youth, and whose language, literature, and customs he knew so well, felt indebted to the princess for the salutary influence she exerted in Baden, and retained a profound affection for her. Always grateful, he remembered that she had not waited until he was Emperor to show an interest in him. She had encouraged and consoled him when he was proscribed and unhappy. To receive her at the Tuileries was one of the great joys of the former exile when he became a powerful sovereign.

Finding herself in great suffering at the close of 1859, the grand duchess left the cold weather of Baden behind her, hoping to improve her health at Nice. Death was awaiting her there. Supported amidst her pains by an indomitable strength and energy of soul, she retained until the end that intellectual activity, that marvellous memory, that charm and exquisite gayety which had endeared her to all by whom she was surrounded.

The Grand Duchess Stéphanie had had three daughters. The eldest, Princess Louise, died before her mother, leaving by her marriage with Prince Gustavus Vasa a daughter who was at one time thought of as a wife for Napoleon III., and who, having married the Prince Royal of Saxony in 1853, is now reigning at Dresden. The second, Princess Josephine, married in 1854 Prince Antony of Hohenzollern, and had several sons, one of whom is now King of Roumania, while another, Prince Leopold, a

candidate for the Spanish throne in 1870, was the indirect cause of the Franco-German War. The third daughter, Princess Marie, married in 1848 a great Scotch lord, the Duke of Hamilton.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SPEECH FROM THE THRONE

UNDER the Second Empire things changed, incessantly, from gay to grave. The brilliant fêtes of the carnival, unusually dazzling this year, were succeeded by the opening of the parliamentary session. This took place, March 1, at the Louvre, in the Hall of States, which opens into the great picture gallery and is near the *Salon Carré*.

The speeches from the throne were always an event, Napoleon III. writing them himself and correcting the proofs with the utmost care. Pleasing his self-love as a sovereign and a writer in their composition, he delivered them afterward in a sonorous voice. As formal manifestations of the imperial mind, they were in striking contrast with the commonplaces of other sovereigns on similar occasions. They nearly always expressed great ideas in an imposing and really masterly style. Napoleon III. was a crowned publicist, whose language could be equally well understood by the lettered classes and the masses. Published at once after delivery, his speeches were quickly transmitted by telegraph to all countries. Probably no documents ever attained a similar publicity.

Their author undoubtedly took a secret satisfaction in the great place which France and he occupied in the world.

In 1860, the speech from the throne was still more widely read and commented on than usual. It was like an oracle whose meaning everybody was seeking to divine.

"In Europe," said the Emperor," the difficulties are, I hope, nearly at an end, and Italy is on the point of setting up boldly for herself. The predominant idea of the treaty of Villafranca was to obtain the almost complete independence of Venetia at the price of the restoration of the archdukes. This arrangement having failed, in spite of most urgent entreaties on my part, I have expressed my regrets for it to Vienna as well as Turin. . . . As I guaranteed Italy from foreign intervention by my army, I had the right to fix the limits of this guaranty, and therefore I have not hesitated to inform the King of Sardinia that although I would leave him perfect freedom of action, I could not follow him in a policy prejudiced in the eyes of Europe by its apparent tendency to absorb all the Italian States, and threatened by new complications. I have advised him to respond favorably to those provinces which offer themselves to him, but to maintain the autonomy of Tuscany and respect in principle the rights of the Holy See. Although this arrangement does not satisfy everybody, yet it has the advantage of reserving principles and

calming apprehensions, while it makes Piedmont a kingdom of more than nine millions of souls."

The sovereign next foreshadowed the proximate annexation of Nice and Savoy. "In view of this transformation of northern Italy, which gives to a powerful State all the passages of the Alps, it was my duty, for the safety of our frontiers, to claim the French slopes of the mountains. There is nothing in this demand for a very limited territory which should alarm Europe or seem to contradict that policy of disinterestedness which I have more than once proclaimed; because France does not wish to make this acquisition, insignificant though it be, either by military occupation, instigated insurrection, or underhand manœuvres, but by frankly stating the question to the great powers."

On the subject of the religious agitation Napoleon III. expressed himself as follows: "I cannot pass over in silence the emotion of a portion of the Catholic world; it has suddenly yielded to such inconsiderate impressions; it has plunged into such passionate alarms; the past, which should be a guaranty of the future, has been so disregarded, the services rendered so forgotten, that only a very profound conviction, a most absolute confidence in public judgment, could have enabled me, amidst the agitations wilfully excited, to maintain the calmness which alone establishes us in what is true. The facts, however, speak loudly for themselves. For the last eleven years I alone have maintained in Rome the

power of the Holy Father, without ceasing for a day to revere in him the sacred character of the chief of our religion.

"On the other hand, the populations of the Romagna, suddenly left to themselves, followed a natural impulse and sought to make common cause with us in the war. Ought I to forget them in peace, and deliver them anew, for an unlimited period, to the chances of a foreign occupation? My first attempt was to reconcile them with their sovereign, and being unsuccessful in that, I have at least tried to safeguard the principle of the Pope's temporal power in the revolted provinces."

The Emperor declared the time had come "to put an end to over-long preoccupations and seek for means of inaugurating boldly in France a new era of peace." He stated that the army had been diminished by 150,000 men, and that this reduction would have been greater still but for the war in China and the occupation of Rome and Lombardy. He resolutely assumed responsibility for the commercial treaty with England, and ended his speech with this truly eloquent conclusion: "The protection of Providence, so visible during the war, will not be lacking to a peaceful enterprise whose object is the amelioration of the condition of the more numerous classes. Let us then steadily continue our progressive march, delayed neither by the murmurs of selfishness, the clamoring of parties, nor unjust suspicions. France threatens no one; she wishes to develop in peace

the immense resources bestowed on her by Heaven, and she ought not to rouse jealous susceptibilities, since at our present state of civilization a truth which consoles and reassures humanity becomes every day more dazzlingly evident: namely, that the more prosperous a country becomes, the more it contributes to the riches and prosperity of all others."

Hearty applause greeted this humanitarian and civilizing peroration. Napoleon III. had addressed himself, not to France alone, but to all the world.

The session promised from the first to be particularly interesting. Debate, discussion, so long out of date, seemed to be rising anew from the ashes. People began to wonder whether the sovereign, frightened by the extent of his responsibility, would not like to devolve some of it upon the Senate and the Corps Législatif. The questions at stake were so grave; they raised so many formidable problems from both the religious and the political point of view; they involved moral and material interests of such importance, that they could not be broached in the Chambers without producing an effect on the public at large.

The Comte de Morny, president of the Corps Législatif, a former royalist deputy and disciple of M. Guizot, asked nothing better than a return to the liberal usages of the period when he obtained his political education and his first success. Many senators and members of the Corps Législatif had belonged either to the Chamber of Peers or the Chamber of Deputies under Louis Philippe, and

their language and tendencies showed that they had not forgotten the July monarchy. Up to the *coup d'Etat* of the 2d of December, they had lived under a liberal régime, and were now visibly reverting to their old traditions.

In the Corps Législatif there were some real orators whose speeches did not fail of an echo, not merely in the assembly but outside of it, in spite of the trammels created by the Constitution of 1852. The tribune was suppressed; but the orators went on speaking from their own benches. The speeches, instead of being reproduced at length, were mentioned only in brief summaries; the ministers did not make their appearance in the Chambers, and so the debates could not occasion a ministerial crisis, yet the outlay of eloquence was by no means wasted. The government was always sure of an immense majority, but the discussions on the two burning topics — the Roman question and the commercial treaty with England — were getting to be keen and passionate. Although disfigured by condensation, the reports of the sessions were bound to take an unforeseen development. The field of debate, once so narrowly and strictly circumscribed, showed a tendency to expand. On certain days the Corps Législatif was all the fashion and made itself talked about. Far-seeing people already predicted that soon or late there would be a revival of *parlementarisme*, and that the Constitution of 1852, once so highly vaunted, was not going to last forever.

CHAPTER IX

MONSIEUR THOUVENEL

EXTERNAL policy occupied the public mind much less in 1860 than that of the interior. When the session opened, general attention was turned upon the negotiations concerning the annexation of Nice and Savoy. They were conducted with unusual skill by the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Thouvenel, who occupies a great place in the history of the Second Empire.

M. Thouvenel was born at Verdun, November 11, 1818. He belonged to an old and honorable family of Lorraine. His father, a brave artillery officer, attracted the attention of Napoleon I. by his way of commanding a battery at the battle of Friedland and was granted an endowment. He defended Luxemburg against the allies in 1814 and Verdun in 1815. Remaining a Bonapartist under the Restoration, he lived in retirement until the revolution of 1830, when he again resumed service in the army, became a major-general, and was about to be appointed lieutenant-general when he died in 1843.

The son of General Thouvenel was educated in Lorraine. From early childhood he showed a real

vocation for historic and diplomatic questions. Immediately after leaving college, he made a journey in the Orient and brought back with him the material for a book which appeared as a series of articles in the *Revue des Deux-Mondes* before its publication as a volume entitled *Hungary and Wallachia*. General Baron Athalin, aide-de-camp of King Louis Philippe, was a friend of the Thouvenel family. He called the attention of M. Guizot to the young writer, and obtained his admission to the political department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

M. Thouvenel had an exceptional aptitude for the diplomatic style. He was a first-class editor. M. Desages, director of political affairs, instantly recognized his worth, and charged him with two missions, one to the Comte de Bresser, ambassador at Madrid, the other to the Comte de Saint-Aulaire, ambassador at London. Both ambassadors appreciated him and became his protectors. Made an attaché of the embassy of France at Brussels, he was noticed by King Leopold, who from that time honored him with a special friendship.

Sent to Athens toward the end of 1845, as an attaché of legation, M. Thouvenel won all his promotions there, that of minister plenipotentiary included. He was appointed secretary of legation in 1846, and his chief, M. Piscatory, having been called to the embassy of Spain, he found himself chargé d'affaires when the revolution of 1848 broke out. Recalled in the first instance, he was finally main-

tained at his post by M. de Lamartine, and there obtained, among other successes, the consolidation of the French school. Prince Louis Napoleon appointed him minister at Athens, March 5, 1849.

The post of Greece was at that time a post of combat. France, England, and Russia, each of which had a party in the kingdom, were at sword's point with each other. In 1850, the British government, under pretext of supporting the claim of a Portuguese Israelite protected by England, sent fourteen ships of war to the Piræus and menaced King Otho's throne. This prince always maintained that M. Thouvenel had saved him, and both he and Queen Amélie showed him persistent gratitude.

November 16, 1850, M. Thouvenel exchanged the post of Athens for that of Munich, where King Maximilian I., brother of King Otho, gave him a most cordial reception. In February, 1852, he was made chief of the political department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

No director ever displayed greater activity. M. Thouvenel did not content himself with a personal revision of despatches, acts, and circulars, but found time to write private letters with his own hand to the heads of delegations; and these, in spite of the feverish haste of their author, are perhaps even more remarkable and interesting than the official correspondence. Fortunately, his son has published them, and they will remain historic documents of great value.

The growing reputation of M. Thouvenel possibly gave umbrage to his chief, M. Drouyn de Lhuys. In 1855, the minister, then fifty years old, was amazed on finding the head of the political department, who was only thirty-seven, already possessed of real influence with the sovereign. When M. Drouyn de Lhuys was sent to the Vienna Conference, the Emperor required that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be confided to M. Thouvenel during the interim. As the latter received none but incomplete reports from Vienna, he was greatly offended, and on April 23, 1855, addressed the following letter to the Emperor : —

"Sire, I ask your Majesty's pardon for making, under circumstances so grave, an appeal to his kindness concerning a matter which touches me personally. So long as the proceedings of M. Drouyn de Lhuys affected merely my self-love, I met them with courage, and, I venture to say, with a little pride. I cannot profit to the same degree by those which compromise the service of the Emperor. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in leaving me intentionally, and with an offensive affectation of suspecting my character, in complete ignorance of what takes place in Vienna, has put me in a position which my duties toward your Majesty and my own self-respect forbid me to accept. I come then to ask your Majesty as a favor to sign the decree which will put me on the retired list of my grade. I retain the hope of being able, some day, to serve the Emperor once more with

unreserved devotion, as I have done up to the present time." This letter was found, after the revolution of September 4, in the bureau of Napoleon III. at the Tuileries, and was transmitted by the Comte de Kératry, then prefect of police, to the son of the illustrious diplomat.

The Emperor replied to this letter of resignation by appointing its author ambassador at Constantinople. Never was an embassy more brilliant or better fulfilled than his. This was the zenith of French influence in the East. After the taking of Sebastopol, the ascendency of Napoleon III. in Turkey was incomparable. No sultan had ever accepted a foreign decoration. Derogating from this rule for the first time, Abdul-Medjid gratefully received the broad ribbon of the Legion of Honor. A still more surprising thing, never seen before nor since, the Sultan was present at a ball given at the French embassy. This memorable ball — M. Georges Cain has just been commissioned by the State to commemorate it in a painting which is to hang in the grand salon of the embassy — took place February 4, 1856. In a costume glittering with precious stones, and wearing the broad ribbon of the Legion of Honor, the Sultan ascended the steps of M. Thouvenel's residence between two lines of French cavalry.

For nearly five years the ambassador went from one success to another. His influence was absolutely preponderant. The most impetuous of Eng-

lish ambassadors, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, tried in vain to thwart him, and losing the game, left his post in 1858. M. Thouvenel brought to a happy finish every negotiation that he undertook. All questions raised by the treaty of Paris, and notably the organization of the Danubian principalities, received a solution in conformity with French interests. In 1856, the Sultan gave to France the church of St. Anne, founded at Jerusalem by a Lusignan, on the site of the house in which the Blessed Virgin was born. The negotiations relating to the opening of the Isthmus of Suez succeeded. The Christians of the East were everywhere protected in the most effectual manner, and they gratefully acknowledged that France was truly the great nation. In order to show his gratitude toward his fortunate ambassador, Napoleon III. made him a senator in 1859.

The appointment of M. Thouvenel as Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the beginning of 1860, was very favorably received by public opinion. The new minister was highly appreciated, not merely by imperialists, but even by Orleanists, who remembered his brilliant beginnings in the closing years of the July monarchy. He had a sister who, in 1841, had married M. Cuvillier-Fleury, formerly preceptor, private secretary, and intimate friend of the Duc d'Aumale, and also a French Academician. M. Thouvenel was very fond of his brother-in-law, and kept up an active correspondence with him. He

had relations also with the most influential literary men, and the Parisian press. Convinced of the importance of newspapers from the standpoint of foreign policy, he knew how to guide them aright and supply them with useful information; the *Revue des Deux-Mondes* was more than once inspired by him.

I was attached to the political department during the three years of M. Thouvenel's ministry. He encouraged my early attempts, and gave me my first promotion. I never utter his name without gratitude. He has left in me the souvenir of a great minister and a great citizen, a finished writer, zealous for the glory and greatness of France, bringing a limitless zeal, intelligence, and activity to the exercise of his professional duties; reflecting, writing, working day and night to the extent of his strength and the ruin of his health; a sort of diplomatic Benedictine, taking no relaxations, and finding a bitter pleasure in accomplishing the most laborious tasks and broaching the most difficult of political problems; at once a student and a man of action, fond of fighting, going to meet his responsibilities, and combating his adversaries with loyal courtesy, yet with inflexible animosity. In him the private man was as worthy of respect as the public man. In 1849 he had married a very distinguished woman, Mademoiselle Marie Saget, sister of the general of that name. The idea of increasing his modest fortune never occurred to him. His disinterestedness was equalled by his merit. His manners and speech

were as simple as they were courteous and kind. In the noble sense of that epithet he was ambitious, but it was for his country far more than for himself. M. Thouvenel is one of the men who have most dignified the reign of Napoleon III.

CHAPTER X

THE QUESTION OF ITALY

THE Italian question had just entered upon a new phase when M. Thouvenel took possession of the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. There was no further talk of Congress or Confederation. Napoleon III. was chiefly occupied in considering how to free himself honorably, and without offending Austria, from the trammels of Villafranca and Zurich. In this respect he found facilities in the attitude of England. That power had just formulated the following propositions: —

1. France and Austria will give up any further interference in the internal affairs of Italy, unless requested to intervene by the unanimous assent of the great powers.

2. The French government will come to an understanding with the Holy Father for evacuating the Roman States when the organization of the pontifical army permits, and when the French troops can be withdrawn from Rome without endangering order. The French army will likewise quit the north of Italy within a suitable time.

3. The internal organization of Venetia will be kept apart from the negotiations between the powers.

4. The King of Sardinia will be requested by England and France, acting in concert, to send no troops into central Italy until its various States and provinces, by a new vote of their assemblies, after a new election, have formally expressed their wishes: if these assemblies decide in favor of annexation, France and Great Britain will no longer oppose the entry of the Sardinian troops.

After an exchange of communications with the different courts, France, modifying in a spirit of conciliation the British propositions, substituted for them, toward the end of February, the three that follow : —

1. Complete annexation of the duchies of Parma and Modena to Sardinia.

2. Temporal administration of the Romagna under the form of a vicariate exercised by the King of Sardinia in the name of the Holy See.

3. Reëstablishment of the grand duchy of Tuscany in its political and territorial autonomy.

At this period M. Thouvenel was not in favor of Italian unity. In the Roman question he desired, as he said, *faire la part du feu*, that is, to abandon the Romagna to Piedmont and reserve the remainder of his States to the Pope. In order to claim jurisdiction over Nice and Savoy, he was willing to see the annexations in central Italy carried out, but he hoped the Emperor would prevent the Piedmontese from seizing the Two Sicilies.

In a private letter addressed, March 18, to the

Duc de Gramont, ambassador of France at Rome, the minister wrote as follows concerning the Pope and the King of Naples: "Italian unity displeases us as much as it does them, and, fire allowed for, God knows how long in the north of the peninsula, we would be very sincerely desirous to keep the conflagration from reaching the south. We are the only ones that have the desire and power to do so, but on condition, however, that we are assisted, and that it shall not be forgotten that human policy consists merely in the art of compromises. To introduce the inflexibility of dogmas into it is to plunge into the abyss. Doubtless the Church will not perish, but the method they are pursuing at Rome will deprive them of the temporal power."

The policy of compromises failed utterly. Pius IX. considered the idea of a vicariate of the King of Sardinia in the Romagna as mere mockery, and indignantly rejected it. At the same time, the Cabinet of Turin declared it would accept no solution in Tuscany but that of annexation pure and simple.

As for Austria, it continued to maintain the rights of the dispossessed princes in Italy, but no longer dreamed of employing force to restore them. In reality, it did not care to enter into a confederation whose principal part would be played by the King of Sardinia; what did concern it was to preserve the quadrilateral and entire sovereignty in Venetia. Its language with reference to Napoleon III. remained friendly. Its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count

Rechberg, wrote, on February 17, to Prince Metternich, ambassador of Francis Joseph at Paris: "We join in the hope of which M. Thouvenel has made himself the eloquent interpreter by proving that if differences of opinion may and sometimes must lead to different conclusions, it is not necessary that, when honor is safeguarded on either side, there should result from them disastrous conflicts, remote alike from the intentions of France and Austria."

From the moment it ceased to be afraid of intervention, the Piedmontese government naturally went straight to its object. Count Cavour, who had returned to power in January, felt himself master of the situation. He had just sent as chargé d'affaires to Paris a young man, still unknown, but full of tact and cleverness, M. Nigra, his disciple and *alter ego*. At the same time he had intrusted a confidential mission near the Emperor to an old friend of the sovereign, M. Arese, that great Milanese noble who rendered the Italian cause more services than the professional diplomats, and who had an extraordinary influence over Napoleon III.

The annexations of central Italy were evidently to be accomplished. Their success had been prepared for by the presence of the French army, still encamped in Lombardy, and making an offensive return of Austria impossible. These annexations were to modify profoundly the respective situations of Piedmont and France.

After the peace of Villafranca, which, contrary to

his programme, *Italy free from the Alps to the Adriatic*, had left Venetia to the Austrians, Napoleon III. said to Victor Emmanuel, "There will be no further question of Nice and Savoy." But now things were changed. The Emperor could no longer employ such language without betraying the interests of France.

According to the statistics of 1860, the old kingdom of Piedmont comprised 5,194,807 inhabitants, to whom there had been adjoined 3,009,505 Lombards. Napoleon III. had not thought this increase large enough to justify him in claiming Savoy and Nice. But things were different from the moment when to a population of 8,204,312 souls, composed of Piedmontese and Lombards, there were to be joined 604,512 Modenese, 499,835 Parmesans, 375,631 Romagnols, and 1,793,967 Tuscans. Thenceforward the formation of a considerable state, possessing both slopes of the Alps, became a matter of serious import to the safety of French frontiers. It was not in the name of ideas of nationality, nor yet as natural frontiers, that France was obliged to insist on the annexation of Savoy and Nice to its territory; it was simply as a guaranty.

In a book entitled *Italian Unity*, M. Giacometti puts this question to his readers, — "I ask all honest men, in Italy and everywhere else, whether any French government, empire, royalty, or republic, finding itself like that of Napoleon III. in a position to obtain such a rectification of frontiers in exchange

for immense services rendered, and to be rendered, could fail to demand it of Italy without being guilty of high treason to France?"

M. Giacometti adds this striking remark: "Let us change for a moment the terms of the proposition; look at it no longer from the French point of view, but from that of Italy, happening to find itself in a similar situation. Let us admit for an instant an hypothesis which, for that matter, presents nothing impossible in the internal development of the history of European States: suppose the Austro-Hungarian monarchy threatened with subjugation by one of its two powerful neighbors — Prussia or Russia, it matters not which — and saved from this imminent enslavement by the providential aid of an Italian army. Where is the Italian citizen who would not curse as traitors any statesmen of his country who, as the price of such a service, would not demand the restoration of Trieste to Italy, or, at any rate, the return of the territory of Trent, through which Austria has free access to Milan, just as Italy, through Savoy and Nice, had free access to Lyons and Marseilles?"

The future was to justify completely the precaution taken by the Emperor's government. Have we not, in fact, seen Italy when she possessed Rome as capital, and had absolutely nothing to fear from republican France, enter into that essentially anti-French combination, the Triple Alliance?

CHAPTER XI

NICE AND SAVOY

M. THOUVENEL'S chief title to the gratitude of France was the annexation of Nice and Savoy. The merit of it is due to the Emperor and to him. England tried by every means to prevent it, and labored incessantly to form a coalition against Napoleon III. The least hesitation, the slightest weakness on the part of the French government, would have wrecked the negotiations. A Minister of Foreign Affairs, as resolute, energetic, accustomed to struggle as M. Thouvenel, was required to bring an enterprise impeded by the greatest obstacles to a happy termination.

England had flattered itself that France could be contented everywhere and always, as she had been in the Crimea, by so-called moral advantages, and consider herself happy to put her armies and navies at the service of British interests, without ever demanding anything for herself. This policy of dupes could not last forever. It was plain to the Emperor that if he continued it, he would offend the national sentiment and expose himself to just criticisms. At last he knew what he wanted, and, sec-

onded by a minister with whom he was then in perfect community of views, he braved all opposition and went straight to his object, fully conscious of his authority, rectitude, and power.

Under the ministry of the Comte Walewski, all idea of annexation to France seemed to have been abandoned, and it may be affirmed that if Victor Emmanuel had not insisted upon incorporating Tuscany, the Emperor would have claimed no increase of territory. The Piedmontese ambitions, favored by the English, forced him to demand guarantees, which, in virtue of the arrangements of Plombières, were to restore the equilibrium and assure the security of France on its Alpine frontier.

The Sardinian government would have liked to take everything and give nothing. In July, 1859, it had crushed a certain agitation which had arisen in Annecy and Chambéry in favor of France. It respected the wishes of populations only when they tended to its own advantage. Napoleon III. wished to bring matters back to the point. The *Patrie*, a semi-official journal, published two articles, January 25 and 27, in which it was said that Savoy and the territory of Nice desired to be reunited to France.

It is curious to note that the men who most ardently approved the annexation after it was made, were those who criticised it most adversely in the beginning. Among others let us cite M. Eugène Forcade, the chronicler of the fortnight in the *Revue*

des Deux-Mondes. On February 1 he wrote: "In our view, the prospect of annexing Savoy to France has been very inopportunely brought into view by the journals. . . . We fear lest the question, having been broached too soon, may be immature in every sense. . . . It would not be at all surprising if the annexation, were it officially proposed, should encounter objections on the part of Europe, Piedmont, and Savoy, which it would be imprudent to contemn. The European objections would evidently refer in general to the probable consequences of applying to the rectification of French frontiers, either the principle of natural frontiers or that of nationalities, particularly with reference to the interests of Swiss neutrality."

M. Forcade did not hesitate to approve the resistance of Piedmont. "Savoy," said he, "is the cradle of the Sardinian dynasty, and everybody will recognize how much it will cost King Victor Emmanuel to part with the brave country whose destinies for eight centuries have been associated with the fortune and the glory of his race. The extension of Piedmont toward central Italy would weaken him from the military point of view if it has to be paid for by the sacrifice of Savoy. Lacking the strong position of Savoy, which secures him the shelter of the Alpine slopes, Piedmont could not hold her own against Austria, still less resist France should we become her enemies."

The Sardinian government had organized at Cham-

béry, January 25, a manifestation in which figured an address of fidelity to the king with many signatures. The writer in the *Revue des Deux-Mondes* thought manifestations of this sort very opportune. "The imprudent annexationist exhortations of our semi-official press," said he, "have stirred up Savoyard patriotism and provoked unmistakable demonstrations. The Savoyards wish to preserve their history and their liberal institutions. It is not at a moment when they can claim so large a share of glory in the fortunes of the House of Savoy that they care to plunge and disappear, as a popular proclamation expresses it, in the gulf of a great centralized nation."

The writer concluded thus, "In spite of the assertions of the second-class French press, there is no annexationist party in Savoy, but only a separatist intrigue."

M. Forcade returned to the charge in the issue of February 15. Playing England's game, he wrote: "We are much too good Frenchmen, we have too exalted an idea of the actual and effective power of our country to believe that this power needs to be increased or defended by any acquisition of territory whatever. On the contrary, we dread to see the moral prestige of France diminished if it shows itself capable of sacrificing important interests and raising serious difficulties in Europe for the meagre satisfaction of obtaining a patch of mountains. . . . The acquisition of a little country which has a glori-

ous history and possesses very advanced liberal institutions, seems to us a rather disedifying spectacle in our age; France will not realize a great idea nor win great honor by taking part in it."

It must be recognized that throughout the entire period of the Second Empire, the majority of writers belonging to the liberal party showed themselves more Italian and Prussian than French.

M. Thouvenel remained undisturbed by the objections made, not merely abroad, but in France, to the realization of a project essentially patriotic and national. He put this ultimatum distinctly to Piedmont: either renounce central Italy, or give Nice and Savoy to France. The Emperor would consent that Victor Emmanuel should reign in Parma, Modena, Florence, and the Romagnas, but on a *sine qua non* condition, namely, that France should obtain the frontier of the Alps.

The Piedmontese government, whose only security against an offensive return of Austria was the good will of Napoleon III., dared not take any exception to this, but it probably harbored an expectation that what was impossible in itself would be done for it by the great powers, whose jealousy would prevent the Emperor's plan from being successful.

The moment was critical. The annexations of central Italy were on the point of accomplishment. If France lost a minute she would be mystified and tricked. Napoleon III. and M. Thouvenel com-

prehended this. They took their stand boldly, irrevocably determined not to retreat a single step.

Victor Emmanuel had just gone to Milan for the Carnival. Baron de Talleyrand, Minister of France, had followed him thither with the legation. A ball was given to the King by the notables and merchants of the city. Just as he came out from this ball, the French diplomat found a telegram in cipher from M. Thouvenel. It ordered him to announce at once to Count Cavour that the French troops were going to evacuate Lombardy, and to resume urgently the negotiations relative to Nice and Savoy.

It was two o'clock in the morning. M. de Talleyrand started at once for the Palais-Royal, where M. Cavour was lodging with the sovereign. The King and his minister were just alighting from their carriage, on returning from the ball, when M. de Talleyrand arrived in the court of the palace. Received without delay by the minister, he read him the telegraphic despatch.

Count Cavour appeared somewhat surprised by the order of evacuation, considering it premature. Smiling, he said: "If the English had occupied Genoa under the same conditions that you occupy Milan and Lombardy, do you think they would have been in such a hurry as you are to abandon Italy? However, it was foreseen; everything is for the best, and we accept this decision of the Emperor with more pleasure than the second part

of the despatch. He sticks fast then to Savoy and that wretched city of Nice?" Baron de Talleyrand replied that France and the Emperor considered the thing as done, and that for his own part he expected no discussion with the Cabinet of Turin except as to the method of closing the negotiation which would be most advantageous to both governments. And yet nothing was concluded. It remained to be seen what the great powers would do.

CHAPTER XII

THE GREAT POWERS

THE question of Nice and Savoy revived all the hereditary jealousies and prejudices of England against France. The Queen, Prince Albert, the ministers, Parliament, the journals, all classes of English society, suddenly manifested positive hostility to Napoleon III.

In 1854, her Britannic Majesty had written apropos of the Emperor in her private journal: "I am glad to know this extraordinary man whom it is impossible not to like and even to admire considerably, after having lived with him for no matter how short a time. I think him capable of kindness, affection, and gratitude. I have confidence in him for the future. I think his friendship for us is sincere, and I hope we have secured his candor and fidelity for the rest of our lives."

What a difference between this language and that employed by the Queen in 1860! "We have been completely duped," she wrote to Lord John Russell, February 5. "The return to the English alliance, to universal peace, respect for treaties, commercial fraternity, etc., were but so many masks to disguise

from Europe a policy of speculation. . . . Sardinia enlarges its boundaries at the expense of Austria and the House of Lorraine, and it is France that must be compensated! The passes of the Alps are dangerous to neighbors, and the weakest must surrender them to the strongest! . . . France accepts the principle of non-intervention in Italy, and yet gives us to understand that its army of Lombardy will not be recalled until the Italian question is settled in a permanent and satisfactory manner. This solution must repose, therefore, on the principle of non-intervention in the shadow of its bayonets."

In the House of Lords, that day, there was much declamation against the scheme attributed to France. Lord Grey said: "The annexation would be so prejudicial to the peace of Europe that government ought to do all in its power to avert such a catastrophe. . . . If it is really true that a secret treaty has been concluded between France and Sardinia for their mutual aggrandizement, it would be difficult to find words severe enough to denounce the injustice and immorality of such a contract, which might be called a great crime against the civilized world." Lord Shaftesbury, Palmerston's son-in-law, went still further, exclaiming with a vehemence which bordered on the ridiculous, "The traffic in the rights of man which is about to be practised in Savoy deserves to be repressed as severely as the traffic in human flesh." The House of Lords was

unanimous in demanding that these observations should be presented to the French government.

The prime minister, Lord Palmerston, had always felt a sympathy for Napoleon III., and still observed a certain decorum. But the chief of the Foreign Office, Lord John Russell, was literally exasperated. As his biographer wrote later on, the project of the annexation of Savoy "*discounted for him all his successes.*"

Knowing that it could not thwart the Emperor's plan unaided, the Cabinet of London knocked at every door in hopes of organizing a European resistance. It acted not merely in Savoy and Switzerland, but in Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg. Always a German at heart, Prince Albert chiefly sought to rouse the suspicions of Germany and convince it that the annexation of Nice and Savoy threatened the banks of the Rhine. "No one," he wrote in his private journal, "cares to make war for Savoy; but a European concert would be a powerful barrier against such tricks of legerdemain."

Personally, the Prince Regent of Prussia would have been well enough inclined to follow the suggestions of Prince Albert, to whom he wrote March 4: "As Venetia must now remain intact, the programme '*as far as the Adriatic*' is fortunately not accomplished; hence the annexation of Nice and Savoy is by no means justified. . . . Nobody is more interested in the question than Prussia and Ger-

many, on account of the left bank of the Rhine, which corresponds exactly with what the slopes of the Alps would be as a line of protection in case of an invasion by the Alpine passes." But, on the other hand, the Prince Regent, whose ulterior schemes of aggrandizement were already taking shape, may have thought that Napoleon III. would assist him in carrying them out. A predatory power, Prussia occasionally had an intuition that it would do in Germany what Piedmont was doing in Italy. Nevertheless, in spite of this consideration, Prussia would probably have been tugged along in England's wake if it had not been afraid of displeasing Russia, which formally declared itself in favor of France.

The English grievances awoke no echo in Vienna. The Cabinet of London had been discredited there by making itself the champion of Piedmontese greed, and the Austrian government was diverted by its present discomfiture. Lord Loftus, English ambassador at Vienna, having asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs what view he took of the French annexations in Savoy and Nice, M. de Rechberg replied with ironic coolness, "The same view that we took of the Piedmontese annexations in central Italy." M. de Rechberg did more. In an official despatch he declared that as between the annexations there was this difference in favor of France, namely, that for the cession of Nice and Savoy there would be the consent of the dispossessed sovereign, which

was not the case for Parma, Modena, the Romagna, or Tuscany.

In St. Petersburg, England met a complete rebuff. The Duc de Montebello, French ambassador in Russia, sent the following telegraphic despatch to M. Thouvenel March 11: "Prince Gortchakoff said to me: 'England is trying to organize a crusade against France on the continent about Savoy and Nice. It would not greatly afflict Austria to see an unfriendly understanding against you; and you do not need to be informed of Prussia's sentiments: they are not altogether favorable on this point. I have interviewed the Emperor and inquired how Russia is disposed and how he will act. I beg you to listen to my words as if they came from his own mouth. Russia's only concern is to examine the question of the cession made to France by the King of Sardinia from the point of view of general equilibrium. Will this cession disturb the European equilibrium? No. That is our answer. Therefore, we shall make no objections, even if we stand alone in Europe on that question.' Prince Gortchakoff said, as he took my hand, 'You may rely on Russia.' We can rely on her."

Adroit as M. Thouvenel was, it may be affirmed that all his negotiations would have failed but for the good will of the Russian government. If the Cabinet of St. Petersburg had ranged itself on England's side, it would have drawn the other powers along with it; and had Europe declared against the

annexation, Napoleon III. could not have accomplished it.

The events of 1860, like those of 1859, proved how necessary the friendship of Russia was to imperial France. But for Russia, the Emperor never could have made the war of Italy. He would have found Prussia and the whole Germanic Confederation against him but for Russia. But for Russia, a coalition of the powers would have prevented the annexation of Nice and Savoy.

The question proved in an evident manner that there existed the elements of a real alliance, equally useful to each, between the two empires. Differing in this from the other European powers, Russia had no interest in opposing the territorial development of France. What danger, what inconvenience, could result to an empire so immense as that of the Czars, from the fact that France was adding three departments to her territory.

One of the merits of M. Thouvenel was that he perfectly appreciated the advantages of the Russian alliance. As long as he remained at the head of affairs, there was harmony between Paris and St. Petersburg. From the day when his successor departed from this safe path, the diplomatic situation of France was put in jeopardy, and the final catastrophes might already be foreseen. So long as Napoleon III. remained faithful to the Stuttgart agreement, all succeeded with him. No sooner did he vary from it than all turned against him.

The France of to-day will not be ungrateful. She will never forget that but for Russia she would not possess Savoy and Nice, those two admirable gems in her casket as a great nation. She will remember that in 1860 England was envious and Russia was helpful.

CHAPTER XIII

THE TREATY OF TURIN

THE annexations of central Italy were accomplished. In Tuscany, 366,571 voters out of a total of 386,445 had declared for the union with Piedmont, and 14,925 for a separate kingdom. The result was proclaimed at Florence, March 15, by heralds at arms, dressed in costumes of the Middle Ages, and mounted on chariots, who announced by torchlight the exact figures.

The French government could hesitate no longer. It had a right to respond at once to the annexation of Tuscany to Piedmont by that of Savoy and Nice to France. The thing was irrevocably determined on before the treaty was signed.

March 21, the Emperor received at the Tuileries a deputation from the provincial and municipal counsellors of Savoy, who presented the addresses of their fellow-citizens. Replying to these, Napoleon III. remarked: "It is neither by conquest nor by insurrection that Savoy and Nice will be reunited to France, but by the free consent of the legitimate sovereign, supported by popular adhesion. . . . My affection for Switzerland made me think it possible

to detach certain portions of Savoy in favor of the Confederation; but in view of the repulsion manifested amongst you at the idea of dismembering a country which in coming down the centuries has been able to create a glorious individuality for itself and thus obtain a national history, it is natural to declare that I will not constrain the wishes of its people in favor of others."

The very day before he made this speech the Emperor had sent to Turin M. Benedetti, director of the political department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. M. Benedetti, who was to act with Baron de Talleyrand as second plenipotentiary, was instructed to refuse all discussion, all adjournment, and not to return to Paris without having signed the treaty.

Count Cavour was still under some illusions. Duped by England, he hoped that Victor Emmanuel could at least retain Nice, if not Savoy. On the other hand, the Helvetian Confederacy put forward its claim for an augmentation of territory, demanding two regions which form part of Savoy, the Chablais, whose chief town is Thonon, and Faucigny, whose capital is Bonneville. Under pretext that these two countries had been neutralized in 1815, they put in a claim for them, alleging that their occupation by France would be dangerous to Switzerland. England furiously sustained this theory, and made desperate efforts in its favor. It entreated the powers to lend it their support in

this instance, and thought it had succeeded in inducing the court of Turin to do so.

M. Benedetti was instructed to tell Count Cavour that England was disturbing itself in vain, and that the intentions of France would not be changed. I was at that time a humble subordinate of the director of political affairs, and I remember that among the documents he took with him to Turin figured a very long memorandum in which I had summarized the historic precedents of the Savoy question. It is one of the most agreeable reminiscences of my modest career.

Cavour understood that all resistance would be futile. They might take it or leave it. Their only choice lay between these two contingencies: either to sign the treaty, including Nice, the Chablais, and Faucigny in the territories ceded, or to quarrel with France. They knew England too well not to be convinced that in the latter hypothesis no serious assistance to Piedmont was to be expected from that quarter. Hence no hesitation was possible.

March 24, at three o'clock in the afternoon, at Turin, in the cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the Place du Château, the treaty was signed by which Victor Emmanuel ceded to Napoleon III. Savoy and the territory of Nice. The plenipotentiaries for France were Baron de Talleyrand, French Minister at Turin, and M. Benedetti; for Sardinia, Count Cavour and M. Farini, Minister of the Interior.

An eye-witness of this great diplomatic scene shall describe it, the Comte d'Ideville: "M. de Talleyrand," he says, "had taken me with him to read the secret memorandum and the minute of the treaty intended for the Sardinian government, while M. Arton, then Count Cavour's secretary, did as much for the instrument intended for France. MM. de Talleyrand, Benedetti, and Farini sat in the little greenroom in the angle of the palace usually occupied by M. de Cavour. The latter was walking up and down, his hands in his pockets, and his head bent. I never saw him so preoccupied, so silent; his imperturbable gayety, his proverbial look of good nature, had abandoned him. At this serious moment, when a stroke of the pen was about to deprive his royal master of two provinces, one of which was the cradle of the House of Savoy, it was easy to comprehend the concentration of mind, even the sadness, of the great minister.

"After the reading of the treaty and the memorandum, Count Cavour took the pen and signed both instruments with a steady hand. His countenance cleared up at once, and his habitual smile came back to his lips. He went up to M. de Talleyrand, rubbing his hands in his usual fashion, and whispered in his ear: 'Now we are accomplices, Baron. Isn't that so?'"

The treaty stipulated that the inhabitants should be consulted, that the neutralization of the Chablais and Faucigny should be maintained, and that the

people of the ceded provinces should have a year in which to decide between the Sardinian nationality and that of France.

On that day, as soon as the telegraph had apprised him of the signing of the treaty, Napoleon III. addressed the following billet to his minister : —

"My dear M. Thouvenel : I am very glad to be able to thank you for the result obtained, and to attribute all the merit of it to your ability.

"Believe in my sincere friendship,

"Napoleon."

Faithful interpreters of the instructions they had received, the French plenipotentiaries acquitted themselves of their task with equal energy and celerity. Appreciating the assistance given him by his colleague, Baron de Talleyrand wrote to M. Thouvenel March 30: "M. Benedetti leaves this evening for Paris. The results obtained speak loud enough to make it unnecessary to lay stress on the influence exerted by the language, the cleverness, the prudence, and the truly diplomatic tact he has employed on this serious occasion. Count Cavour and M. Farini will, I doubt not, retain the greatest esteem and highest opinion of the character of the Emperor's plenipotentiary."

The news of the treaty caused profound joy throughout France. The detractors of the war of Italy ceased their criticisms. Even the *Revue des Deux-Mondes*, which by the pen of M. Eugène

Forcade had censured the government for desiring the annexation, now permitted the same writer to become the enthusiastic defender of the enterprise. In a word, the treaty of Turin was a great national triumph. May the day come when France shall sign other treaties equally glorious!

CHAPTER XIV

THE VOTE OF THE POPULATIONS

THE annexation of Nice and Savoy was all the more agreeable to the Emperor for being not a conquest, but a realization of two of his favorite doctrines: the principle of nationalities, and the right of peoples to dispose of their own destiny.

The first article of the treaty of Turin stipulated that the reunion should be effected without putting any constraint upon the will of the inhabitants, and that the two governments should as soon as possible arrive at an agreement on the best means of estimating and making known the manifestations of that will.

In consequence it was decided that a plébiscite should take place in the territory of Nice April 15, while in Savoy the complete melting of the snows should be waited for, the 22d of the same month.

The Sardinian government preserved an absolutely loyal attitude in these circumstances. Before the voting, Victor Emmanuel addressed a noble and affecting proclamation to the inhabitants of the two provinces. He said: "In spite of the pain of separating from you, I was obliged to consider that the territorial changes occasioned in Italy by the

war justified the demand of my august ally, the Emperor Napoleon, for your reunion to France. Also I was obliged to take into account the immense services which France has rendered Italy. Moreover, I could not but admit that the rapidity and facility of communications are every day increasing the number and importance of the relations of Savoy and Nice with France. Nor could I forget that great affinities of race, language, and customs render these relations still more close and natural. Nevertheless, such a change in the destinies of these provinces could not be imposed upon you; it must be the result of your free consent." The King ended his proclamation by these words, which the two Latin nations ought never to forget: —

"If you are to follow other destinies, do it in such a manner that the French shall receive you as brothers whom they have long esteemed and loved. Act so that your union with France shall be an additional link between two nations whose mission it is to pursue in unison the development of civilization."

Garibaldi, a native of Nice, was exasperated by the idea that this city should cease to be Italian. He wanted to go there and stir up an anti-French disturbance, and only the urgent insistence of the King induced him to give up the project.

France had not to intervene in the actual operations of the voting, but simply to make sure that it was carried out in freedom and sincerity. For

that purpose she sent, in a semi-official capacity, two commissioners, both senators of the Empire and confidential agents of the Emperor. They were M. Laity and M. Pietri, the first of whom went to Chambéry, the other to Nice. They abstained from all pressure, contenting themselves with winning the people by graciousness and by promises of future improvements, all of which were afterward carried out. The result at Nice, where the policing of the city had been intrusted to Sardinian carbineers and the electoral lists and the operations of the vote regulated by the King; where the people went to the voting by parishes, the curés, officials of the quarter and notables at their head; was that out of the 6821 votes cast only 11 were against the annexation.

In the whole county of Nice, but 25,993 out of the 30,712 electors inscribed presented themselves at the polls; 25,743 voted for annexation to France, and but 160 against it. This result did not include the vote of 2500 Nicene soldiers then in the army. For these the result was 1200 ayes against 186 noes.

The 22d of April was election day for Savoy. Chambéry made it a holiday. The city, guarded only by the militia, was hung with flags. The inhabitants assembled by wards, and the corporations formed in companies to cast their votes. The religious orders and the magistrates presented themselves in a body. After High Mass, the archbishop came to vote in state, followed by all his chapter.

Universal enthusiasm was displayed. Similar manifestations occurred at Annecy.

The final results of the election in Savoy were proclaimed by the Court of Appeals of Chambéry amidst the applause of the crowds: names inscribed, 135,449; voting, 130,839; ayes, 130,533; noes, 235; not valid, 71; not voted, 4610. This did not comprise the vote of the Savoyard soldiers in the army. The result for them, including the famous Savoy brigade, was: ayes, 5847; noes, 290; not valid, 26. No popular vote had ever given such a majority. It was a brilliant triumph for France.

The ratification of the treaty by the Sardinian parliament took place a month later. Cavour delivered one of his most remarkable speeches on the occasion at the Chamber of Deputies. He rendered formal homage to Napoleon III. "If we should change alliances," said he, "if we should become guilty of that black ingratitude toward France, we would commit not merely the most shameful but the most imprudent action in our power." After a debate which lasted six days and ended May 29, the vote was as follows: present, 285; voting, 262; *for the treaty*, 229; *against*, 33. Twenty-three deputies, M. Rattazzi among them, abstained from voting.

The vote of the Senate was cast June 10. Out of 102 voters, 92 declared for the treaty and 10 against it.

A few days afterward, Victor Emmanuel reviewed for the last time the Savoy brigade, so justly cele-

brated for its bravery. It contained veterans who in 1849 had been his companions in arms at the battles of Milan and Novara. Many of them shed tears.

Options for Sardinian nationality were very rare. General de Sonnaz and the Comte de Barral remained loyal to Sardinia. But the majority of the notables of Savoy elected for that of France. Such, among others, were General Mollard, the Comte de Sales, the Marquise d'Arvillars, grand-mistress of the household of the defunct Queen, the Comte de Maugny, the Comtes de Foras, and the Marquis Costa de Beauregard, whose son, one of the eminent members of the Académie Française, could not sit under the cupola but for the annexation.

All was consummated. The English intrigues had definitively failed. The apogee of the Second Empire had been attained.

Napoleon had at this time the idea of creating M. Thouvenel a duke and presenting him with a mansion. The great minister, who died without a fortune, refused. All he would accept was the broad ribbon of the Legion of Honor. But, by derogation from the rule which provides that no motive shall be alleged for any nomination to a promotion in the order, that which raised M. Thouvenel to the dignity of the grand cross, stated that it was given him by the Emperor on occasion of the annexation of Savoy and Nice to France.

CHAPTER XV

VICTOR EMMANUEL

ON March 14, 1860, Victor Emmanuel entered upon his forty-first year. He had just passed his nineteenth birthday when he ascended the throne after the disaster of Novara, March 23, 1849, in consequence of the abdication of his father, King Charles Albert, who fell, arms in hand, and died in voluntary exile at Oporto, in Portugal.

Victor Emmanuel was not handsome. One might even say that he was ugly. But there was something strange and imposing about his ugliness. His prominent blue eyes, his snub nose, his overlong mustachios twisted upward to a point, gave his countenance a singular character of audacity and resolution. He was above middle height. He held his head up proudly. His whole person breathed energy and courage.

The great sculptor Marochetti said, after finishing the statue of Charles Albert: "I would greatly have preferred to execute a statue of King Victor Emmanuel. Our sovereign is assuredly not handsome, but one could make a striking and original work with him as model; there is a certain savagery,

a picturesqueness about him which does not lack grandeur. He reminds one of a king of the Huns or a barbaric chieftain. He is fine on horseback, and I feel certain that taking advantage of that fact one could achieve an interesting statue."

In mind, Victor Emmanuel was as strange as in body. His essentially complex character, full of contradictions and contrasts, would be a very curious study for psychologists. A mixture of peasant and gentleman, libertine and devotee, soldier and king, his instincts were democratic and aristocratic by turns. At times he seemed a trooper or a country clown, and again a statesman of the first order, the glorious head of one of the most ancient and illustrious dynasties of the world. Under an undiplomatic exterior he concealed an extreme cunning. In political matters he had a truly extraordinary insight. No one understood better than he how to turn a corner or profit by a difficult situation. This finished model of a soldier was a consummate diplomatist, a true disciple of Machiavelli.

Intrepid and indefatigable, Victor Emmanuel was incessantly pursuing his object, even at times when one would have thought him most unconcerned with politics. He was possessed by a fixed idea : Italian unity. Beaten at Novara, he determined to take reprisals at all costs for this Waterloo of the Piedmontese. He swore to avenge his father, the martyr of the Italian idea. "I ascended the throne after great disasters," he said in one of his manifestoes.

"My father set me a fine example in resigning the crown to save the dignity and liberty of his subjects. His death has linked the destinies of my family still more closely to those of the Italian people, who for many centuries have left the ashes of their exiles in all foreign lands as a title to claim the heritage of each of the nations which God has placed on their frontiers, and which speak the same language. I have followed that example, and the memory of my father has been my guiding star." In raising the Italian tricolor, the son of Charles Albert believed himself to be performing an act of filial piety. Like all men who accomplish difficult and extraordinary tasks, he was impassioned with his work, devoting himself body and soul to it, without a moment's weakness or discouragement, and with an ardor and vehemence which knew no obstacles. He would have given his last drop of blood for the success of the cause whose champion he had made himself.

At Palestro he was admired by all the zouaves, good judges where courage is concerned, and proud of such a companion in arms. Passionately fond of war and the chase, he preferred a tent to gilded canopies, and the scent of powder to all other perfumes. To console himself for the impossibility of fighting, he would go into the mountains for several days, sometimes for weeks, to hunt the chamois, unattended save by two aides-de-camp. Wearing a blouse, rifle in hand, eating dry bread and raw onions like the peasants, he clambered over rocks

and precipices, outstripped the best walkers, the most skilful marksmen, and came back to Turin alert and cheerful, while his unlucky aides-de-camp, who had found it hard work to follow him, returned ill or worn out with fatigue.

For this Nimrod war was the greatest of all hunts. He lived in it as his native element. On the day after a battle he knew no such sentiment of gloom and melancholy as took possession of the affectionate heart of Napoleon III. Fighting was his favorite pastime. In 1859, he had looked forward to long and bitter hostilities, and the treaty of Villafranca was a cruel disappointment to him, chiefly because it obliged him to put his sword back into its scabbard. Yet his keen political instinct made him recognize that peace was then necessary; and, more cautious than Cavour, as opposed to whom he was often in the right, he took good care to make no recriminations against Napoleon III., whose aid was still indispensable to him. He believed, moreover, — and it was this that consoled him, — that fighting would soon break out again. April 12, he said to Baron de Talleyrand, Minister of France at Turin, "I foresee that we shall be engaged in a general war within a year, and I hope the Emperor will not then forget his ally."

Victor Emmanuel was ambitious, but what he loved in power was neither luxury nor riches; he had a horror of public display, and submitted only with great reluctance, and a weariness he did not try

to disguise, to the requirements of etiquette. According to the Comte d'Ideville, when he was obliged to be present at a great court dinner, he neither unfolded his napkin nor touched a single dish. Resting his hands on the pommel of his sword, he studied his guests without troubling himself to conceal his impatience. He seldom lived in his Turin palace, preferring to reside at Mandria, a hunting-meet in the woods, three-quarters of a league from the capital, where he lived the life of a private individual, far from the indiscreet and importunate, and without either amusement or luxury. For himself he had no need of money. Sober, eating only once a day, but then abundantly, he preferred the ordinary food of the people to skilled cookery. His passion for women apart, his habits and tastes were those of an anchorite.

If he had consulted only his personal convenience, Victor Emmanuel would never have entertained the idea of exchanging his kingdom of Piedmont for that of Italy. A Piedmontese at heart, he greatly preferred his native land to any other. Neither the Royal Palace of Naples nor the Quirinal of Rome had any attraction for him. When he quitted Piedmont, he felt himself an exile.

The audacious sovereign triumphed, but there were moments when he regretted his triumphs. His conscience now and again reproached him, and a silent struggle went on within his soul. On one

hand, he was glad to have favored the national aspirations of Italy, avenged Novara, freed Milan, and destroyed Austrian influence in Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and the Legations. On the other hand, as a monarch by divine right, he suffered for having come to terms with the revolution; and as the head of one of the most illustrious families for having despoiled a widow and an orphan, — the Duchess of Parma and her young son, — and taken their States from near relatives like the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena. But he suffered much more from having engaged in a struggle with the Pope. He who counted not merely heroes but men and women saints among his ancestors; who retained the convictions of a Catholic even while giving bad examples in his private life; who had never trembled before balls and bombs, but who turned pale at the thought of an excommunication, was profoundly moved by the complaints of the Holy Father. All his efforts to pacify the anger of Pius IX. were fruitless.

February 6, he had written to the Sovereign Pontiff: "A devoted son of the Church, descended from a very pious race, as your Holiness very well knows, I have always cherished sentiments of sincere attachment, veneration, and respect toward the Church and its august head. It never has been, nor is it now in my intention to fail in my duties as a Catholic prince, or to diminish, so far as it depends on me, the rights and the authority which

the Holy See exercises on earth in virtue of the mandate of Heaven."

But after these expressions of devotion, the King concluded as follows, and the Pope had been very indignant about it: "If, taking into consideration the necessities of the age, the growing strength of the principle of nationalities, the irresistible vehemence by which peoples are impelled to unite and organize themselves in conformity to the rules adopted by all civilized countries, your Holiness thought he might have to claim my frank and loyal assistance, there would be a means of establishing, not merely in the Romagna, but in the Marches and in Umbria, a state of things which, while preserving its supreme power to the Church, and to the Pope a glorious rôle at the head of the Italian nation, would make the people of these provinces share in the benefits which a strong and truly national monarchy would secure to the greater part of central Italy. I hope that your Holiness will deign to take into consideration these reflections, dictated by a heart sincere and wholly devoted to his person, and with his customary kindness will grant me his sacred benediction."

This letter exasperated the Pope. On February 14, he gave it this crushing answer: "Sire, the idea which your Majesty intended to convey to me is an imprudent idea, and one which is certainly unworthy of a Catholic king and a king of the House of Savoy. . . . I am deeply grieved, not

for myself, but for the unhappy condition of your Majesty's soul; for it is already under censures, and others will follow when you have accomplished the sacrilegious act which you and yours intend to accomplish. I pray the Lord from the bottom of my heart that He will enlighten and give you the grace to know and lament the scandals which have occurred, and the frightful evils which, with your coöperation, have stricken poor Italy."

An unbeliever might have received this letter with indifference, but it profoundly troubled Victor Emmanuel, who was a believer. This intrepid man feared but one thing — hell. Those who knew him best agree in saying that he ended his days, like his father before him, in great piety. He had a presentiment that Rome would be fatal to him, and that if ever he set foot there he would die without great delay. Of all the sovereigns, it was he who most wronged the Papacy ; and yet, of all the sovereigns, it was he for whom the Papacy had the greatest prestige.

CHAPTER XVI

COUNT CAVOUR

WHEN Count Cavour handed in his resignation the day after the peace of Villafranca, the Turinese said, "He is going, but with a return ticket in his pocket."

January 20, 1860, the great minister returned to power. He would be fifty years old on the following 10th of August, and was at the climax of his force and talent. As if he foresaw that his life would be short (it was to end in 1860), he continued his work with feverish haste. Scorning patience and tedious delays, he marched toward his goal with incredible audacity. The diplomatist in him gave place to the man of action, to the conspirator resolved on employing violent measures, and considering international stipulations and diplomatic agreements as empty impediments. To substitute the new right of revolution for the old law of nations, and to cover it under the cloak of monarchy, was thenceforward his programme.

Joseph de Maistre has said, "The Revolution leads men more than they lead it." It was by the Revolution that Napoleon III., Victor Emmanuel,

and Count Cavour were led. Not one of the three suspected at the beginning of 1860 that before the year was out Piedmont would be master of the Marches, Umbria, and the Sicilies. M. Thouvenel wrote to the Duc de Gramont, March 3: "If the Pope and the King of Naples understood their own interests, they would see that on one capital point those interests are identical with ours. Italian unity displeases us as much as it does them." The Emperor was not more anxious for that unity than his Minister of Foreign Affairs. As to Count Cavour and his sovereign, they did not believe it possible as yet. They simply profited by circumstances they did not create.

Cavour had in the first place but one object: the incorporation of central Italy into the Piedmontese monarchy. On resuming power, he had this sentence published in the *Opinione*, a semi-official organ, "The first Cavour ministry meant independence, the second means annexation." But in the mind of the minister, annexation applied only to Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and the Romagna. As yet he could not imagine that Europe would allow him to go further still, and he was the first to be surprised by the inertness of the great powers. But when he saw that they were ready to tolerate all audacities, he threw aside the mask and got rid of all his scruples. The apathy, impotence, feebleness of diplomacy, the passivity of the so-called European concert, were cards which he played with extreme dexterity. He

excelled in the art of modifying his plans to meet emergencies, and of deriving the greatest possible profit from every situation.

"The Italians," M. de La Gorce has said, "had come to the point of creating a conscience of their own for the affairs of their country. As many treaties had formerly been made without consulting them, they decided that they were not bound by any. Everything in Italy which did not belong to the Piedmontese aggregation, seemed to them unjustly withdrawn from the national patrimony." On opening the Parliament, April 2, Victor Emmanuel expressed himself as follows: "Italy is no longer the Italy of the Romans, or the Italy of the Middle Ages; nor ought she any longer to be a field open to foreign greed, but to be the Italy of the Italians."

Such was the bold policy of which Cavour was the ardent and zealous interpreter. His activity was devouring, his ability for work prodigious. Writing, reading, meditating nearly all night long, he yet rose every morning at five o'clock in winter and summer. Relying on his iron constitution, he went too far. When he had a congestion, bleeding and a day and night spent at his farm of Leri sufficed to set him up completely, and he returned to work with extraordinary vigor. Playing the riskiest of games, he experienced violent emotions, which finally undermined his robust health and shortened his life. His hardihood sometimes amazed even himself. "If I get out of danger this time,"

he wrote to the Comtesse de Circourt in 1860, "I shall try to manage so as not to be caught in it again. I am like the sailor who, in the midst of a howling tempest, swears and makes a vow never more to go to sea."

It has been asked whether Victor Emmanuel had a real affection for his powerful minister. The Count d'Ideville has written: "The King is lazy and not well educated; to busy himself with public affairs, preside at the Council, make decisions, are so many tortures to him. Hence Count Cavour spares him this kind of occupation as often as he can. The King feels the superiority of his prime master, but has never forgiven him for it; he submits to it, hating him, meanwhile, from the bottom of his heart." To our mind, this opinion is greatly exaggerated. Victor Emmanuel did not hate a statesman to whom he owed so much. But though he did not hate him, his liking for him was extremely limited. He preferred M. Rattazzi, because M. Rattazzi had a deference for Rosina, the royal favorite, which Cavour had not.

Rosina was the daughter of one of the palace guards, a company bearing some resemblance to the Austrian halberd-bearers and the hundred-guards of France. Pretty and virtuous, she was but sixteen when first noticed by the King. He had two children by her, whom he recognized and legitimated after the Queen's death. Along with an endowment, the mother received the title of Countess of

Mirafiore, the name of a royal farm not far from Turin. The favorite did not concern herself with politics, and led a very retired life. She seldom appeared in public, and was scarcely ever seen except in the proscenium boxes of the petty theatres of Turin. However, M. Cavour censured the liaison, and would never have any relations with her, and when the King, through religious scruples, showed a disposition to contract a morganatic marriage with the favorite, Cavour opposed the plan so strenuously that Victor Emmanuel gave it up for the moment. But he carried it into effect later on, and in the latter years of his life figured in the Almanach de Gotha as "married morganatically to the Countess of Mirafiore," the date of their union being left unmentioned.

Upright, disinterested, generous, charitable, Count Cavour was neither conceited nor proud. He gave to agriculture the rare moments of leisure which he could spare from politics. He was never so happy as when strolling about his estates with the peasants, in sabots and clothes like their own. He led the simplest of lives in Turin. Except on days of ceremony, such as the opening of the session, he was never seen in a carriage. Every morning he passed on foot like an honest citizen under the porticos of the rue du Po, affable, familiar, accessible to every one, still more appreciated by the humble than by the great, and popular in the best acceptation of that term. The Turinese had absolute confidence in him, and called him *Papa Camillo*.

On his side, a Piedmontese at heart, Cavour had a passion for Turin, his native city, where everybody knew and liked him. Like the King, had he consulted his tastes and personal convenience only, he would not have dreamed of modifying the character of the House of Savoy and exchanging the kingdom of Piedmont for that of Italy. His farm of Leri seemed to him preferable to the most splendid palaces of the peninsula; and if he had been living when Turin ceased to be a capital, this declension would have made him suffer. No one understood better than he the difficulty of solving the problems raised by the Roman question. No one inwardly realized more fully the bitterness that lies beneath ambitions that have been achieved. Possibly he envied more than once, in the midst of unhoped-for triumphs, the obscure and tranquil life of a simple country gentleman. Like his master, he remained a Catholic in spite of his struggles against the Church; and what he regretted most was his inability to come to terms with the Pope.

CHAPTER XVII

PIUS NINTH

THE memory of Pius IX. will last forever. To employ the expression of Bossuet, "Providence reserved for him that nameless finish which misfortune adds to virtue." He was the victim of his kindness and his generous illusions, and like Jesus Christ, of whom he was the worthy Vicar, he received ingratitude in return for his favors.

Charles Albert and Pius IX. may be considered the martyrs of Italian patriotism. Both were punished for their devotion to the national aspirations by an exile which for the one was only temporary, but for the other lasted all his life. It left most painful memories in the mind of the Holy Father, who was threatened with another banishment from Rome. The chief promoter of the great movement for independence, the Sovereign Pontiff had heard the *hosannahs* succeeded by curses. Clothed in the pomp of religious ceremonies, Pius IX. seemed to grow taller, his countenance assumed a character of supreme majesty, his features were lighted up as by a divine inspiration. If he received an audience of pilgrims, or made a speech to soldiers, his good nature,

his frank gayety, his pleasant air, gained every heart. Diplomacy, with its subterfuges, reserves, and equivocations, seemed to him a wretched science. He had a horror of intrigue and a passionate love of truth.

One can easily comprehend how painful it was for Napoleon III. to dissatisfy and pain the Holy Father. Their relations dated from a remote period. M. Louis Thouvenel recounts an anecdote concerning this which he got from a person very nearly connected with the Italian political movement, and which deserves to be remembered. It happened in 1831. Louis Napoleon had just come to grief in the insurrection of the Romagna, where his brother lost his life. Hunted by the Austrian troops, and in danger of being run through if he fell into their hands, he wandered about, vainly seeking a place to lay his head. Arriving before Spoleto, of which city Monseigneur Mastaï-Ferretti — the future Pius IX. — was then archbishop, the proscript remembered that when this prelate was only a simple canon at Rome, he and his brother had often served his Mass, and been very kindly treated by him. It occurred to the fugitive to ask him for shelter. The dirty face and worse than shabby costume of the applicant roused the suspicions of the servants, and it was with difficulty that he got entrance to the house. Monseigneur Mastaï-Ferretti received the son of Queen Hortense very kindly, and the prince having confided to him his absolute destitution, the archbishop borrowed five thousand francs from a rich manufacturer of the city

and gave it to his quondam altar boy, now metamorphosed into an Italian revolutionist. Then, putting him into his own carriage, the prelate took the reins and drove him to a place of safety, where he would be sheltered alike from Austrian bayonets and the pontifical authorities. Pope Gregory XVI., hearing of the incident, summoned Monseigneur Mastaï-Ferretti to Rome, where he remained for some time in disgrace. He did not, in fact, receive a cardinal's hat until 1840. Could a grateful heart like that of Napoleon III. forget such a service?

When the insurgent of 1831 became President of the French Republic, he maintained good relations with the former Archbishop of Spoleto, who by that time was Pope. But in 1849, during the Roman expedition, his youthful tendencies reappeared, and the famous letter to Edgard Ney did not fail to cause anxiety to Pius IX. This suspicion was soon dispelled, and throughout the earlier years of the reign of Napoleon III. there was complete understanding between the Tuileries and the Vatican. The harmony was, for that matter, quite as useful to the Empire as to the Papacy, and the conservatives of all countries were grateful to the French sovereign for being the champion of the Holy Father.

From the beginning of the war of Italy, Pius IX., in spite of the protestations addressed to him by the imperial government, with a view to reassuring Catholics, had a presentiment that this harmony would be of short duration. May 7, 1859, when the

Duc de Gramont, ambassador of France at Rome, presented a letter from the Emperor, assuring him of his devotion, the Holy Father made a brief acknowledgment to the ambassador, and then added, pointing to the crucifix, "It is He in whom I trust."

When Austria evacuated the Romagna during the war, it left the revolutionists free to install themselves as masters, and since then had taken no initiative in favor of the pontifical cause. The courts of Madrid, Lisbon, Munich, Brussels, Rio Janeiro, were powerless. Pius IX. had nothing to expect from diplomacy.

Meanwhile Victor Emmanuel himself, before he had been dragged by the revolution farther, possibly, than he would have cared to go, had done justice to the Pope. Replying to the delegate from Bologna, who came to ask for the annexation of the Romagna to Sardinia, the King said: "It will not do to let Europe accuse me of acting merely through personal ambition, and of substituting Piedmontese absorption for Austrian oppression. The Holy Father, the venerated leader of the faithful, remains at the head of his people. He is not, like the sovereigns of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany, deprived of his temporal authority, which we ought not simply to respect but to consolidate. Therefore I would disapprove of any subversive act, contrary to equity and injurious to the noble cause we serve. Let us not forget that Pius IX. is an Italian prince."

The Pope has been blamed for not accepting

cordially the presidency of an Italian confederation. But it should be remembered that this presidency was to be merely honorary, and that Napoleon III. wished to make it coincident with a system of secularization whose consequence in fact, if not in law, would have been the suppression of the temporal power not only in Rome but throughout the States of the Church. Pius IX. considered this presidency as a decoy, a snare. He would not accept it unless the Romagna were previously restored; on that condition only would he consent to be represented at a congress.

In his despatch addressed to the Papal Nuncio at Paris, February 29, Cardinal Antonelli, Secretary of State, expressed himself thus: "The Holy Father cannot consent to an abdication of any sort, and he never can. He cannot, because his States are not his personal property, but belong to the Church; he cannot because he has bound himself by solemn oaths, he has promised God to transmit them intact to his successors; he cannot on account of the scandal which it would entail to the detriment of the actually dispossessed Italian princes and even to the detriment of all Christian princes." Pius IX. considered his inflexibility a sacred duty. A concession of any sort would have seemed to him a sacrilege. Nothing in the world could have induced him to cede voluntarily a single village of the pontifical patrimony. He would have died rather than violate his oath.

People were asking for reforms ; but were not all the partisans of Italian unity agreed in declaring that no reforms, however extensive, would induce them to give up their plan : Italy one and Rome its capital? Even had the pontifical government been not merely the most paternal but the most liberal, most enlightened, wisest government in the world, the revolution never would have spared it. The opposition encountered by Pius IX. was absolutely irreconcilable. Each concession granted by the Sovereign Pontiff would have been changed into a weapon against him. Cardinal Antonelli wrote in the despatch already quoted, "If it were still possible some months ago to delude ourselves as to the possibility of pacifying certain Italian States by reforms and concessions, such an illusion has become impossible now that the parties have openly declared, as they did in the memoir of the so-called government of Bologna, that no reform can satisfy them which stops short of the utter destruction of the temporal power." No agreement could be reached. Both parties were absolutely unwilling to compromise.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE DUC DE GRAMONT

SELDOM has any diplomatist found himself in a situation more difficult than that of the Duc de Gramont, ambassador of France at Rome. The private letters exchanged between him and M. Thouvenel, Minister of Foreign Affairs, which the son of the latter has published, show what the duke had to suffer in a post apparently enviable, but in reality full of vexations and disappointment.

The beginnings of his mission were both easy and agreeable. Up to the war of 1859, the relations between the Tuileries and the Vatican left nothing to be desired. When that broke out, the most positive assurances were given to the Sovereign Pontiff. M. Baroche, President of the Council of State, declared to the Corps Législatif that the government would take all necessary measures to insure that the safety and independence of the Holy Father would be maintained amidst the disturbances of which Italy was to be the scene. The Emperor himself said in his proclamation of May 3, 1859, to the French people, "We are not going to Italy to promote disorder, or to shake the power of the Holy Father, whom we have replaced on his throne." The

Duc de Gramont had seized every occasion to speak in a similar strain to Pius IX.

A false and difficult situation was suddenly created for the ambassador by the attitude taken by the imperial government concerning the Romagna. Toward the end of January, 1860, Lord John Russell wrote to his nephew, then in Rome in a semi-official capacity, that the annexation of the Romagna was about to be accomplished by the admission of Romagnal deputies to the Sardinian parliament; that England would at once recognize the new state of things, and the Emperor immediately follow suit. Much disturbed by this information, the Duc de Gramont wrote to M. Thouvenel, January 31: "The moment has come, my dear minister, when I must consider with regret, I might almost say with anguish, a contingency which would be doubly painful to me now that you are in power. The recognition announced by Lord John Russell would be the first act by which the Emperor participates in the spoliation of the Holy See. Until now, his government has taken very special pains to avoid anything which could bind it in this respect. It has been free to admit the legitimacy of certain complaints made by the inhabitants against the pontifical government; to declare that it will not employ force to restore them to the Holy See; to express the opinion that the sacrifice of the revolted provinces would offer a solution to the Pope and to Italy, whose advantages would counterbalance its

losses; but it has not officially sanctioned the seizure of the Roman provinces by the House of Savoy."

Then the ambassador broached the personal issue: "Until now I have loyally and entirely associated myself with the Emperor's policy; I have served him with the utmost possible zeal, and, I will add, with sentiments which he fully recognizes in me, and which I have heartily devoted to him for these many years." He referred to the fact that, by the sovereign's orders and the constant instructions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he had invariably asserted that Napoleon III. would never be the aggressor and spoiler of the Pope. He had said this to Pius IX. and his ministers, to the inhabitants of Bologna and Rome, to the entire diplomatic corps. "I ask you, my dear friend," he went on, "how I could continue to represent his Majesty near the Holy See after such a flat contradiction given to all my words? God preserve me from wishing to give myself an exaggerated importance here; but after all, the Emperor himself is concerned in having his ambassador preserve his personal dignity and the esteem of those around him. In writing these lines, I consult nothing but my conscience; I sacrifice all my personal convenience and my inclinations; I sacrifice even my feelings, for I am afraid of wounding the Emperor to whom I am deeply attached; but I listen to an interior voice which dictates these words, and which has never led me astray."

The Duc de Gramont cooled down and waited. He was always hoping that the Pope and the Emperor would come to terms, and he endeavored to bring this about. However, the relation between the Vatican and the Tuileries became more tense. In February, Pius IX. said: "Well, M. l'Ambassadeur, the situation is clearing up. I know that I have nothing further to expect from the Emperor; he will let the Legations be taken from me, and I cannot prevent it. They will take whatever he will permit them to take, and leave me what he forces them to leave. He has the power, he is the master."

The irritation of Pius IX. continually increased. The Duc de Gramont wrote to M. Thouvenel, March 6: "For some days past the Pope seems much excited; he talks a great deal, a great deal too much, and to everybody. Day before yesterday this indignation crushed the Portuguese minister who had ventured a few words in favor of conciliation. In the evening he said, "Truly, advice from that little man, representing that little country, is the ass's kick." To others, to Frenchmen, he exclaimed, "This is an infernal policy which changes every moment."

In March, the ambassador entertained a fleeting hope that a combination might be made which, in his view, would solve all difficulties. He thought the Pope might defend Rome with the pontifical troops, and a Neapolitan army be assigned the task of defending the rest of the States of the Church.

On the 10th of the month he wrote to M. Thouvenel: "Should the Emperor have no objection to enter into negotiation on these bases, a single word by telegraph will apprise me of the fact, and I can arrange it here more easily than elsewhere, as I have means of acting directly upon the King of Naples. For my part, I own it would afford me great satisfaction if such a combination could succeed, for it unquestionably holds out serious political advantages both to Italy and to us. It would put an end to this irksome solidarity which our prolonged occupation necessarily entails. It would round out the Emperor's idea and fulfil his promises to Italy and his engagements with England by leaving the peninsula in the hands of the nationals. Indirectly it would bridle Piedmontese aggressiveness by exacting from the King of Sardinia a pledge concerning the Neapolitan troops, or even, which would be more explicit, concerning the pontifical territory. Hence from every point of view it would be an excellent climax to our efforts for the welfare of Italy."

But this latest illusion of the ambassador was speedily dispelled. Francis II., King of Naples, was of too vacillating a character to attempt such an enterprise. He refused to lend his troops to the Pope, saying he was afraid that Victor Emmanuel might corrupt them. And, when April began, the arrival in Rome of General de Lamoricière increased the ambassador's embarrassments.

CHAPTER XIX

GENERAL DE LAMORICIÈRE

PIUS IX. did not content himself with prayer. He chose to avail himself of the human means at his disposal, and to defend by arms, if need were, the patrimony of St. Peter. In the Vatican a party of action was visibly in process of formation which hoped to recruit an army and rely in France upon the adversaries of Napoleon III., and not on the imperial government, in which the Pope had lost all confidence. A militant and impulsive prelate, Monseigneur de Mérode, belonging to the highest aristocracy of Belgium, was the leader of this party. Born March 15, 1802, he had served as an officer in the army of King Leopold, and, in Algeria, under the French flag. Becoming a priest, he retained under the cassock the ardor and the belligerent inclinations that he had formerly sheltered under a uniform. Stationed at Rome in the capacity of privy chamberlain and grand cup-bearer of the Pope, he was appointed Minister of War in 1860. It would have pleased him to make of Pius IX. another Julius II., that warlike pontiff who took back the Romagna from Cæsar Borgia, subdued Perugia

GENERAL DE LAMORCIÈRE.

and Bologna, added Parma, Piacenza, and Reggio to his States, and fought, sword in hand, against Venice and France.

It was Monseigneur de Mérode who had the idea of inducing General de Lamoricière to enter the Pope's service. He héard that in talking with a former French ambassador at Rome, M. de Courcelle, the general had said, "The pontifical cause is one that it would be good to die in." This phrase was a revelation to Monseigneur de Mérode. Accompanied by his brother, the Comte Werner de Mérode, he went to see General de Lamoricière at the château of Prouzel, in Picardy, and had no difficulty in persuading him to become the armed champion of Pius IX. Lamoricière wrote at the time to General Bedeau: "I commission one of our common friends to tell you the part I have taken. . . . Really, I have no hope but in God; for, so far as I know, no man is equal to the work I am about to begin. . . . I hope I shall not lack boldness when need arises; but I expect my reward in heaven much rather than here."

General de Lamoricière was possibly the most illustrious of all the men who had refused to rally to the Second Empire. His family connections and his piety made him agreeable to the legitimists, the glorious part he had taken in the African campaigns, and his friendship for the sons of Louis Philippe to the Orleanists, and to the republicans he was equally endeared by the great rôle he had played under the

Second Republic, his loyalty to General Cavaignac, and his bitter opposition to the *coup d'Etat*. He was one of the principal victims of the 2d of December. The different oppositions found in him their incarnation. In his own person he represented all the malcontents.

General de Lamoricière arrived in Rome with Monseigneur de Mérode, April 1, 1860. Two days later, the Duc de Gramont wrote to M. Thouvenel : —

"My dear Minister : General de Lamoricière is here. He has accepted an appointment as generalissimo of the pontifical army, with the proviso that he is never to serve against France. Cardinal Antonelli was commissioned to ask the Emperor for the necessary authorization, and he seems to have replied that he would arrange matters with the Minister of War and the grand chancellor of the Legion of Honor ; that this would suffice, and that there was no need of writing to the Emperor. There is a menace in this which will not escape you, and which annoys the Holy See. In fact, the Pope is very well aware that it would be impossible to give a high position in his States to an officer who should set up as a rebel against his Majesty."

Lamoricière's arrival embarrassed the Duc de Gramont, who on this occasion thought he had cause of complaint against General de Goyon, aide-de-camp of the Emperor, and commander of the French army of occupation at Rome. April 7 he sent word to M. Thouvenel that "General de Goyon has begun

by taking in hand the Vatican party and Lamoricière, and if I had not prevented him, a word from the Cardinal was all he was waiting for to pay military honors to the new pontifical general, without troubling himself to ascertain whether or not the latter stood all right with his own government. The result is that the camarilla considers the general a saint and the ambassador a devil, the worthy representative of a sovereign who is still more of a devil than he."

It is curious to note the opinion formed of Lamoricière's new rôle by M. de Persigny, one of the most ardent of imperialists. He writes: "Ambassador of France at London, I happened, some days since, to be in Paris, when I heard this news, which astonished me very much. I knew M. de Lamoricière's hatred for the Emperor, his violent, vindictive character, his inconsiderate remarks, and that his surroundings were hostile to the government; I did not understand how so important and delicate a post could be given to such a man under circumstances so grave. I was convinced that he had accepted command of the Pope's army simply to have occasion to create difficulties for us in Italy. Carrying no serious political weight, by turns revolutionist and conservative, demagogue and clerical, yet brave and audacious, M. de Lamoricière might be a dangerous political instrument in the hands of our enemies."

It is plain that M. de Persigny was greatly preju-

diced against the general. And yet he had the idea of making him serviceable to French interests by uniting him to a combination which he proposed to the Emperor as likely to prevent Italian unity by severing the Pope and the King of Naples. According to this plan General de Lamoricière would have defended Rome with the pontifical troops, — the French troops occupying the Marches and Umbria meanwhile.

M. de Persigny adds in the same writing (dated from Chamarande, January 29, 1868): "If this policy was not in the interest of Italy, it was at least in that of France, which had everything to fear from the complications of the Roman question. When one reflects that nothing was needed to escape all these difficulties but to station General de Lamoricière at Rome and guard our frontier ourselves, it is hard to understand why a measure so simple and easy of execution was not adopted by the French government. For several years my amazement at this fault was so great that, in spite of my knowledge of its habitual inertia, I attributed it to the opposition of the court of Rome and the obstinate passions of the ultramontane party. The truth, which I learned later, was that the Emperor's government did nothing, proposed nothing to Rome on this subject. All warnings were unavailing. The force of inertia carried the day against the most ordinary prudence."

The Emperor gave the general the authorization

required in order to preserve his French citizenship while serving under the Papal flag. But between him and the quondam proscript of the 2d of December there remained a mutual suspicion. It annoyed the Duc de Gramont to see Frenchmen known for their ultra-legitimist or Orleanist sympathies coming to Rome to take service under the new general. The legitimists were the most enthusiastic of his supporters. The former minister of General Cavaignac had become the idol of the adherents of the white flag.

Yet the general's attitude toward the French embassy was correct. He ordered his officers to abstain from imprudent language, and not to provoke the displeasure of the Emperor. Moreover, he was touched by the attentions shown him by General de Goyon and the French officers, all of whom admired the exploits of the hero of Africa. He still hoped that France would not abandon him. It was at this time that M. de Persigny, notwithstanding his well-known sympathies for Piedmont, said to Napoleon III.: "To aid in the destruction of the pontifical army by force of arms would be to outstep the boundaries of prudence, and give an appearance of weakness and duplicity to our policy which nothing could justify in the eyes of Catholic Europe." Lamoricière sometimes had a presentiment of such a desertion. From the time of his arrival in Rome, he had comprehended all the difficulties of his task. This brave soldier, whose youth

had been so brilliant, so gay, so enthusiastic, had in later years experienced all the sorrows and disenchantments of life. The eight years of exile or of inactivity he had passed since his sword was broken in 1851, left him profoundly melancholy at heart. Neglected by men, he had returned to God. The religious sentiments which animated the Crusaders when they reached the Holy Land were not more keen than those which he experienced on entering the Eternal City. If need were, he meant to offer himself in holocaust, and to merit in the eyes of the Church, if not the laurels of the conqueror, at least the martyr's palm.

CHAPTER XX

THE PONTIFICAL ARMY

ON the 1st of March the pontifical army comprised sixteen thousand men. General de Lamoricière occupied himself in completing and organizing this army. Volunteers from France, Belgium, Ireland, Austria, and Bavaria augmented the total to nearly twenty-five thousand. This was a real crusade.

April 8, Easter Sunday, Lamoricière issued an order of the day to his soldiers, in which he said: "At the sound of the grand voice which lately apprised the world from the Vatican of the dangers threatening the patrimony of St. Peter, Catholics were moved, and their emotion soon spread to every part of the earth.

"This is because Christianity is not merely the religion of the civilized world, but the animating principle of civilization; it is because the Papacy is the keystone of the arch of Christianity, and all Christian nations seem, in these days, to be conscious of those great verities which are our faith.

"The revolution to-day threatens Europe as Islamism did of old, and now, as then, the cause of the

Pope is that of civilization and liberty throughout the world.

"Soldiers, have confidence, and believe that God will raise our courage to the level of the great cause whose defence He has intrusted to our arms."

As chief of staff, Lamoricière selected the Marquis de Pimodan. Born in Paris January 29, 1822, he had been received at Saint-Cyr, but as officers were then required to swear allegiance to Louis-Philippe, he was unwilling to serve in France, and, with the approbation of the Comte de Chambord, entered the Austrian army, already well supplied with officers belonging to old French families. He distinguished himself in 1848 and 1849 in the Italian and Hungarian campaigns. At the age of thirty-three he was already a colonel, and as no further promotion was possible unless he were naturalized an Austrian, he renounced the military career, returned to France, and in 1855 married Mademoiselle de Couronnel, granddaughter of the Duc de Montmorency-Laval, the famous ambassador of the Restoration. Thenceforward he lived sometimes in Paris, and sometimes at the château of Echenay, in the department of the Haute-Marne. Military matters continued to interest him. He published a pamphlet on the rôle of cavalry, went to Russia to study the battlefields of the grand army, and gave M. Thiers considerable information for his *History of the Consulate and the Empire*.

One evening, at the château of Echenay, Pimodan

said in the course of conversation, "If the Pope wishes to do anything to regain his States and defend what he has left, I am at his service." The idea of forming a compact little pontifical army seemed at that time to many Frenchmen the best way to serve at once the Papal cause and that of France. Toward the end of January, 1860, Pimodan went to Paris to see the Papal Nuncio, Monseigneur Sacconi. "I am entirely devoted to the pontifical cause," he said to him; "I urgently request the Pope to count on me." He arrived in Rome April 4, and saw Lamoricière the following day. On the 16th he was appointed colonel in the pontifical army and chief of staff. His attitude was extremely prudent. He wrote to France, "Protest on my behalf against all idea of hostility to the government." He kept up cordial, almost family, relations with General de Goyon, who commanded the French corps of observation. After the Revolution the great-uncle of M. de Pimodan had married a demoiselle de Goyon, and the Marquise de Pimodan was a relative of the Comtesse de Goyon, born Montesquiou-Fezensac.

Pimodan displayed great activity in aiding Lamoricière to reorganize the pontifical troops. It was not an easy task. One might say that everything remained to be done. The commander-in-chief had to contend against inertia, routine, and inveterate abuses.

However, volunteers poured in, overflowing with courage. A generous movement had taken place

in the Catholic provinces of western France. Young men belonging to the oldest French nobility, and bearing the most illustrious names, came with enthusiasm to enroll themselves under the pontifical banner. This example was followed by the great Belgian families. The French were divided between a squadron of guides under command of the Comte de Bourbon-Chalus, and a demi-battalion of infantry which, united to the Belgian volunteers, formed a corps known as the Franco-Belgian sharpshooters, commanded by M. de Becdelièvre, once a captain in the French army. This corps was the nucleus of the pontifical zouaves. Henri de Cathelineau, grandson of the Saint of Anjou, had raised a troop of volunteers. Not having received authorization to command it himself from the pontifical government, he joined it to the Franco-Belgian battalion. The Duc de Bisaccia presented the Pope with twelve rifled cannon. The Irish formed a battalion named for St. Patrick. The Italian pontifical troops comprised two regiments of the line and two battalions of chasseurs, besides the gendarmes and a single squadron of cavalry in good condition. The Swiss, commanded by Colonel Schmidt, numbered between three and four thousand, and formed a battalion of carbineers and two regiments called foreign. These were soon augmented by five thousand Austrians, who formed five regiments of bersaglieri, some two or three thousand Irishmen, and several hundred French and Belgians. Added to the troops recruited

from the Pope's subjects, this formed a total of twenty to twenty-five thousand men. Concerning this heterogeneous camp, Pimodan wrote: "It is like a camp of Schiller's Wallenstein. All languages are spoken. I have chatted with a good many Germans, Poles, Hungarians, and even with Swedes, who serve under the name of Switzers in the foreign regiments." Among the Franco-Belgian sharpshooters there was a Rohan, a Ligne, a Chevigné, a Rainneville, a Charette, a Lergeril, two sons of Joseph de Maistre, etc.

After many efforts, the fortified town of Ancona was put in a state of defence, and the command of it given by Lamoricière to one of his comrades at the siege of Algiers, M. de Quatrebarbes, once a French deputy. Ancona suited the commander-in-chief as the last refuge of an independent pontifical authority. He thought that in case of necessity his army might take shelter there and defend itself behind the ramparts long enough to allow Catholic Europe time to intervene. Meanwhile he was everywhere at once, seeking to remedy the lack of cohesion among his troops. "General de Lamoricière," wrote Pimodan, "is really a past master for the regulations and the administration of an army. I have never once found him at fault."

To sum up, there was great devotion, bravery, and enthusiasm among the volunteers who hastened to the aid of the Holy See, but the army was not prepared to resist the attack of a great power. It had

very little cavalry. Its artillery comprised only two mounted batteries badly organized, and five marching batteries which were still worse off. Aided by the French corps of occupation they would have done great service. Alone, they were capable of maintaining order in Rome and of making headway against the revolutionary bands. But from the moment when they should be confronted by the Piedmontese army, the assistance of France would be indispensable. Therefore, Napoleon III. was in reality the master of the situation.

We have just spoken of the Pope's defenders. Now let us glance at the bitterest of his enemies.

CHAPTER XXI

GARIBALDI

THE Italian revolution was incarnated in Garibaldi. A typical sectary and adventurer, courageous to heroism, rash to folly, inflexible, scornful of diplomatic subterfuges; straightforward, sincere, and disinterested, having nothing in common with those demagogues who arrive at power only to grasp at what they once called the baubles of vanity, and who seek to become chamberlains after having been tribunes; a romantic personage, affecting the imagination by his theatrical manners, his inflammatory and vibrant words, and his invincible self-reliance, Garibaldi was a fanatic, a seer, a visionary. His adherents considered him an exceptional and legendary being.

His life was a romance of cloak and sword. Born at Nice July 4, 1807, he served first in the Piedmontese navy. In 1834, he took part in the Young Italy conspiracy. To escape the police, he sought shelter in France. Thence he went to Tunis, — where the Bey made him captain of a frigate, — and from there to America, where he joined the insurgents of the Rio Grande province in fight-

ing against Brazil. In 1842, he was taken prisoner and spent a year in captivity. In 1844, he entered the service of the Republic of Uruguay, then at war with Rosas, dictator of Buenos Ayres. With three small vessels he held his own for three consecutive days against a flotilla of ten ships of war. Rather than surrender, he burned his vessels, went ashore with his companions, fought his way through the enemy's troops, and went to take command of an Italian legion. He was the victor in several engagements, notably that of Saint-Antoine. After this latter fight, the Montevidean government decreed that the date of the battle and the name of Garibaldi should be inscribed in letters of gold on the banner of the Italian legion. At this time, the name of the hardy adventurer was famous throughout America. It was soon to be so throughout Europe.

At the first rumor of the events of 1848, Garibaldi left Montevideo. He landed at Genoa and was greeted with enthusiasm. He established himself in a strong position on the banks of Lake Como, at the head of a free company of five thousand men, but after some successes was obliged to withdraw into Switzerland. In 1849, the flight of Pius IX. and the proclamation of the Roman Republic afforded new aliment to his revolutionary activity. Called to Rome by Mazzini, he sat in the Constituent Assembly, and then organized the defence of the city against the French army. After the victory of the latter, he left Rome July 2, 1849, with two thousand

foot soldiers and four hundred horsemen, and succeeded in conducting his little band to the neutral territory of San Marino. The powers obliged the little Republic to turn out the fugitives, who dispersed. Hunted by the Austrians, Garibaldi crossed the Apennines, his wife Anita dying of fatigue during the journey. It was only after great sufferings and dangers that he reached Genoa and set off once more for America.

On returning to the New World, Garibaldi devoted himself to business. In New York, he managed a candle factory. Then he went to California, entered the service of Peru, and in 1852 made a voyage to China in a Peruvian vessel. He returned to Genoa in 1854, and became a captain in the Piedmontese merchant service. During the war of 1859 he took the offensive against Austria at the head of the Alpine chasseurs. In 1860, he protested against the annexation of Savoy and Nice to France, and resigned his posts as major-general and deputy. When Nice, his native city, became French, he posed as the ruthless adversary of Cavour, and vowed that he would direct the destinies of Italy to suit himself, careless alike of counsels and of threats. Although he continued to speak respectfully of Victor Emmanuel, he resolved to pay no more attention to the King than to his minister, and to consider the remonstrances of European diplomacy as null and void.

Sicily having rebelled against the King of Naples, Garibaldi determined to get an expedition ready at

Genoa and go to its assistance. April 26 the *Gazette* of Milan published the following note: "Volunteers who may desire to go to Sicily should address themselves to the office of this journal." This was the first hint the public got of Garibaldi's schemes. The Piedmontese government took no notice of it. All preparations were made without the slightest secrecy. And before starting the leader of the expedition wrote this letter to Victor Emmanuel: —

"Sire: The cry of distress which reached my ears from Sicily has touched my heart and those of several hundreds of my old companions in arms. I did not counsel the insurrectionary movement of my Sicilian brethren; but from the moment when they rose in the name of Italian unity, of which your Majesty is the personification, against the most infamous tyranny of our epoch, I could not hesitate to place myself at the head of the expedition. I know I am embarking in a dangerous enterprise, but I put my trust in God, as well as in the courage and loyalty of my companions.

"Our war-cry will always be: *Long live the unity of Italy! Long live Victor Emmanuel, its first and bravest soldier!* If we fail, I hope that Italy and liberal Europe will not forget that this enterprise was undertaken through motives untainted by selfishness and entirely patriotic. If we succeed, I shall be proud to adorn your Majesty's crown with this new and perhaps most brilliant gem, on condition,

however, that your Majesty will prevent his advisers from ceding this province to the foreigner, as has been done in the case of my native city.

"I have not apprised your Majesty of my project; in fact, I was afraid lest, by means of my devotion to his person, your Majesty might succeed in persuading me to abandon it.

"Of your Majesty the most devoted subject,

"GARIBALDI."

In reality, the King had very little sympathy with the famous adventurer. The Comte d'Ideville says: "It is a mistake to attribute to Victor Emmanuel a great liking for Garibaldi. Soldiers both, there were doubtless certain points of contact in their character and tastes which occasionally enabled them to come to a mutual understanding. But the republican familiarity and frequently protective airs of the hero were extremely displeasing to the descendant of the House of Savoy. For that matter, where is the sovereign, placed in similar conditions, who would not have taken umbrage at the fabulous prestige of Garibaldi's name?"

It is our own belief that, far from inciting and organizing the expedition, the King and his prime minister attempted, at any rate in the first place, to prevent it; but, thinking themselves not strong enough to oppose the popular sentiment, they let things take their course, intending to disown the enterprise if it failed, and to profit by it if it succeeded. The Comte d'Ideville relates that Victor

Emmanuel said to Baron de Talleyrand, the French minister: "*Mon Dieu*, of course it would be a great misfortune, but if the Neapolitan cruisers hang my poor Garibaldi, he will have brought his sad fate upon himself. It would simplify matters a good deal. What a fine monument we would put up to him!"

When it was learned that during the night of May 5–6 Garibaldi and a thousand volunteers had embarked at Genoa for Sicily on two vessels taken by force from the Rubattino Company, there was great excitement in Europe. Diplomacy protested against this violation of the law of nations. In Paris, the official world, the Catholics, the conservatives, loudly blamed the adventure. But the liberal journals praised it.

Facing such a situation, Napoleon III., on whom the eyes of all Europe were fixed, had to choose between three policies: 1. Frankly to accept Italian unity, and put himself at the head of the movement. 2. To combat unity by defending the Pope and the King of Naples with energy. 3. To preserve an expectant attitude, invoking the principle of non-intervention, and allow himself to be led by events instead of leading them. The Emperor adopted the latter policy.

CHAPTER XXII

FRANCIS II

THE throne of Naples had been occupied since May 2, 1859, by Francis II., born January 16, 1836, of the first marriage of Ferdinand II. with a daughter of Victor Emmanuel I., king of Sardinia. February 3, 1859, the young prince had married a daughter of Duke Maximilian of Bavaria, the Princess Sophia, sister of the Empress of Austria.

On ascending the throne, Francis II. seemed determined to deviate in nothing from the system of his father, — an inflexible adversary of liberalism, — and in his proclamation to his people he praised "that great and pious monarch whose heroic virtues and sublime merits have never been sufficiently celebrated." The adviser of the young sovereign at this time was his stepmother, the Archduchess Theresa, daughter of the famous Archduke Charles, Napoleon's rival, and second wife of Ferdinand II. Not one of the officials who served the late King was displaced, and the Neapolitan government remained neutral during the war in northern Italy.

Might Francis II. have averted the dangers which threatened his dynasty if he had at once become the ally of his relative, King Victor Emmanuel, and

granted certain reforms and a constitution? It is doubtful. No concession would have induced the advocates of Italian unity, or such revolutionists as Mazzini and Garibaldi, to lay down their arms. The Neapolitan dynasty was condemned by them, they would not at any price uphold it. If Francis II. refused reforms, they accused him of blindness and tyranny; if he granted them, they were converted by his enemies into weapons against him. Russia, Austria, and Prussia displayed great sympathy for him; but as the European concert was now but a figure of speech, of what avail were their sympathies? At the beginning of his reign England, which dreaded that some Murat might ascend the throne of Naples, and France, which was not engaged in such a combination, and, moreover, cared nothing about Italian unity, had both been kindly to the youthful monarch, and renewed the diplomatic relations with the Neapolitan government which had been interrupted at the end of the reign of Ferdinand II. The underground work of the Revolution was not yet completed, and the difficulties in the way of uniting under one sceptre peoples so dissimilar as the Piedmontese and Lombards on one hand, and the Neapolitans on the other, gave room for hope that the most natural solution of the Italian question would be arrived at; namely, the division of the peninsula between Victor Emmanuel, king of northern Italy, Pius IX., sovereign of the States of the Church in the centre, and Francis II., king of southern Italy.

FRANCIS II.

Of Naples and Sicily.

Napoleon III. did not seem averse to such a system. He directed Baron Brénier, his minister at Naples, to maintain amicable relations with the king's government; but his sympathies with that prince were very limited, and he had no intention of giving him active assistance. If a Bourbon of the elder branch, or even of the younger, had been on the throne of France instead of Napoleon III., it is probable that Francis II. would not have been abandoned as he was. Family ties might then have induced the government to sustain a dynasty of French origin, the head of which was a descendant of Louis XIV. But such souvenirs counted for very little with the Emperor. Then, too, all the republicans, the advanced liberals, the partisans of Piedmontese policy, showed a systematic hostility to Francis II. The legitimist party alone bore him real good will; and yet the youth of the prince made him interesting, and he was worthy of respect for his virtues and his piety. If there were abuses in his dominions, he was not responsible for them. He bore the penalty of crimes he had not committed.

In spite of its weakness and the germs of treason it contained; in spite, too, of an incessant revolutionary propaganda, the Neapolitan government would have repressed all internal troubles and made an end of the Garibaldian gangs, had it not been forced to contend against the Piedmontese regular army.

When Garibaldi sailed in the night of May 5–6

from Genoa for an unknown destination, the consuls telegraphed, the chancelleries were in commotion. The semi-official Parisian press tried to reassure the public. After announcing the enterprise, *La Patrie* added: "We need not add that the Piedmontese government censures this conduct, which is not simply an act of insubordination, but actual treason, so far as it is concerned. Besides, the vessel which carries Garibaldi is signalled all along the coast."

The daring adventurer had selected Marsala, a city of 20,000 souls, 156 kilometres from Palermo, as his landing-place. The choice was a clever one. Marsala contained many English people among its inhabitants, consequently many friends, and the country between it and Palermo was hilly and had no roads, and therefore was advantageous for a leader of desultory troops. Unable to go through the strait guarded by the citadel of Messina, Garibaldi had to sail in the direction of Tunis. Going ashore at the Regence headland, near Cape Bon, he provisioned his boats, the *Piemonte* and the *Lombardo*, and went on toward Marsala.

The two boats had been perceived, and two Neapolitan war-vessels, the *Capri* and the *Stromboli*, pursued them in all haste. When the *Piemonte* and the *Lombardo* came in sight of Marsala, May 11, the two frigates were not more than half a league behind them. Garibaldi and Bixio, hastening to shelter behind two English men-of-war, the *Argus* and the *Independence*, lying in the harbor, began their disem-

barkation. The Neapolitans sent a request that the English captains would withdraw their vessels and leave room for an attack. The latter replied that they could not comply with this demand until their officers, most of whom were ashore, should return on board. This operation took two hours at least, and it is permissible to believe that the English were willing to be slow about it. However this may be, Garibaldi and his companions, thus protected by two British ships, landed without being disturbed. The only consolation left the Neapolitans was to seize their empty vessels.

The Sicilian insurrection seemed to be nearly put down, and Garibaldi received a rather cool reception in Marsala. He did not remain there, but went on to Salemi, where he bivouacked three days, awaiting the recruits he expected from the interior. The effective of his little troop having mounted to four thousand men, he marched toward Palermo May 15, and fought a Neapolitan corps at Calatafimi. He was at Alcamo on the 17th, where in the name of King Victor Emmanuel he organized a government whose Secretary of State was M. Crispi, afterward prosecuted for his republican tendencies. May 22 he arrived at Parco, ten kilometres from Palermo. He attempted a surprise the next morning at four o'clock and succeeded. He carried the San Antonino gate at the point of the bayonet, and got as far as the Place of the Four Cantons, the centre of the city. The Neapolitan general, Lanza, at once ordered

a bombardment, and the fleet bringing its broadside to bear on the Marine Promenade, shelled Palermo with red-hot shot and bombs. It was a useless performance, however, and Garibaldi remained in possession. Admiral Persano then arrived in the roadstead with Piedmontese naval vessels, and secretly provided Garibaldi with cannon and munitions. The Cabinet of Turin did not yet dare to take off its mask.

At Naples, people heard in quick succession of the landing of Garibaldi, the occupation of Marsala, the battle of Calatafimi, and the taking of Palermo. The terrible news stupefied the court and the government. Francis II. felt himself surrounded by traitors. Their principal asylum, the centre of their conventicles, was the Piedmontese legation. The unhappy sovereign still fancied that Europe would not permit such a violation of the law of nations. But fate held in reserve for him a series of still bitterer and more painful disillusions. This was but the first act in the fatal drama.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE INTERVIEW OF BADEN

THE annexation of Savoy and Nice had greatly disturbed the Germans. Every one was saying that if Napoleon III. had rectified the southeastern frontier of France, he likewise intended to rectify that of the northeast, and possess himself of the banks of the Rhine.

There was at this time in Berlin a woman better adapted than any one else to appreciate the dispositions of Prussian society. This was Madame the Comtesse de Beaulaincourt, whose husband was military attaché of the French legation, and whose sister was the widow of Count Hatzfeldt who died while Minister of Prussia at Paris. Madame de Beaulaincourt wrote, June 1, to her father, Marshal de Castellane: "You can't imagine how annoyed this country is against the French. This hostility exists among the people as well as in society. Infamous libels are published, and read with avidity. You can't get it out of the heads of the majority of the public that we mean to go to war with them on the Rhine, although there is neither word nor deed to confirm that notion; the Rhine populations are also greatly irritated. From this springs hatred,

anxiety, suspicion. As there is no foundation for the rumor, I do not see how things are to be rectified and set in their true light. Italian affairs produce a great effect here and help to increase the feeling against France."

Napoleon III. suddenly resolved to reassure the public mind himself by resorting to personal measures with that one of the German princes whose influence was greatest and whose adherence to his policy in general he most desired. This was the Prince Regent of Prussia, to whom he proposed an impromptu interview at Baden to which all the German sovereigns with the exception of the Emperor of Austria might be invited. It is curious to note that of all the countries composing the Germanic Confederation, Austria was the one that, in spite of the war of Italy, suspected France the least. Unlike the Prince Regent of Prussia, the Emperor Francis Joseph needed no reassurance.

No sooner was the interview decided on than the Comtesse de Beaulaincourt wrote to Marshal de Castellane: "People are much occupied here with the Baden conference; the ultras are furious; in general, it is believed that it will produce a good effect; but even if the Regent is firm about it, he will require time to calm all the evil passions that have been roused here for some years past. The Regent will be accompanied only by two aides-de-camp: one of them is M. de Loc, who will do admirably; the other is old Rostitz, he is eighty."

Baden was a well-chosen locality for an assembly of monarchs and princes. Switzerland affords no more luxuriant vegetation, no finer trees, no greener swards than are found in this little earthly paradise sheltered between three mountains. Even the streets are nothing but alleys overarched by oaks, underneath which cluster pretty villas and attractive shops.

In the reign of Louis Philippe, Baden had been adopted by the Parisian upper class, as their favorite summer resort, and during the reign of Napoleon III. it had become more fashionable still. During the hot season it was the rendezvous of all luxuries, elegances, and pleasures. At nightfall, the *House of Conversation*, standing in the middle of a vast parterre surrounded with orange trees, lighted up its long galleries and glittering salons, the café on the left, the theatre on the right, and between them the immense ballroom. The season of 1860 opened with an improvised congress which no one had spoken of ten days before, but which for all that was almost as brilliant as the famous interview of Stuttgart. The following personages were present: the Prince Regent of Prussia and his wife (the future Empress Augusta); the Grand Duke of Baden and his wife, daughter of the Prince Regent; the Kings of Würtemberg, Bavaria, Saxony, and Hanover; the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt; the Duke of Nassau; the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha; the Prince and Princess Antony of Hohenzollern; Princess Marie

of Baden, Duchess of Hamilton; the Prince and Princess of Fürstenberg.

Napoleon III. left Paris June 15, at seven in the morning, for Baden. At half-past four in the afternoon he arrived at Strasburg, where, although he was travelling strictly incognito, an enormous crowd covered the space between the railway station and the Kehl bridge. At the Kehl station he was met by Prince William, sent by his brother the Grand Duke to convoy him to Baden. He had often been there in his youth, while living in the little château of Arenenberg near by. It pleased him to reappear, brilliant and powerful, in a city which reminded him of such different aspects of his career. His only regret was no longer to meet there the amiable Grand Duchess Stéphanie of Baden, whose recent death had given him real sorrow, and in whose former residence, the Villa Stéphanie, he now took up his own.

He arrived at half-past seven in the evening, and the Prince Regent of Prussia called upon him there an hour later. On descending from his carriage, this prince found himself face to face with Napoleon III., who shook hands cordially and brought him into the salon on the ground floor. Their interview lasted for more than an hour.

The *Prussian Gazette* published that day an article reproduced in Paris by the *Moniteur*. It said: "The Emperor Napoleon will arrive to-day at Baden to salute the Prince Regent on German ground. It

was the very kindly expressed wish of the Emperor to give the Prince Regent this proof of his peaceful and friendly sentiments. Prussia has reason to rejoice at this kindness, and to consider its signification — which it is impossible to misapprehend — with an unbiassed mind. For Prussia there can be no question of adopting a new policy, for its own has ever been frank, loyal, conciliatory, careful to preserve the peace of Europe and its tried foundations. But the difficulties of the times have caused anxieties which Europe will be glad to see vanish in presence of the friendly exchange of opinions between two princes whose manner of acting always exerts a considerable influence, often a decisive one, on the destinies of Europe. Germany will be pleased if the Emperor of the French strengthens in the mind of the Prince Regent the conviction that French policy is as pacific as it is strong, and France will see an important pledge of the duration of its neighborly relations with us, if the Emperor Napoleon receives from the Prince Regent in person the assurance of that loyal and moderate policy which serves as an invariable rule for the actions of his government."

The article concluded thus: "What is done at Baden will, we hope, revive confidence in a safe and prosperous future for Europe, and at the same time assure one of the essential bases of that future: the concurrence of Germany."

At this time Napoleon III. had a sort of predilection for Prussia and the Prince Regent. A nuance

of etiquette made this noticeable. When the Prince came to pay the first visit, June 15, he was received on the staircase of the villa Stéphanie by the sovereign himself. When the King of Wurtemberg, the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the Kings of Saxony, Bavaria, and Hanover, the Duke of Nassau, and the Prince of Hohenzollern called the following day, they were met at the door by a chamberlain and an aide-de-camp who conducted them to the Emperor's apartments and announced them.

Napoleon III. produced a good impression on the assembled sovereigns during this visit. They all appreciated his very kindly expression, his politeness, and charming simplicity of manner. He proved himself a brilliant talker and an invariably good-tempered one. All pleased themselves with hoping that he cherished no dark designs on Germany.

Napoleon III. returned to Fontainebleau, where he had left the Empress and the Prince Imperial on the 18th of June. On the following day the *Moniteur* said; "The rapid journey just made by the Emperor will doubtless have fortunate results. Nothing but the spontaneity of so significant a proceeding was required to stifle a unanimous concert of malevolent rumors and unfounded criticisms. In fact, the Emperor, by going to Baden to explain frankly to the sovereigns there assembled that his policy will never deviate from right and justice, must have conveyed to minds so distinguished and so devoid of prejudices the conviction which a real sentiment, honestly ex-

plained, never fails to inspire. Hence something more than courtesy entered into the reciprocal relations of this august assembly."

The Baden interview was favorably estimated in Paris. The Bourse greeted the return of the sovereign by a great rise in prices.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE SYRIAN MASSACRES

THE death of the Emperor's uncle, King Jérôme Bonaparte, occurred June 18, 1860, and his funeral obsequies were celebrated at the chapel of the Invalides with royal pomp on July 3. A few days later, the public mind was greatly occupied by news from Syria, where frightful massacres had just taken place. The Christian religion also had received most cruel injuries in the land of its birth, and further catastrophes were impending.

The massacres began in the mountains of Libanus, and their cause seemed attributable to the mistakes made by European diplomacy. It had been a very ill-advised proceeding on the part of its agents to undertake to secure peace between the Maronites and Druses by assigning to each of these races and religions a distinct administration, after Syria had been taken by force in 1840 from the energetic domination of Mehemet Ali, Viceroy of Egypt. The diplomats had forgotten that the Druses and Maronites, though separate from the ethnographic and religious point of view, are not always so in the space they occupy. In many villages the popula-

tions are mixed. Instead of maintaining peace, the distinct administrations were bound to multiply the causes of animosity and disputes.

The Porte, which aimed at destroying the arrangement of 1845 in order to make a simple pashalik of Mount Lebanon, promoted disorder itself. Dividing to reign, it adopted the Machiavellian policy of setting the Maronites and Druses mutually by the ears. Seconded in this work by the English agents, jealous of French influence and hostile to the Maronites, who, like all the Eastern Christians, were protégés of France, it systematically organized disorder and anarchy.

There had been an underground disturbance going on in the Libanus for several years, not merely in the mixed community, but in the Christian lieutenancy, where struggles had occurred between the Turkish lieutenant, the sheiks, the clergy, and the peasants. In August, 1859, the first fight occurred in the village of Beit-Meri.

M. Jules Perrette, who witnessed the Syrian massacres in 1860, has thus explained the situation: "What in reality are these bitter adversaries? Peasants of patriarchal manners, each of whom owns a house and an orchard. To disturb their peace a third party, interested in their common ruin, was essential; whereas the slightest intervention of a well-meaning government, even were it as feeble as that of the Turkish Empire, would have been enough to prevent trouble. Nothing was required

to avert any serious collision but that the pashas of Damascus and Beyrout should confine themselves to preventing both parties from coming to buy arms and powder in either of these two cities, and should be furnished with at most two thousand men ready to go into the mountains at the first sign of disturbance."

Instead of this, what does the Turkish government do? It had long been exciting the two races against each other, favoring the Druses and permitting them to get ready for massacres. Now, while these remain at liberty all winter to provide themselves with arms and ammunition, government prevents the Maronites from leaving the towns with their ordinary weapons, without which no prudent man would even dream at any time of stirring a step.

The preparations of the Druses are complete. Thereupon the government hastily withdraws all the regular troops from Syria, leaving Damascus, the capital, a city of a hundred and fifty thousand souls, under guard of three hundred soldiers, and such soldiers! The consuls rage and protest. They are tricked by evasive and dilatory answers.

The great conspiracy comes to a head May 29, 1860. The attack on the Christians begins at the little town of Beit-Meri, some leagues from Beyrout, and thence extends to all the Meton. Thirty-two villages are burned in three days amidst scenes of cruel atrocity. Horrible massacres make Sayda,

Rascheya, Hasbeya, Zahle, and Deir-el-Kamar stream with blood. The Turkish soldiers retire into their barracks instead of assailing the cut-throats, and refuse shelter there to victims who implore their pity. Authority is either helpless or else playing the accomplice in every quarter. At Deir-el-Kamar, where the massacre and pillage lasted from noon to sundown, the soldiers kept for themselves four-fifths of the booty (June 21, 1860). The horrors committed would be incredible, were they not vouched for, not merely by French testimony, but by the reports of the English, the political protectors of the Druses.

The Christian populations are seized with terror, and, abandoning their villages at the risk of being killed on the highways, flee toward Beyrout and Damascus. Many perish on the road. At Damascus they crowd pell-mell into the buildings of the Greek patriarchate, the churches, and the khans. The streets swarm with mendicants. All the Christians of the city are mad with fright, remembering the tragedies of Marach, Aleppo, and Djeddah. They live from day to day, from hour to hour, in expectation of a frightful drama, a general massacre. It is no longer possible to escape the catastrophe by flight. No road is safe. The neighborhood is full of brigands and Druses.

Amidst this dreadful crisis there is one Mussulman who distinguishes himself by his humanity, who does his duty, and more than his duty. This is the

former adversary of the French, the Algerian hero, the Emir Abd-el-Kader. Shortly before ascending the throne, Napoleon III. went to the château of Amboise, in October, 1852, and restoring the Emir to liberty, said to him: "You have been the enemy of France, but I do justice none the less to your courage and your patience in misfortune; and that is why I consider it an honor to put an end to your captivity, having perfect confidence in your parole." Ever since that time, Abd-el-Kader had found an asylum in Damascus, where he lived at the head of many Algerians. When the hour comes to show his gratitude to Napoleon III., his admirable conduct proves that it is deeply felt.

Read this letter, written at Damascus July 2, a week before the grand massacre: "While the authorities maintain an inexplicable inactivity, the Emir Abd-el-Kader is constantly at work among the ulemas, the notables, and chiefs of the different quarters to prevent the evils by which the Christians are threatened. One may say that his energy and eloquence have saved the city twice already, for a movement has twice been on the point of breaking out, and it is he who averted it. . . . He watches over the general safety night and day, and gives incessant proofs of personal abnegation and loyalty to the cause whose defence he has so nobly undertaken."

But Abd-el-Kader multiplies his generous efforts in vain. The Turkish authority has decided on the

massacre, and it will take place. It breaks out, July 9, with unheard-of fury and atrocity. There are neither Druses nor Maronites among the population of Damascus; Mussulman fanaticism is solely responsible for the catastrophe. Horrible scenes, inconceivable refinements of cruelty, occur. Such Christian females as are spared are taken to the harems. Blood flows in torrents. The bashi-bazouks and the police rob and murder instead of preserving order. The Russian consulate is the first to be attacked; then comes the turn of the vice-consulates of Belgium, Holland, and America. The dragoman of the Russian consulate is assassinated, the American vice-consul seriously wounded. Achmet Pasha takes no measures whatever to arrest the scourge. The Fathers of the Holy Land refuse to leave their convent and are all put to death inside its walls. All the religious establishments are first pillaged and then burned. For six days the massacres go on. But for the generous intervention of Abd-el-Kader, all the Christians would have perished. A squad of some twelve hundred Algerians protected and opened a passage for the flying consuls, Lazarists, and Sisters of Charity who found shelter in the house of the Emir.

So it went on: after the Libanus, Damascus; after the Druses, the Turks. It began to be a question whether Moslem fanaticism, excited to the point of madness, were not on the point of annihilating all the Eastern Christians.

Paris learned of the Damascus massacres by the following note in the *Moniteur* of July 18: "The Minister of Marine has received the following despatch from the commander-in-chief of the Levant naval division: 'Beyrout, July 14. — The attack on the Christians began at Damascus on the afternoon of July 9. By evening many men had been killed and women taken to the harems. It is said that all the consulates were burned except the English one. The French, Russian, and Greek consuls took shelter at the house of Abd-el-Kader. The action of the Turkish authorities at Damascus has been null, and, as always, more harmful than helpful. Three thousand Turkish soldiers arrived to-day on a vessel and two Turkish frigates. Vely and Namich Pasha, the commissioners, are impatiently expected.'"

Islamism knew that the Emperor of the French would defend the Cross, and would not abandon the venerable traditions which made the Eldest Son of the Church the protector of all the Oriental Christians. Hence, instead of justifying the massacres, the Sultan addressed the following letter to Napoleon III.: "Palace of Dolma-Batché, July 16. — I am sure your Majesty well knows with what sorrow I have learned of the events in Syria. Be assured that I will do all that lies in my power to restore order and security, to punish the guilty, whoever they may be, and to do justice to all. In order to remove all doubt concerning the intentions of my government, I shall entrust this important commis-

sion to my Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuad Pasha, whose principles your Majesty is well acquainted with."

July 20, the *Moniteur* said, "In presence of the deplorable events of which Syria is the scene, and which justly cause profound emotion in Europe, the Emperor's government has felt constrained to make its impressions known to other cabinets and to the Porte, and to urge the adoption in common of the measures demanded by the circumstances."

Napoleon III. comprehended that the initial order given to the squadrons, to put their vessels at the disposal of the consuls, did not permit of reaching the insurrection in its stronghold in the interior of the Libanus or the inland towns, already invaded or threatened, and that nothing but a body of troops, ready to act according to circumstances, would be sufficient for the task.

Christianity had found its defender. When the late massacres in Armenia took place, all Europe could see for itself how greatly it lacked the initiative and energy of a Napoleon III.

CHAPTER XXV

SYRIA AND ENGLAND

NAPOLEON III. loved chivalrous causes. To defend the oppressed seemed to him the noblest attribute of power. He believed in the saying: *French soldier, God's soldier;* and in the antique device: *Gesta Dei per Francos.* At a moment when the clergy were blaming his conduct with reference to Rome, it pleased him to send his troops to the aid of the Oriental Christians and renew the glorious traditions of the Crusades. But he could not succeed in this without offending the jealous susceptibilities of England. He needed as much prudence as sang-froid to triumph over the opposition of the Cabinet of London and perform a work of mercy.

It is not easy to comprehend the unjust suspicions which England, Prince Albert, and even Queen Victoria nourished in 1860 against France and the Emperor. Her Britannic Majesty wrote to Leopold I., King of the Belgians, May 18: "The continual agitation of our neighbor and the rumors that are in circulation destroy our confidence. Really, it is altogether too bad! No country, no kingdom in the world, dreams

of attacking France; all would be enchanted to see it prosper, but it is bound to disturb every corner of the globe, to cause confusion, and set everybody by the ears. Sooner or later this will bring about a crusade against this universal perturber of the peace." So, after the confraternity of arms in China and the Crimea, after the commercial treaty, after so many advances made to England, such proofs of sympathy given to its sovereign and its government, it is as a *universal perturber* that the Queen treats her best, most loyal, and most faithful ally!

It was natural that the sending of French troops to Syria should awake uneasiness on the part of a nation so ill disposed. In London people fancied that the Emperor's plan was a mere cover for designs of conquest in the East, and Napoleon III. had the greatest difficulty in dispelling such illusions.

France had not the slightest wish to act alone in Syria. She asked the other great powers to join their troops to hers. M. Thouvenel wrote, July 17, to the Comte de Persigny, ambassador of France at London: "The combination could not succeed except in concert with the Porte, and, moreover, it would be essential that it should be the result of an evident agreement between the five courts. The intervention would thus be collective in its origin, and the European troops, sent with a mutual intention, might simply act as a sort of delegation from the powers."

The Porte, on the other hand, strongly opposed the proposed expedition in two diplomatic com-

munications dated July 20 and July 26: "Such a measure," it claimed, "by the impression it must unavoidably and quickly produce on the Mussulmans and Christians of other parts of the Empire, would have consequences beyond all calculation or description, and its efforts to protect Christians in one part of the Empire would thus entail great bloodshed elsewhere." Moreover, the Porte claimed that Fuad Pasha had already sufficient troops in Syria for the restoration of order, and refused to send the ambassador all the powers requisite to sign a convention.

Napoleon III., thinking himself bound to make a personal attempt to dispel British suspicions, wrote a letter from Saint-Cloud, July 29, to his ambassador at London, in which he insisted more strongly than ever upon his invincible resolve to maintain the English alliance. It began as follows: "My dear Persigny: Things seem to be in such a state of confusion, thanks to the distrust so widely disseminated since the war of Italy, that I write you in hopes that a perfectly frank conversation with Lord Palmerston may remedy the present evil. Lord Palmerston knows me, and when I affirm a thing he will believe me. Very well, you may tell him from me, in the most explicit manner, that, since the peace of Villafranca, I have had but one thought, one end in view, namely, to inaugurate a new era of peace and live on good terms with my neighbors, and especially with England. I had given up Savoy

and Nice, and the only thing that revived my wish to see provinces essentially French restored to France was the extraordinary growth of Piedmont. But, it will be objected, you want peace, and you are increasing the forces of France beyond all measure! I deny the fact in every particular."

The Emperor added that there was nothing in his army or navy which should disquiet anybody. His steamships were not nearly so numerous as the sailing vessels deemed necessary in the time of King Louis Philippe. He had 400,000 men under arms, but when one subtracted from this number 60,000 in Algeria, 6000 in Rome, 8000 in China, 20,000 gendarmes, the sick and the conscripts, it was plain to be seen that the regiments had an effective greatly reduced from that of the previous régime.

Then the Emperor broached the affairs of the Orient: "When La Vallette departed for Constantinople, the instructions I gave him were limited to this: Do all in your power to maintain the *status quo*. It is to the interest of France that Turkey shall live as long as possible.

"Now come the massacres of Syria, and writers say that I am very glad to find another occasion for a little war, and for playing a new part. Really, they give me credit for very little common sense.

"If I have at once proposed an expedition, it is because I feel like the people who have placed me at their head, and the news from Syria has transported me with indignation. All the same, my first

thought was to act with England. What interest save that of humanity could induce me to send troops into that country? Could the possession of it possibly increase my power? Can I avoid seeing that Algeria, in spite of its advantages in the future, is as yet only a drain on France, which for thirty years has been giving it the purest of its blood and its money?

"I should be very glad not to be obliged to send an expedition to Syria, and, in any case, not to do it alone; in the first place, because it will cost a great deal, and secondly, because I am afraid this intervention may involve the question of the Orient; but, on the other hand, I do not see how I am to resist the public opinion of my country, which will never understand how one can leave unpunished, not merely the murder of Christians, but the burning of our consulates, the destruction of our flag, the pillage of monasteries under our protection."

Frankly and loyally the Emperor held out his hand to England and desired to come to terms with her, not only in Syria, but in Italy. "It has been difficult for me," said he, "to agree with England in reference to central Italy, because I was bound by the treaty of Villafranca; as to southern Italy I am unpledged, and I ask nothing better than to act with England on that point, as on others; but for heaven's sake, let the eminent men at the head of the English government lay aside mean jealousies and unjust suspicions. Let us come to a loyal

understanding like the honest men we are, and not act like thieves who want to cheat each other.

"I desire that Italy may be appeased, no matter how, but without foreign intervention, and that my troops may leave Rome without endangering the safety of the Pope."

The letter ended thus: "I have told you exactly what I think, disguising nothing and omitting nothing. Make what use of my letter you see fit. Believe in my sincere friendship."

The imperial letter made a great commotion when published in the English papers. Prince Albert wrote to the Prince Regent of Prussia, August 5: "I must tell you that M. Thouvenel immensely regrets the publicity given the Emperor's letter to M. de Persigny; he is afraid that it will injure his Majesty in the eyes of the people, and that it includes promises it may be difficult to keep." Nevertheless, the Emperor attained his object, and as Sir Theodore Martin has said in his life of the Prince Consort, a work inspired by Queen Victoria and filled with documents which she supplied, "Nothing afterward occurred in the Emperor's relations with England to contradict the language of this remarkable and clever letter."

Napoleon III. attained his ends. The five great powers and the Porte, in conference at Paris, had come to an agreement on all the points, when, at the last moment, the English ambassador, Lord Cowley, received from his government the singular mission

to request that the execution of the measures, urgently called for by the perilous condition of the Christians of Syria, should be delayed until the representatives of the powers had received plenary powers in due form, and the ratifications of the arrangements been exchanged. No attention was paid to this request. August 3, a protocol, whose clauses went immediately into effect, and which was transformed into a convention on the 3d of September following, was signed at Paris at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It stipulated that a body of European troops, which might amount to twelve thousand men, should be sent to Syria. The French government agreed to provide at once the moiety of these troops. General de Beaufort, commander-in-chief of the expedition, was to enter into communication as soon as he arrived with Fuad Pasha, the Sultan's commissioner in Syria, in order to concert all the measures demanded by the circumstances. The high contracting parties, declaring themselves convinced that six months would suffice to attain the peaceful settlement they had in view, set that limit to the occupation of the country by the European troops.

Treated with suspicion in London, Napoleon III. had met only kindness in St. Petersburg. The Duc de Montebello, French ambassador in Russia, wrote to M. Thouvenel, July 21: "Prince Gortchakoff has made no difficulty about telling me that whenever there is question of measures for the protection of

Christians, Russia will always be ready to take part in them, making no distinction of races or cults; also, that he would agree to my propositions, and would see, without jealousy and with confidence and pleasure, the flag of France floating in these latitudes in preference to any other."

Would not Napoleon III. have been better inspired had he everywhere and always preferred the Russian alliance to that of England?

CHAPTER XXVI

THE JOURNEY IN THE SOUTHEAST

OF all the imperial journeys under the reign of Napoleon III., the longest and most successful was that made in 1860 by the Emperor and the Empress in southeastern France, Corsica, and Algeria. The inhabitants greeted with acclamations the sovereign who came after his victories to make a peaceful conquest. The people of the three new departments distinguished themselves by their enthusiasm, and the ovations awarded to the Emperor by all the Arabs definitively consecrated the triumphs of France on Algerian soil.

Leaving Saint-Cloud, August 23, the imperial party arrived at Dijon at four in the afternoon. From the railway station, where it was met by the municipal council and the mayor, M. Vernier, who presented the keys of the city to the Emperor, the cortège passed on to the cathedral. The bishop, Monseigneur Rivet, surrounded by his clergy, came out into the open space in front of the church to receive their Majesties; in his address he said: "Heaven grant, Sire, that your faithful piety may yet be permitted to banish from the patrimony of St. Peter the raging waves which threaten it, and to

guarantee to our chief, to our father in the faith, the sacred principality which twelve centuries have given him. This is your Majesty's wish, we know, and it is also ours. God, to whom we are about to pray, will, I hope, grant to you, Sire, this new and very great glory, and to us this immense consolation."

Reaching Lyons in the evening of August 24, their Majesties went the next day to the Palace of Arts and then to the Palace of Commerce, which they inaugurated. M. Brosset, President of the Lyons Chamber of Commerce, made an address, to which the Emperor replied as follows: "I thank you for the manner in which you appreciate my efforts to increase the prosperity of France. Occupied solely with the general interests of the country, I disdain everything which can impede their development. Hence the unjust suspicions excited beyond our frontiers, and the exaggerated alarms of the self-regarding interests of the interior, find me equally insensible. Nothing will make me deviate from the path of moderation and justice which I have hitherto pursued, and which maintains France at that height of greatness and prosperity which Providence has assigned it in this world. Devote yourselves confidently, then, to the labors of peace; our destinies are in our own hands. In Europe, France gives the impulsion of all great and glorious ideas; it is only when it degenerates that it is subjected to the influence of bad ones, and be confident that, with God's help, it will not degenerate under my dynasty."

August 27 the imperial party quitted Lyons for Chambéry. The Savoyard city draped all its windows with flags, and gave its new sovereign the most cordial reception. From the station their Majesties went to the cathedral, where a *Te Deum* was chanted with great solemnity, and then to the Old Château, where they took up their residence. On the following day, two Piedmontese, M. Farini, Minister of the Interior, and General Cialdini, dined with their Majesties, the one sitting at the left, the other at the right hand, of the Empress. People supposed they had no other mission than that of saluting the Emperor in the name of Victor Emmanuel. They had a much more important one. They came to ask secretly an authorization for the Piedmontese to invade the Marches and Umbria, and brought with them an autograph letter from the King deliberated on in a ministerial council. The two envoys told the Emperor that troubles were impending in the two provinces, that the road thither must be barred to Garibaldi, and that the best way to maintain order would be to have them occupied by the army of the King. It is claimed that Napoleon III. must have said mysteriously to M. Farini and General Cialdini: "*Fate presto.* Do it, but be quick about it." What is certain is that within a few days this phrase, true or false, was repeated throughout Italy. It is also incontestable that all that was necessary to prevent the invasion of the Pontifical States was a single

word from Napoleon III., and this word he did not say.

Arriving at Grenoble, September 5, their Majesties went at once to the cathedral. Receiving them, the bishop, Monseigneur Ginouilhac, said: "It is a great consolation for us to see that wherever in the world there is a just and holy cause, the flag of France is raised to support or avenge it. Your armies, Sire, in the extreme Orient, are serving the sacred interests of Christian civilization. On the throne which they have reëstablished they are protecting the greatly menaced security of the Head of the Church, and in a land illustrious through the greatest of memories, they are avenging the nameless outrages committed against religion and humanity."

Making a triumphal entry at Avignon, September 7, their Majesties likewise paid their first visit to the cathedral of Notre-Dame-de-Doms, situated on a rock to the north of the ancient palace of the Popes. Here they were addressed as follows by Archbishop Debelay: "Sire, the glories of France are one and inseparable, and you have tried them all, since they are added like rays to your own greatness. It is not France alone, but the whole Catholic world which will be thrilled when it hears of your promise that the first architect of our day shall restore our ancient palace of the Popes, enhance its majesty, and revive its glory. If our religious convictions are alarmed by the attacks made on the temporal domain of the Sovereign Pontiff, if our hearts are troubled by the

sorrows which afflict that of Pius IX., who may not hope when beholding the same hand that protects his throne in the Eternal City restoring the venerated asylum of his predecessors in our temporary Rome, that France and its sovereign, true to their traditional mission, and nobly jealous of their purest glory, are to-day, as in the past, destined by Providence to accomplish all things in justice and peace?"

At half-past five in the afternoon of September 8, their Majesties arrived at Marseilles. Before the day was over the Emperor received the important telegram subjoined: —

"*The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Emperor, at Marseilles:* —

"Paris, 8 September, 1860. — I hasten to transmit to the Emperor the following despatch, just received from Turin: —

"'The Cabinet of Turin is sending a note to Cardinal Antonelli to declare that if the Holy See does not disband the foreign troops, the Sardinian army will enter the Marches and Umbria to occupy those provinces. According to M. Cavour, the Piedmontese government, being unable to stop the progress of Garibaldi either at Naples or in the Romagna, ought to oppose a barrier against him near the Abruzzi, and also prevent Lamoricière's army from butchering the insurgent populations.

"'RAYNEVAL.'

"The resolution taken by the Sardinian government is extremely grave. It attacks the very prin-

ciple of our occupation at Rome, and constitutes the most flagrant and least justifiable violation of the rights of sovereignty.

"I beg the Emperor to reflect that Europe will not understand how so exorbitant a measure can be taken without our consent, and that our relations with all the continental powers, Russia included, will be seriously affected by it."

M. Thouvenel was exasperated by "the monstrous news" — the expression is his own. He wrote to the Duc de Gramont: "I think I never in my life experienced such indignation! Such a complete violation of all rights, palliated by sophisms so imprudent, is utterly beyond my comprehension." He feared that the Emperor might have been induced to say something to M. Farini, at Chambéry, which was calculated to encourage M. Cavour's audacity. Singularly disturbed and anxious, he wanted to relieve his mind. That was why he asked by telegraph the Emperor's permission to go to Marseilles and discuss the situation with him. The sovereign replied by the following telegram: —

"Marseilles, September 8, 1860. — I would have been charmed to see you here; but I think the questions are so clear that they do not require a long examination. . . . If Austria is unjustly attacked, I will not defend Piedmont; but if, after a victory, Austria violates the treaty of Villafranca, I will defend Piedmont. As to the latter, I wish to write as follows to the King: 'I am obliged to acquaint

you with my intentions : if, as M. Farini said, your troops do not enter the Papal States until after an insurrection and for the purpose of restoring order, I have nothing to say; but if you attack the States of the Church while my troops are in Rome, I shall be forced to withdraw my minister from Turin and intervene as antagonist.'

"If you approve of this language, write Talleyrand to come to Nice, and I will give him my letter."

The Emperor received this despatch from his Minister of Foreign Affairs the following day: —

"Paris, September 9, 1860. — I am glad to find myself in complete accord with the ideas and resolutions of the Emperor. I am about to write Talleyrand to go to Nice, but I must remind your Majesty that after the sending of Cavour's note to Rome there is no time to lose.

"Haste is all the more necessary because King Victor Emmanuel expects to start at once for Florence and Bologna. Therefore I beg the Emperor to allow me to send this very day the following telegram to Turin: 'Declare officially to M. Cavour, in the Emperor's name, that if we are not given an assurance that the note addressed to Cardinal Antonelli will be followed by no disagreeable consequences, and that the Sardinian army will not attack the pontifical troops, our diplomatic relations with the Cabinet at Turin will be instantly broken, and France will place itself in antagonism with a policy which, in behalf of its own dignity,

the repose of Europe and the future of Europe, it would no longer be sufficient to disavow.'

"I am going to consult M. de Gramont on the return of General de Goyon from Rome, and to request him to advise the Pope not to accept the fragments of the Neapolitan army which the King of Naples may be tempted to offer him in order to link his own cause with that of the Holy See."

On his side, during the same day, Napoleon addressed this despatch to M. Thouvenel: "Marseilles, September 9, 1860. — The serious tidings you have sent me have necessitated the following despatch which I am sending to the King of Sardinia: 'Your Majesty knows how devoted I am to the cause of Italian independence; but I am unable to approve the means now being employed to secure it, for these means are opposed to the end that we propose. If it is true that without legitimate cause the troops of your Majesty are entering the Papal States, I shall be forced to oppose it. I am giving orders this very day to increase the garrison at Rome. M. Farini had explained your Majesty's policy to me very differently! Nevertheless, I beg to renew all the expressions of my friendship.'

"It is absolutely necessary to reinforce the garrison at Rome and to recall General de Goyon.

"The Duc de Gramont must yield to circumstances."

September 10, their Majesties embarked at Marseilles on the imperial yacht, *l'Aigle*, and went to

Ciotat to see the launching of a large transatlantic steamer to which the company had given the name *l'Impératrice.*

In the evening a banquet was given by the merchants of Marseilles in the new palace of the Bourse. Two hundred and fifty persons had been invited, and all the upper and lower galleries were filled with ladies and guests. The Emperor responded as follows to the address of the president of the Chamber of Commerce, M. Pastré : —

"The unanimous demonstrations of attachment we have received since the commencement of our journey touch me profoundly, but cannot make me proud, for my sole merit has been to have entire faith in the divine protection, as well as in the patriotism and good sense of the French people. . . . Let us do all in our power to develop the resources of our country : the labors of peace seem to me to produce crowns as beautiful as those of the laurel."

The sovereign excited transports of Marseillaise enthusiasm when he added: "In the future of grandeur and prosperity I dream of for France, Marseilles holds a great place by its energy and the intelligence of its inhabitants as well as by its geographical position. In proximity with the military post of Toulon, it seems to represent on these shores the presiding genius of France, holding an olive branch in one hand but conscious of a sword at its side. May it reign in peace, this Phocian city, through the gentle influences of commerce; may its multiplied relations civilize

barbaric nations; may it induce European peoples to come and meet each other on the poetic shores of this sea, and to bury in its depths the jealous blunders of another age; in a word, may Marseilles ever appear as I now see it, on a level, that is to say, with the destinies of France, and then one of my dearest wishes will be fulfilled. I drink to the city of Marseilles!"

The sovereigns sailed for Toulon immediately after the banquet, arriving there at ten o'clock the next morning. In the evening they took ship for Nice. All the vessels in the roadstead were illuminated, all the sailors were on the yards. When the imperial flotilla passed out of the harbor, salvos of artillery were fired from all the forts, and the fireworks sent up from the mole of the old port added brilliance to the scene.

On that very day, grave events had occurred in Italy. The Piedmontese troops had invaded pontifical territory and occupied Umbria and the Marches.

Embarrassed by the language he had used to M. Farini, with which M. Thouvenel was unacquainted, the Emperor was probably not ill pleased to be away from Paris and far from his Minister of Foreign Affairs. The despatches crossed each other. The distance, and the possibly wilful ambiguity of the terms, increased the embarrassments of the French diplomatists. As for the Empress, the news from Italy disquieted her profoundly, and dimmed the splendors of a journey which had seemed triumphant.

CHAPTER XXVII

NICE

September 12. — The sovereigns have been sailing all night. They land at Villafranca at ten in the morning, and go from there in a carriage to Nice. They cross the five kilometres of mountains which separate the two cities amidst the acclamations of those who live along the route. The inhabitants of neighboring places have come in procession, preceded by banners. The whole of the new French department of the Maritime Alps desires to testify its sympathy to the monarch who brought about the annexation.

The first visit of their Majesties is to the cathedral. In receiving them, Monseigneur Sola, Bishop of Nice, says : " We, ministers of the sanctuary, who gave ourselves to your glorious Empire five months ago with the most lively and ardent impulse, acclaim you, Sire, by a double title, as the benefactor of the people, and as the most powerful defender of religion and the social order. Sire, the eyes of all men of order are turned toward you. Sovereign of the nation by which God causes His will to be done, Eldest Son of the Church, successor of Pepin and of Charlemagne, save Christian society by efficaciously

protecting the Church on which it rests. You are the heart, the head, the árm of France. . . . Be the joy of the Church, as you already are the happiness, the glory, and the love of France."

Their Majesties go to the palace ceded by Victor Emmanuel and there receive the authorities. On the following day they go to the Var bridge. The Emperor orders the construction of a dike which will restore some fifteen hundred acres of good ground to agriculture. For this work he grants three hundred thousand francs, and a like sum for the shore road between Nice and Villafranca. During the day, Napoleon III. receives Baron de Talleyrand, Minister of France at Turin, summoned to Nice to receive the instructions of his sovereign.

Born November 28, 1821, this diplomatist has been successively secretary at Lisbon, Madrid, and St. Petersburg, minister at Vienna and Carlsruhe, commissioner of the French government in the Danubian Principalities, and succeeded the Prince de La Tour d'Auvergne at Turin in 1859. Like his predecessor, he belongs to the old school of diplomacy, and consequently is the avowed adversary of Count Cavour. The Emperor knows this very well, and yet has kept him at his post, it being one of his ways to entrust the principal embassies and legations to men who do not coincide in his ideas, for instance, the Duc de Gramont at Rome, and the Duc de Montebello at St. Petersburg.

Baron de Talleyrand discusses with the sover-

eign the events which preceded the invasion of Umbria and the Marches.

M. Farini had claimed that an insurrection was on the point of breaking out in the two provinces, and that the Piedmontese troops would not enter them except for the preservation of order. Things did not happen in this way at all. There was not the slightest insurrection, and the Cabinet at Turin had to invent another pretext.

On September 7, Count Cavour had sent to Cardinal Antonelli an ultimatum absolutely unjustifiable from the standpoint of the law of nations. He had summoned the pontifical government to dismiss the volunteers, alleging that "no government has the right to abandon to the caprice of a band of military adventurers the property, honor, and lives of the inhabitants of a civilized country."

In his reply, dated September 11, the cardinal said: "We were not aware until to-day that a government was forbidden to have foreign troops in its service, especially at a time when several European States have them in their pay. And, while on this point, it seems to me opportune to remark that, thanks to the character of common father of all the faithful with which the Sovereign Pontiff is invested, he, less than any other, can be forbidden to receive among his troops those who come from the different parts of the Catholic world to offer their services to defend the Holy See and the States of the Church."

The reply of the Cardinal Secretary of State ended as follows: "Your Excellency concludes his ignoble (*disgustosa*) communication by requesting me, in the name of his sovereign, to order at once the disarmament and dismission of the troops in question; and this request is accompanied by a sort of threat announcing that, in the contrary case, Piedmont will arrest their action by means of the royal troops. Here a sort of intimation makes itself manifest which I most willingly abstain from qualifying. The Holy See cannot do otherwise than repel it with indignation, for it knows itself strong in its legitimate right, and appeals from it to the law of nations under whose ægis Europe has lived until to-day, no matter to what unprovoked outrages it may be exposed in consequence and against which it is now my duty to protest strongly in the name of the Holy See."

That very day, September 11, Victor Emmanuel addressed the following proclamation to his army: "Soldiers, you enter the Marches and Umbria to reëstablish civil order in the ravaged cities, and to give the inhabitants liberty to express their wishes. You have not to contend with powerful armies, but to deliver some unfortunate Italian provinces from bands of foreign adventurers.

"You are not going to avenge the injuries done to me and to Italy, but to prevent an outbreak of popular vengeance against a bad government. By your example you will teach forgiveness of injuries

and Christian toleration to those who insanely compare love for the Italian fatherland to Islamism.

"I am accused of ambition; yes, I have an ambition; it is to restore social order in Italy and to save Europe from the continual dangers of war and revolution."

What is Napoleon III. going to do? That is the question which all the world is asking. It is a solemn moment.

At Rome, anxiety is at its height. The Duc de Gramont writes to M. Thouvenel: "My dear Minister: I see that the reading of the strange documents put forth by the Sardinian government has produced in you a sensation analogous to that which I experience. Everybody criticises them in the same way; there is a general hue and cry, and I cannot explain to myself so monstrous a fault on the part of Cavour. According to what you write me, I have reason to believe that the Emperor has condemned them very severely and very justly as well; but this opinion is not shared by everybody here or elsewhere. People are discussing the value and extent of the meaning to be ascribed to his Majesty's expressions: 'I shall be forced to oppose it, to constitute myself an antagonist.' They want to know whether the Emperor's troops are going to march against the Piedmontese to force them to withdraw. Everybody, from the Pope and the cardinals to the heads of all the missions accredited to Rome, asks me that same question. The Pope tells

me you have been interrogated by the Nuncio, and that you did not think yourself able to give a precise answer. *The Piedmontese assert that they are in agreement with us where the Marches and Umbria are concerned, and they are acting in consequence.*"

After his interview with Talleyrand, the Emperor understands the situation perfectly. None the less he persists in his resolve to make no serious opposition to the invasion of Umbria and the Marches. He will protest for form's sake only. The measure he adopts is veritably spiritless. Baron de Talleyrand is to depart from Turin, but M. Rayneval is to remain there as *chargé d'affaires* for the despatch of matters pertaining to the chancery and the supervision of national interests. M. de Talleyrand is to place one of the three secretaries of the legation at the disposition of M. Rayneval, and to invite the others to go back with him to France.

In the *Moniteur* of September 13 appeared the following message from Nice: "The Emperor and Empress leave Nice to-night for Ajaccio. In consideration of the facts which have just taken place in Italy, the Emperor has decided that his minister shall quit Turin immediately. A secretary remains *charged with the affairs of the legation.*"

CHAPTER XXVIII

AJACCIO

September 14. — The imperial yacht has been navigating all night and all the morning. Yonder on the horizon, between Cape Parate on the north, near the Sanguinary Islands and Cape Muro on the south, Ajaccio appears in its magnificent site, at the extremity of its azure gulf and with its amphitheatre of mountains. Discovering on the sky line that picturesque and poetic isle of Corsica, which, according to the singular prophecy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, has astonished the world, Napoleon III. is deeply moved. For the first time he is about to touch the soil which was the cradle of his dynasty. The prisoner of Ham had often dreamed in captivity the dream which was now becoming an actuality: a triumphal voyage to Corsica.

At noon they land at Ajaccio. The mayor turns over to the Emperor the keys of the city, and makes a speech, M. Pietri, president of the Council General of Corsica, following it with another. When Napoleon III. in response speaks of the sentiments of affectionate sympathy, and the religious souvenirs which attach him to the island, the enthusiasm of the

mountaineers, who have come from every quarter as if on a pilgrimage, becomes unbounded. Their Majesties are conducted to their palace amidst an excited crowd surrounding the carriage, clapping their hands in frenzy, and seeking by an exceptionally impassioned welcome to make the sovereigns forget the more magnificent receptions they had met with elsewhere on their journey. They drive to the Place Letizia, in which is situated the Bonaparte house, a humble dwelling of three stories with six windows each. Burned in 1793 by the partisans of Paoli, this house, in which Napoleon first saw the light, was rebuilt by the Fesch family. It contains authentic furniture, a harpsichord which belonged to Madame Mère, and the sedan chair in which she was taken home from church when seized with the pangs of childbirth. Then they go to the Fesch palace, which comprises a college, a museum, a library, and a chapel. The latter, built in 1855, contains the tombs of Madame Mère and of Cardinal Fesch, both of whom died in Rome, she in 1836, he in 1839.

On the following day, their Majesties visit the cathedral. Popular enthusiasm is still greater than on the day before. None the less, the gravity of Italian affairs weighs upon the sovereign's mind. Perhaps he likes to be deafened by the acclamations of which he is the object; perhaps all this noise hinders him from facing a situation which is in great measure his own work. On September 11, Cavour

had written to Baron de Talleyrand: "If we do not get to Cattolica before Garibaldi, we are ruined and thrown ignominiously into the mud by him. The revolution is invading all Italy. If our movement occasions an Austrian intervention in the States of the Church, so much the better. I think we can fight them outside the quadrilateral; they are unassailable there, I know. Driven to an extremity between two equal dangers, I prefer to fall fighting. The Italian idea will not perish. *However, I do not need to tell you that if you send troops into the Marches and Umbria, ours will withdraw.*"

Hence the Emperor, who, for form's sake, protested against the invasion of pontifical territory by recalling his minister from Turin, knew perfectly well that he could prevent that invasion by a single word. In Paris he would have been hampered by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was indignant against the proceedings of the Piedmontese government, and he would not have known how to answer the Nuncio and the representatives of the great powers. On the other hand, he hoped that his distant voyage, accomplished under most critical circumstances, when Italy was in revolt and all the cabinets trembling at the arrival of each courier, would be considered indicative of confidence and composure. Therefore it was with a secret satisfaction that he embarked at noonday, September 15, at Ajaccio for Algeria. The voyage would last two days. During those days he could receive no de-

spatch, telegraphic or otherwise. Abandoning himself to fatality, he left Italy to accomplish its own destiny. During this time, M. Thouvenel, not authorized to rejoin the Emperor, and having failed to induce him to oppose Piedmont effectively, no longer tried to stem the torrent.

M. Benedetti, political director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote to the Duc de Gramont, September 16: "My dear Ambassador: The Emperor being on his way to Algeria, and communication with him for the time impossible, the minister has gone to the country to rest for three days. In compliance with his orders I apprise you of the fact, and enclose a copy of the despatch directing Talleyrand to quit Turin. He also desires me to notify you that if the Pope thinks he must abandon Rome, our troops will at once withdraw."

While M. Thouvenel was in the country, the Piedmontese were getting ready to destroy the pontifical army of General de Lamoricière.

CHAPTER XXIX

ALGIERS

AFTER a stormy voyage, the imperial yacht arrived at Algiers on the morning of September 17. Early the next day, the Emperor was apprised of the death of the Duchess of Alba, sister of the Empress, which had occurred the previous evening in Paris. As it was too late to countermand the immense and costly preparations for their entertainment, and their absence would certainly be misunderstood, he decided not to communicate the sad tidings to the Empress, and went with her in a carriage attended by an escort of a hundred guards.

The plain of Metidja, between the mountainous zones of the Atlas and the Sahel, a few leagues from Algiers, was the scene of the fantasia, or Arab race, organized by General Yusef. An attack on a caravan in march was simulated by thousands of riders and footsoldiers from the desert. The long guns of the latter were adorned with silver and coral. The horses were caparisoned with housings of contrasted colors. The women, in palanquins on the backs of camels, uttered savage cries. This feigned assault was succeeded by the advance of

some nine or ten thousand Arabian horsemen, who galloped up in front of the tent of their Majesties and there discharged their firearms.

Then came gazelle, ostrich, and falcon chases, followed by a procession of Touaregs with veiled faces, mounted on camels, and of Chambâas, dwellers in the depths of the desert, who were to be the convoys of French commerce to the Soudan.

The fête ended with a display that was like magic. The entire Arabian military contingent, forming an immense line of battle, with the Prophet's colors displayed in front of every chieftain, made a majestic approach to the eminence on which was spread the tent of the Emperor and Empress, the Sultan and Sultana. All the chiefs, in glittering apparel, bent the knee before the sovereigns. According to General Fleury, when they raised their heads after this prostration, "the chiefs could distinguish the features of the Empress, and a sentiment of admiration for her gracious beauty reflected itself on their bronzed faces, usually so imperturbable. The sovereign was greatly flattered by this tribute paid far more to her personal prestige than her rank. The *woman* was uppermost in her, and she found this homage all the more agreeable for being so artless and unexpected."

Alas! that brilliant day marked the apogee of the Empress Eugénie's career. The enchanting dream was at once succeeded by a bitter awakening. Not, indeed, that the Emperor acquainted her with

the whole truth when she returned to the Dey's palace. He did not yet venture to admit that the Duchess of Alba was dead, but telling her that she was very ill, he proposed to abridge their stay in Africa and sail the next day for France.

On the following evening Napoleon III. was present at the banquet offered him by the city. Replying to the speech of the president of the Council of Algiers, he said: "When I set foot on African soil, my first thought was for the army whose courage and perseverance have accomplished the conquest of this vast territory. But the God of armies does not send the scourge of war upon a people except as a chastisement and a redemption. Conquest, in our hands, cannot be other than a redemption, and our first duty is to occupy ourselves with the welfare of the three millions of Arabs brought under our dominion by the fortunes of war. Providence has called us to spread the benefits of civilization over this land. Now, what is civilization? It is to count man's comfort for something, his life for much, and his moral improvement as the greatest of all goods. Hence to raise the Arabs to the dignity of freemen, to give them instruction while respecting their religion, to ameliorate their existence while bringing forth from this soil all the treasures Providence has placed within it and which a bad government has left sterile, this is our mission and we shall not fail in it. . . .

"The European peace will permit France to show

herself still more generous to the colonies, and if I have crossed the sea to remain for a few moments amongst you, it is to leave behind, as traces of my passage, confidence in the future and perfect faith in the destinies of France, whose efforts for the good of humanity are always blessed by Providence. I drink to the prosperity of Africa."

Napoleon III. understood the Arabs. He knew how to appreciate their loyalty, gravity, and courage. He did not forget the prodigies of bravery their soldiers had performed in Italy and the Crimea. At Magenta and Solferino he had himself seen the Turcos at work. He considered them as comrades in arms for whom he felt equal esteem and gratitude. He was deeply interested in the fate of the Arabs, and wished to see them free and happy. He liked and respected them.

On their side the Arabs had real sympathy for the sovereign whose grave and dignified aspect, lofty courtesy, and extreme politeness charmed them. They were grateful for his liberal and generous intentions. When their chiefs went to the Tuileries they were always received with the greatest respect and seated at the royal table. Abd-el-Kader had just won the grand cross of the Legion of Honor by his admirable conduct in Syria, and the homage paid the Emir by France was a title of glory for all Algeria. In a word, Napoleon III. had reconciled the Arabs and the French.

While the Emperor was talking the imperial

yacht was getting up steam in the harbor, and messengers from the city were explaining the sudden departure of the sovereigns. It was rather sad to see a brilliant journey terminating in such a fashion. Distracted by painful anxieties and gloomy forebodings, half suspecting that the truth was being kept from her, and afraid to ask too precise questions, the Empress was more dead than alive. "If only we arrive in time!" she exclaimed, while going aboard on General Fleury's arm. The circumstances were so painful that it was probably permissible for him to give the equivocal reply that she must hope for better news on reaching France.

The voyage was a difficult and even dangerous one, the wind being high and the yacht pitching a good deal and shipping heavy seas. On nearing the Gulf of Lyons, Commandant Dupont, who was sailing her, grew uneasy, fearing some serious damage to the machinery, and said that if he were not afraid to displease the Emperor, he would ask permission to make for Port Vendres, in order to avoid crossing the gulf. This proposition was transmitted to the Emperor, who was very seasick and asked nothing better than to go ashore as soon as possible, no matter where. He went up on deck, which looked like a pond, and after hearing what the captain had to say, agreed to his proposal. The landing was effected at half-past six in the evening of September 21, at Port Vendres, a little town of some two thousand inhabitants in the department of the

Eastern Pyrenees. No carriages could be found, but a butcher and a grocer provided means of getting to the railway at Perpignan.

The death of the Duchess of Alba had occurred in Paris, at her house in the Avenue des Champs-Élysées, on September 16, while the Empress was sailing from Ajaccio to Algiers, and her obsequies had been performed at the Church of the Madeleine, September 20, during the stormy voyage just ended. The Emperor thought he ought not to conceal the news any longer from her sister, and the unhappy sovereign learned the painful tidings as soon as she landed. Her grief was boundless. Then she set off with her husband and her ladies in the four wretched vans which alone were procurable. The aides-de-camp and the indispensable attendants were crowded up beside the drivers. The rest of the cortège had to wait for the local diligence which was almost ready to start.

"It was in this way," says General Fleury, "that the triumphal voyage of Nice, Corsica, and Algiers ended. What a lesson! During a long month enthusiastic applause, fêtes, balls, banquets, promenades in gilded carriages admired by crowds, and, to terminate this Odyssey, almost a shipwreck! A sumptuous vessel constructed under the supervision of Dupuy de Lôme, the 'shipwright of genius,' as the Emperor called him, which could not risk crossing the Gulf of Lyons without danger! What a dark side human greatness has! When such changes

occur, how seriously princes ought to reflect on them as warnings from on high! If the waves are treacherous, fortune likewise is inconstant!"

Alas! during the still more painful voyage of 1870, the Empress will doubtless remember this one which foreboded it.

At six in the evening of September 22, their Majesties arrived at the grating of the château of Saint-Cloud, where they found the Prince Imperial, whose impatience to embrace his parents had brought him there much earlier. But neither the pleasure of seeing her son again, nor the homage of courtiers, nor the verdant shades of the beautiful park, could console the Empress. She wrote soon after to the Comtesse Stéphanie de Tascher de La Pagerie: "If you knew all I have been suffering of late, the constant anxiety during my journey and my stay in Algeria! And then to arrive only to find the house empty, not even to have the consolation of embracing her inanimate body, it is all a brief summary of the cost of high positions on earth. One often arrives only by walking over one's heart. I have had a painful revulsion of feeling; I wonder whether earthly goods are worth the trouble one takes to keep them."

The death of her sister was not the only grief which racked the heart of the Empress. On September 18, the very day before her departure from Algeria, the army of the Pope, her son's godfather, had been crushed by the Piedmontese at Castelfi-

dardo. And other events had recently occurred which annoyed her deeply. September 6, the King and Queen of Naples, in whose misfortunes she sympathized, had been obliged to leave their capital, Garibaldi, who personified the revolution, entering it the next day. This was the pretext the Sardinian government had alleged for its invasion of the States of the Church. At Chambéry M. Farini and General Cialdini had said to Napoleon III. that "Garibaldi was going to make his way unimpeded through the Roman States, stirring up the inhabitants as he went, and when this last barrier was crossed, it would become totally impossible to prevent an attack on Venetia; hence the Cabinet of Turin saw but one way of averting such a catastrophe, namely, as soon as Garibaldi's approach should have provoked disturbances in the Marches and Umbria, to enter for the purpose of restoring order, without infringing on Papal authority, to give battle to the revolution if necessary on Neapolitan soil, and to hand over at once to a Congress the business of settling the destiny of Italy."

Later on, M. Thouvenel wrote in a circular addressed to the French diplomatic agents: "His Majesty, although he deplored the tolerance or weakness of the Sardinian government in allowing matters to come to this point, did not disapprove its resolve to put an end to it. But, in taking this stand, the Emperor assumed that the fall of the Neapolitan government would be complete, that an insurrection

would break out in the Roman States, that the sovereignty of the Holy Father would be reserved, and that the right to decide upon the definitive organization of the Peninsula would be referred to Europe. The mere statement of this programme, as contrasted with that which the Cabinet of Turin has carried out, is enough to demonstrate that King Victor Emmanuel and his advisers are solely responsible for the latter, and that nothing but malevolence or self-interest can seek to connect the Emperor with it."

What is certain is that if Napoleon III. had merely said, "I will not have it," the invasion of the Marches and Umbria by the Piedmontese army would have been prevented. This he did not say. The Empress was inconsolable.

CHAPTER XXX

THE PIEDMONTESE INVASION

A PIEDMONTESE army of thirty-three thousand men under the command of General Fanti had crossed the pontifical frontier, September 11, while the fleet was sailing toward the Adriatic. General della Rocca was to occupy Umbria, and General Cialdini to seize the Marches. The latter addressed to his troops a strange and violent order of the day, in which he said: "Soldiers, I am leading you against a band of foreign adventurers whom thirst for gold and desire for pillage have brought into our country. Fight with, scatter pitilessly, these wretched hired assassins. Let them feel at your hands the anger of a people which desires its nationality and its independence!" That same day, Victor Emmanuel described the defenders of the Pope as "bands of foreign adventurers," in a proclamation to the army. The Cabinet of Turin had thrown aside the mask. In a memorandum of September 12, addressed to the Sardinian diplomatic agents, Cavour defended Garibaldi: "What justice and reason have been unable to obtain," said he, "the revolution has just accomplished, prodigious revolution which has astonished all Europe by the almost

providential manner in which it has been effected, and startled it into admiration for the illustrious soldier whose exploits recall the most surprising things recounted by poetry or history."

The hour was decisive. Everybody was wondering what Napoleon III. would do. He had telegraphed to Victor Emmanuel from Marseilles, September 9: "Your Majesty knows how devoted I am to the cause of Italian independence, but I cannot approve the means at present employed to obtain it, because they are contrary to the end proposed. If it is true that without legitimate cause your Majesty's troops are entering the Papal States, I shall be forced to oppose it."

What was the meaning of that phrase, "*m'y opposer*"? Did it signify a real opposition, that is to say, an opposition by force, or a purely platonic opposition? The entire question lay just there.

September 10, Monseigneur de Mérode had sent a telegram to General de Lamoricière, then at Spoleto, announcing that the French embassy had received word that the Emperor had written to the King of Piedmont announcing that if the States of the Pope were attacked, he would oppose it by force (*si vorebbe opposto colla forza*). Monseigneur de Mérode had reproduced the imperial language inexactly by adding to it the words, by force, *colla forza*. In reality, neither the prelate nor General de Lamoricière, neither Cardinal Antonelli nor even the Duc de Gramont, knew what the Emperor meant.

What is certain is that the ambassador would have liked an effective opposition, for he wrote to M. Thouvenel, September 15: "It seems to me that the circumstances which have accompanied the Piedmontese aggression are of a sort which perfectly admits of an armed opposition, and allows us, while remaining loyal to the traditions of imperial policy, to attack and repulse them. To my mind it even seems an excellent chance for the Emperor to prove the loyalty of his intentions; all Europe would applaud him, and England could find nothing in it to gainsay. For that matter, you can see what we get for all the circumspection with which we have been treating her; I am convinced that she would do less against us if we did not act as if we were anxious to do everything for her."

Meanwhile, at the time of the Piedmontese invasion, the French corps of occupation had not budged. General de Noüe, who was in command during General de Goyon's absence, had been ordered to remain in Rome. But General de Goyon was expected presently. He was to bring reinforcements; the pontifical troops had confidence in him, for he was known to be devoted to the cause of the Holy See.

Born in 1802, graduated from Saint-Cyr in 1821, the Comte de Goyon, a member of the highest French aristocracy, had replaced my father as colonel of the second dragoons in 1846. Brigadier general in 1850, major general in 1853, aide-de-camp of the Emperor, he had been appointed in 1859 to

the command of the corps of occupation in Rome. He would have been glad to defend not merely the Eternal City, but the entire States of the Church. Such was also the desire of the Duc de Gramont, who forgot all his former quarrels with the general and wrote to M. Thouvenel: "If General de Goyon arrives with instructions releasing us from our solidarity, I will receive him, I promise you, as I have never yet received my dearest friend. But if we are still to continue the same duty I shall have to hide myself, for then I could not put up with what I should have to see and hear."

As to Monseigneur de Mérode, he made no effort to delude himself. . . . "General de Goyon," said he to General de Noüe, "is coming with a brigade; he will occupy the environs of Rome at all the points which are in no danger, but he will nowhere face the Piedmontese to drive them back; we know that, and it is what deprives us of confidence in you." And as the Duc de Gramont complained rather sharply of this distrust, the Holy Father said to him: "My dear ambassador, your own loyalty is for me beyond all doubt; but are you quite sure of knowing the full mind of your government? Besides, doubt is no longer possible; it was known two weeks ago what the Emperor wanted to do. How glad I should be if I could myself confound those who suspect his intentions, and proclaim him a worthy son of the Church and her principal defender!"

The leaders of the pontifical army still wished to hope for French assistance. By order of General de Lamoricière the following was posted in the streets of Perugia: "The government of H. I. M. Napoleon III. has threatened to break off friendly relations with Piedmont in case its troops cross the frontier of the Pontifical States." The same day, Lamoricière telegraphed from Foligno to the Marquis de Pimodan: "France intervenes. Official. The first troops will arrive the 17th with General de Goyon. I leave them Umbria to guard." And on the 14th, he telegraphed Colonel Gadi, at Ancona: "General de Goyon arrives at Rome the 17th with two thousand men and forty cannon. Official. Post this good news in your city."

While the defenders of the Holy See were thus beguiling themselves with vain hopes, the Piedmontese invasion was going on without difficulty. General Cialdini occupied Urbino, took Pesaro, entered Fano and Sinigaglia. General Fanti seized Perugia with General della Rocca's column, and made sixteen hundred prisoners, General Schmidt among them. Victor Emmanuel recognized M. Valerio in Umbria, and the Marquis Pepoli in the Marches, as royal commissioners.

The Piedmontese and the French troops found themselves very close together. The Duc de Gramont made the following bitter reflections in a letter to M. Thouvenel: "I will not conceal from you that our soldiers feel profoundly humiliated at

having to tolerate a neighborhood of this description with arms in hand, and in my opinion it will not be altogether prudent to subject them much longer to such a trial. There is no use of trying to delude ourselves, we have never been criticised so severely as we are now. Perhaps you do not see this as clearly in Paris as it is seen elsewhere, but the truth is that there is nobody who is not entirely convinced of our *complicity* with the Piedmontese. The recall of Talleyrand has produced no effect; it was foreseen, and was meant as part of the theatrical properties. As for me, I cannot describe to you how deeply I suffer on the Emperor's account and my own from this atmosphere of repulsion and scorn which is beginning to envelop us."

Lamoricière had to fight without any assistance from France. He had at his disposal the Schmidt, Courten, and Pimodan brigades, and a reserve brigade under his immediate orders. After leaving the battalions of the Schmidt brigade in the environs of Perugia, and confiding to a detachment of three hundred Irishmen the defense of Spoleto, he went in the direction of Ancona with the remainder of his forces. The 12th he was at Foligno, the 13th at Tolentino, the 15th at Macerata, the 17th at Loretto, where he made ready to give battle. No one knew better than he did how unequal were the chances. He was going to fight, not for success, but for honor.

CHAPTER XXXI

CASTELFIDARDO

GENERAL DE LAMORICIÈRE is not going to try to reconquer Umbria. His plan will be confined to defending the Marches, and if he does not succeed there, to defending Ancona as a refuge for the pontifical troops, and there awaiting events. The two brigades at his disposal comprise scarcely more than five thousand men, and being made up from very different elements, their equipment leaves much to be desired. They have hardly any cavalry, and their hastily created artillery has not more than ten cannon. With these slender resources the struggle will be made against General Cialdini's excellent Piedmontese divisions, comprising between thirteen and fourteen thousand men. Hence the invaders have every chance of success.

September 17, the little pontifical army is before Loretto, twenty-one kilometres southeast of Ancona, and two kilometres from the Adriatic. The Musone, which empties into the sea about a league and a half below Loretto, is near a valley of some two hundred yards, planted with trees and intersected by irrigating ditches. About two hundred yards from its

mouth, the Musone receives on its left bank a large affluent called the Aspio. Between these two rivers, and in the angle they form before uniting, extends a chain of hills on which is built Castelfidardo, a town twelve kilometres south of Ancona, which will give its name to the battle of the 18th of September. At the eastern extremity of these hills are two farms known as the Crocette farms. Two leagues farther away toward the west rise the mamelons which dominate the city of Osimo. The two principal roads from Loretto to Ancona, the one by Osimo, the other by Camerano, pass these mamelons. General Cialdini has occupied them in force since the morning of September 17. The pontifical troops are not sufficiently numerous to fight there. There is, besides, a little road, macadamized only in part, which crosses the Musone by a ford, passes the village of Umana, and leads to Ancona along the seashore. This is the road Lamoricière will take, his movement being protected by the brigade of the Marquis de Pimodan, recently made a general. The latter, attacking the Piedmontese extreme left, will move toward Castelfidardo and the Crocette farms.

The night before the battle, while lying on the ground at the foot of a haystack, Pimodan says to his aide-de-camp, the Comte de Carpegna, "In any case, I shall leave my children an honorable name; they can hold up their heads and say, 'Our father died in defence of the Pope.'" And here we resign the pen to his eldest son, who has written some fine

pages, signed: "A former French officer," on the battle of Castelfidardo: "Determined at all hazards to attempt a perilous passage, Lamoricière confided his most valiant troops to Pimodan. They comprised four and a half battalions of infantry, eight six-inch guns and four howitzers under the command of Colonel de Blumenthal, and lastly two hundred and fifty cavalry led by Major Prince Odescalchi. Among the infantry was especially notable the heroic phalanx of three hundred Franco-Belgians, the primitive nucleus of the future regiment of pontifical zouaves. With these slender forces, Pimodan was to seize the last mamelons of the heights, occupy and hold them until Lamoricière should cross the narrow pass with the rest of the army. Afterward the survivors were to rejoin the main body of troops and act as rear-guard. Neither Pimodan nor his companions in arms could avoid knowing that they were going to almost certain death; but, like the vanquished of Thermopylæ, not one of them hesitated."

During the night of September 17–18, the campfires of the Piedmontese were seen in the distance on the hills, on the other bank of the Musone. "It will be a hot day, to-morrow, gentlemen," said Commandant Becdelièvre to his Franco-Belgian sharpshooters. "I advise you to get your papers ready for eternity." The advice was followed. The famous church of Our Lady of Loretto, the *Holy House*, or house of the Blessed Virgin, was close at hand. Very early in the morning of September 18, Lamo-

ricière, Pimodan, the staff, guides, Franco-Belgians, and a multitude of officers and soldiers, communicated in this venerated sanctuary. A French priest has written concerning it: "I saw them prostrated on the pavement of this basilica which has been touched by so many foreheads. There was something so grave and solemn in the meditative composure of the two generals that I could not control my emotion." The soldiers of Pius IX. were praying in the basilica which contains the banners of Lepanto. Pimodan being already in the saddle, his chaplain came up to shake hands, and, at his request, gave him a last absolution. During the entire battle, a Dutch priest, the penitentiary[1] of the sanctuary of Loretto, remained on a terrace whence he could see the combatants, repeating at every minute the formula of Catholic absolution, with arms outstretched in the direction of Castelfidardo.

Before the fighting began, Lamoricière went among the troops with words of encouragement, recalling to the Swiss and the Austrians the battles in which they had distinguished themselves, reminding the Italians of the campaigns of the grand army of Napoleon, in Italy, Spain, and Russia, and addressing each corps in its own tongue. "As to you, gentlemen," said he to the volunteers from France, "you are Frenchmen; I have nothing beyond that to say."

[1] A priest empowered by the bishop to absolve in what are known as "reserved cases."

The battle opens. Lamoricière descends the coast side of the Loretto heights, and then, making an abrupt turn, goes along the shore to meet the Piedmontese and cross the Musone. He starts and leads in person, with his usual intrepidity, the carbineers and Franco-Belgian sharpshooters, who climb up the mamelon on which Castelfidardo stands, and after some hot fighting occupy the first of the Crocette farms. But the Sardinian troops arrive in crowds with very heavy artillery. Outnumbered, the pontifical troops cannot take the second farm, and are obliged to retreat to the first, where they make a stand. Wounded in the face, Pimodan remains in command and continues the fight. Lamoricière, who has been watching every phase of the combat, sends reënforcements but without avail. In spite of individual acts of heroism, the admirable behavior of the Franco-Belgians and the remarkable steadiness of Major Feschmann's Austrian battalion, the pontifical troops fall into disorder. While performing prodigies of valor in the attempt to rally them, a ball strikes Pimodan in the breast, inflicting a mortal wound. He refuses to be carried to the nearest house, saying to the Franco-Belgians who wished to take him there, "No; let me have the glory of dying on the battlefield." Nevertheless he is placed on an improvised litter of guns and straw, and carried toward the Adriatic. On the way, they meet Lamoricière in the midst of the disaster. Pimodan tries to sit up and salute his

chief, but is unable. The two generals exchange a few words and mournfully press each other's hands.

Pimodan had the supreme misfortune of falling into the hands of the Piedmontese, who carried him up to the heights. "I have no need of you," he said to their chaplain; "I went to communion this morning." He died at midnight, his eyes fixed on a poor engraving representing the Madonna of Loretto. Speaking one day of his desire to go to heaven, Pimodan had said, "They surely must put me there, if only for example's sake, after I have worn myself out for the Pope."

All was lost but honor. The Franco-Belgians had fought with fury. M. de La Gorce, author of the remarkable *Histoire du Second Empire*, who has made a touching account of the battle of Castelfidardo, pays them this tribute: "In this little corner of the pontifical Marches, under the shelter of a wretched farm, there was as it were a renewed episode of the Vendéan wars. There was the same robust and faithful race, the same names; the inspiration which had animated the fathers had passed on to the grandchildren." The defence of the Crocette farms made one think of that of the Château de la Pénissière by the partisans of the Duchess of Berry in 1832. The Franco-Belgian tirailleurs resisted until the Piedmontese set fire to a stack of fodder and the farmhouse was threatened with conflagration. Some were then forced to surrender, while

others managed to get back to the shore of the Musone. Out of three hundred men, twenty-five had been killed, and one hundred and twenty wounded. "Here are all I have left," said M. de Becdelièvre, showing the remnant of his valiant phalanx to M. de Bourbon-Chalus. The majority of the other pontifical troops had not displayed a like steadiness. Swiss and Austrians, subjects of the Pope, recrossed the Musone and crowded into Loretto, which capitulated the next day.

For an instant Lamoricière had hoped to lead the fugitives away from Loretto and urge them in the direction of the littoral toward Ancona. When he found all his efforts useless, he took the cross-roads and reached Ancona about six o'clock in the evening with an escort of eighty men. He heard firing as soon as he entered. It came from the Piedmontese squadron which was beginning the attack by sea.

"The consequences of Castelfidardo," the Duc de Persigny has written, "were bound to be and were in fact deplorable. In permitting the spoliation of the Holy See and the adjunction of Naples to the kingdom of Italy, the Emperor plunged his policy into inextricable complications. His government was discredited in the eyes of all Europe. It had sought to prevent Italian unity, and Italian unity was accomplished. It had intended to protect the Holy See, and the Holy See lost its richest provinces; the States of the Church were sacked, pil-

laged, dismembered, under the very eyes of a French army."

The present Marquis de Pimodan, Duc de Raré-court, who is a historian and a poet, has made a melancholy remark about this: September 18, 1870, ten years to a day after Castelfidardo, the Prussians came in sight of Paris.

CHAPTER XXXII

ANCONA

"THIS is all the army I have left," were the first words Lamoricière addressed to M. de Quatrebarbes, who was in command at Ancona, the only spot in Umbria and the Marches where the Papal flag still floated. In the city people were still inclined to hope that France would intervene. The Duc de Gramont had telegraphed to the French consul, M. de Courcy, that the Emperor would oppose the Piedmontese invasion and that General de Goyon would arrive with reënforcements.

On the very day of the combat of Castelfidardo, the general had assumed command at Rome, and issued the following order of the day to his troops: "Officers and soldiers, the Emperor has deigned to order me to resume my former command. Hence I return to you, and with a joy equal to the regret I expressed when going away. Called again, and in circumstances more serious than ever, to protect the interests of Catholicism in the person of the Holy Father, who is its highest and most legitimate representative, and to guarantee the safety of the Holy City which is its seat, we shall be equal to this lofty

mission, and ready, if necessary, for all sacrifices in order to fulfil it. In these sentiments we respond as French soldiers to the will of our Emperor. Thanks to his Majesty, we no longer need envy our brethren now in Cochin China and Syria the glory of defending a generous and noble cause."

The defenders of Ancona fancied that the troops of General de Goyon were coming to their assistance. Pimodan had thought it impossible that the Duc de Gramont's despatch to the consul could be a trick or a falsehood. Austria's intervention was also hoped for. The Archduke Maximilian, Francis Joseph's brother, was in command of the Austrian fleet at Trieste. Would that not make its appearance before Ancona? But, like Napoleon, Francis Joseph abandoned the defenders of Ancona.

The Piedmontese fleet of Admiral Persano had begun the bombardment of the city by September 18. The siege stores having arrived by the 22d, the blockade was officially declared. The next day the tents of the Piedmontese were visible on all the heights in the vicinity of Ancona. Lamoricière had only between seven and eight thousand men with which to resist the double attack, and after several days' bombardment, the Piedmontese army, under General Cadorna, succeeded in capturing a suburb and the Pia gate, which had been taken and retaken five times. September 28, Admiral Persano advanced toward the port with all his fleet. On the coast side, the chief defence of the city consisted of batteries

placed on two moles. The Piedmontese established themselves within pistol-shot of these batteries and destroyed them by the fire of one hundred cannon. The pontifical artillery had defended the works with great courage, but a shell at last reaching the powder magazine, a terrible explosion followed. All means of defence being exhausted, Lamoricière asked for an armistice of six days, which was refused. "I could hold the place longer," he said, "if I had the least chance of being reënforced, but under existing circumstances further resistance would be suicide." September 29 he resolved to capitulate. The taking of Ancona delivered to the Piedmontese 7143 prisoners, of whom three were generals, 17 superior officers, and 331 officers of lower rank. It had cost the besieged and the besiegers together about 1500 lives. The capitulation, concluded on the same terms as that of Loretto, was honorable for the defeated. The garrison went out with the honors of war. The officers, transferred to Genoa by sea, and the soldiers, by land to Alessandria, were free to return to their homes under the sole condition of not taking service against Piedmont within a year. After surrendering the city, Lamoricière went aboard the frigate *Marie-Adelaïde*, where Admiral Persano received him with the respect due to unfortunate courage. He was taken to Genoa and restored to liberty.

The obsequies of General de Pimodan were celebrated in Rome with great solemnity. The national

church of Saint-Louis, in the Eternal City, is considered as French ground. In case he fell while fighting for the Pope, Pimodan had expressed a wish to be buried there. The wish was granted. Pius IX. himself composed the inscription engraved upon his tomb. He conferred the title of duke on all his male descendants, and wrote an affecting letter to his widow which ended thus: "I shall never cease to recommend this soul to God, my dearest daughter, even though I am convinced that the cause and object which have taken him from us on earth will have already obtained for him a blissful eternity in heaven." General de Goyon and the principal officers under his command were present at his funeral. Victor Emmanuel would not permit his sword to be placed in the Turin arsenal, but sent it respectfully to his widow. Even General Cialdini paid homage to the vanquished. Visiting the prisoners at Loretto, he said: "Gentlemen, you all leaped like lions." And on reading the list of killed and wounded, he exclaimed: "Why, all old France was there! One might think he was reading a list of the morning levée of Louis XIV."

On arriving at Genoa, Lamoricière, by the King's directions, was installed at the palace with his orderlies. Two of these, MM. de Terves and de Chevigné, came afterward to Turin. "The general is very much overcome," they said to the secretaries of the French legation; "he is silent, and profoundly sad."

Set free at Genoa, Lamoricière went at once to Rome, where he resigned his command to the Holy Father in person. Writing to M. Thouvenel, October 16, the Duc de Gramont said: "The Pope has received General Lamoricière, who repeated to him the identical words of General Cialdini, to wit: 'They tell you at home that the Emperor Napoleon disapproves of us. It is completely false. He approves all we are doing; it was arranged with him, he spoke to me himself, and said in leaving me: "Go, and be quick about it!" He even corrected my plan of campaign.' The Pope seems to have replied, 'What you tell me sounds very positive, and yet it is very hard to believe.'"

The ambassador added: "Confess, my dear minister, that all this is strange, and does not mend matters. I maintain that the Piedmontese are lying, just as they lied to the Emperor in saying they would enter the Papal States in order to arrest Garibaldi. Is it to arrest Garibaldi that they are entering the kingdom of Naples? Did they arrest him at Volturno? Is it not now plainly evident to everybody that all this was simply a clever comedy?"

The French prisoners from Lamoricière's army were arriving at Turin. The Comte d'Ideville, secretary at this period of the French legation, says of them in his *Journal d'un diplomate:* "The enthusiasm, vivacity, and courage of these young men are an additional proof that the old ardor, vitality

and spirit still exist in France, in all classes and in every party. These sons of Brittany and the Faubourg Saint-Germain have the dash and gayety of the zouaves of Africa and Solferino, sons of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine. They will be forgotten by to-morrow, perhaps, the brave young fellows; but this glorious campaign, short as it was, will have given them the love of war, the righteous pride of their nobility, retempered in blood. De Terves, de la Neuville, Perrodil, Maistre, Champrobert, Rohan, Chevigné, Sabran, are those whom we have seen the most of. We dined together at the Fedar hotel."

On leaving Rome for France, Lamoricière received from the Pope the order of Christ. He refused any other reward, saying that he was nothing but a defeated man.

The Holy See had definitively lost the Marches and Umbria. The territory which General de Goyon had been ordered to protect comprised merely the delegations of Civita-Vecchia and Viterbo on the north, the delegation of Velletri on the south, and on the east the environs of Rome as far as Civita-Castellana. Within this radius he was authorized to occupy all points he deemed suitable, either for a time or permanently.

The Duc de Gramont wrote to M. Thouvenel, October 13: "If the situation were not so grave, one could not be present without laughing at all these declarations of *spontaneity* which succeed each

other every twenty-four hours. There are cities which *spontaneously* return to the Pope, which illuminate *spontaneously* for the Pope when our columns approach, just as they did for Victor Emmanuel. On the other hand, at Turin La Farina is asking to have Piedmontese sent into Sicily to ascertain the *spontaneity* of the vote of annexation."

To sum up, from 1860 to 1870, the year in which the temporal power of the Pope came to an end, all that remained of the States of the Church was Rome, and the Comarca, Viterbo, Civita-Vecchia, and Fresinone, with a population of about 690,000 souls.

Garibaldi had held all European diplomacy in check. The sovereigns were bowing before the revolution, and Austria, the conservative power *par excellence*, had done still less than France for the cause of the Pope and the King of Naples.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE SYRIAN EXPEDITION

PRECISELY at the time when France was deserting the cause of the Pope in Umbria and the Marches, it was taking that of the Oriental Christians with great energy. In Syria, if not in the Papal States, it was the Emperor's policy to act as "the eldest son of the Church." The chagrin occasioned to Catholics by the affairs of Italy was in some degree alleviated by this counterpoise.

Before embarking at Marseilles, the commander-in-chief of the Syrian expedition had issued the following proclamation to the troops: "Soldiers, defenders of all great and noble causes, the Emperor has decided in the name of all civilized Europe that you should go to Syria to assist the Sultan's troops in avenging outraged humanity. It is a glorious mission, which you are proud of and will worthily perform. You may still find noble and patriotic souvenirs in those celebrated lands, the birthplace of Christendom, which Godfrey de Bouillon and the Crusaders, General Bonaparte and the brave soldiers of the Republic, have successively made illustrious. You are accompanied by the good wishes of all

Europe. I firmly hope that the Emperor and France will be satisfied with you, no matter what may happen. Long live the Emperor ! "

M. Thouvenel had called the Emperor's attention to General de Beaufort d'Hautpoul while he was acting as president of the Franco-Sardinian commission for settling the new boundaries of Piedmont and Savoy. The choice of him as commander of the new expedition was an excellent one. Detailed for service in Egypt, from 1835 to 1837, when only a staff captain, he spent three years in Syria as aide-de-camp of Soliman Pasha (Colonel Selve), and made the campaign of 1840 with him. Extremely intelligent, firm and upright in character, familiar with the manners, customs, language, and climate of Syria, perfectly well acquainted with the ground his troops were to cover, a map of which he had given to the War Department, General de Beaufort d'Hautpoul possessed every requisite for success in his command. The army was also in every way capable. Its officers had been long accustomed to manage Arabian affairs, and its soldiers included African zouaves and chasseurs, incomparable for an expedition of this sort, and spahis, Arabians by birth and Moslems by religion, whose presence under the French flag proved that there was no question of executing race or creed vengeance.

The expeditionary corps, amounting to some six thousand men, included the 5th and 13th of the line, the 16th battalion of foot chasseurs, a battalion of

the 1st zouaves, a squadron of the 1st hussars, one of the 1st African chasseurs, another of the 2d spahis, two batteries of artillery, a company of engineers and one of train-soldiers. Colonel Osmont was chief of staff.

The general landed at Beyrout August 16. On his arrival he found the Sisters of Charity, those worthy servants of God and the poor who are met wherever there are unfortunates to be assisted. In forcing Mussulman fanaticism to recoil before Christian civilization, in remaining loyal to the adage *Gesta Dei per Francos*, in displaying to the world the alliance between the cross and the sword, between charity and courage, France nobly continued its ancestral traditions and was about to render brilliant service to all Christendom.

If the authors of the recent massacres were to be punished, it was necessary that Fuad Pasha, the commissioner appointed by the Sultan with unlimited powers, should be carefully watched. Arriving at Beyrout July 17, he had entered Damascus on the 29th at the head of three thousand regulars. Seven hundred arrests were made at once, but in spite of the efforts of the French consul, all culprits of high rank were left at liberty. The repression vacillated between vigor and laxness up to the time when the French troops landed in Syria. April 20, fifty-seven Mussulmans who had been recognized as guilty by the extraordinary tribunal instituted by Fuad at Damascus were hanged, and on the same day one

hundred and ten policemen were shot. Fearing lest the French army might enter Damascus, the holy city, and thus scandalize all Mahometans, Fuad concluded to execute Achmet Bey, formerly marshal of the army of Syria and governor *ad interim* of Damascus at the time of the massacres. Achmet was led secretly to his death before sunrise, which permitted Fuad to tell Europe that he had been inflexible, and the Mussulmans to believe that the great criminal had been spared.

On returning to Beyrout, September 11, Fuad found the tricolored flag floating on the city walls. Unable to bend the inflexible determination of the French to look for the guilty Druses in the Libanus, with or without the concurrence of the Turks, he had to resign himself to an expedition made in common. The French were to move toward Deir-el-Kamar, and from there explore the mountain, while the Turks would march southward, cross the heights of Lebanon, cut off the retreat of the armed bands of Druses toward Hauran, and throw them back on the French troops. Such was the plan adopted; but Fuad Pasha, relying on England, which had doubtless resolved to defend the Druses, had great hopes of bringing it to naught.

The expeditionary corps left Beyrout September 25, and reached Deir-el-Kamar the next day. M. Ernest Louet, paymaster of the Syrian expedition, says: "On the spot formerly occupied by bazaars and shops we now found nothing but heaps of dead bodies.

Even the horses refused to pass through these traces of carnage; they pricked up their ears at the flight of the hawks and vultures disturbed by our arrival. All that the journals have published about it seems to us below the hideous truth. In every direction lay pools of blood which only the sun could dry up."

The chief result aimed at by an expedition in common was completely missed. Either through incapacity or connivance, Fuad Pasha had allowed all the Druses who had taken refuge in Hauran to pass through the Turkish lines, just when they were supposed to be surrounded on all sides. Mustapha-Aga, whom Fuad Pasha had placed at Djeb-Jenin with several companies of Metualis to prevent them from passing through the defile which leads to Hauran, had opened it to them. "Let Europe expect nothing from Turkey in the way of punishing the Druses," writes M. Louet; "the Anglo-Turkish policy which for twenty years has been the ruin of Syria assures them impunity, and Fuad Pasha has to resort to every trick and every artifice of speech in order to disguise it."

General de Beaufort d'Hautpoul resolved to act alone thereafter, independent of Turkish coöperation. The military rôle of the expedition was restricted, but its humanitarian mission called down blessings on the name of France. Scattered about in their encampments, the French troops everywhere employed themselves in effacing the traces of the catastrophes, in rebuilding houses destroyed by

incendiary fires, in sharing their rations with the unfortunates around them. Under shelter of the French flag villages were repeopled and confidence returned. French soldiers and religious distributed food, seed corn, and building materials, set up anew the family hearthstónes, and appeared as liberators and saviours.

October 7, the expeditionary corps was at Kab-Elias, where a Mass was said in open air. On the same day it entered Zahlé. The Christians thronged the passage of the general. The women pursued him with acclamations whose enthusiasm was in striking contrast with the smoking ruins that served to shelter them. In this city, which had contained not less than fifteen thousand inhabitants before the massacres, but four or five houses were left standing, and that not because they had been spared, but because they had not taken fire so easily as the others.

On the very day when the French army of Syria entered Zahlé in continuance of its benevolent mission, the army of King Victor Emmanuel was invading the kingdom of Naples. Let us give a rapid sketch of the events leading up to this invasion, a result of that of Umbria and the Marches.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES

IT should be recognized that the events now going on in southern Italy were in no wise conformable with the programme of France. Though it blamed severely the defects of the Neapolitan administration, it desired to see Francis II. maintained on his throne, and would have liked to see him in alliance with King Victor Emmanuel. Even England had at first seemed to favor such an arrangement. Comte de Persigny wrote to M. Thouvenel, June 1: "Lord John Russell tells me that after all it would be more advantageous for everybody if Italy should form two friendly groups united by a common interest, than to run after a possibly unattainable unity whose first consequence would be inevitably to bring on a new war with Austria. I congratulated Lord John Russell on his prudent frame of mind, and, in support of this opinion, I called his attention to the advantage of avoiding by a reconciliation between the two sovereigns the consequences which might result from the dissatisfaction of the northern Powers with the violations of the law of nations now taking place in Italy."

Baron Brénier, minister of France at Naples, had always advised Francis II. to make liberal reforms and ally himself with Victor Emmanuel. After long and easily comprehensible hesitation, the young sovereign ended by adopting this advice. June 20 a royal act appeared announcing: (1) a general amnesty; (2) the formation of a liberal ministry, under the presidency of M. Spinelli, of the Princes Scalea; (3) a national statute; (4) an accord with Sardinia; (5) adoption of the Italian flag; (6) special representation for Sicily.

The following month Francis II. sent two extraordinary ambassadors to Sicily for the purpose of negotiating a political, customs, and commercial league between the two Italian crowns, with the object of blending the interests of their states and ensuring the independence of the peninsula against all foreign attack or influence. These ambassadors were M. Manna and Baron Winspeare. They arrived at Turin July 15. Baron de Talleyrand had received orders to support their mission warmly. He wrote, July 16, to M. Thouvenel: "I have pointed out to Comte Cavour as the probable cost of his persistence in the line of conduct adopted toward the King of Naples, an imminent rupture of diplomatic relations between Sardinia and the courts of Prussia and Russia; even Italy's independence imperilled by a policy condemned by our conscience and sense of justice; European war, in a word, resulting from the Italian revolution, and impelling France to place

itself in line with its own interests and no longer those of King Victor Emmanuel.

"Comte Cavour, M. le Ministre, listened to me with emotion. 'If we should do as we are asked,' said he, 'we should be thrown out of the windows. Even the popularity of the King could not excuse it. Nobody in Italy would advise me to do it, for nobody believes in the King of Naples. He will do what his father and grandfather did before him. The situations are precisely the same, and experience tells us what the future will be. The dangers and difficulties are immense. It is not one of the most difficult positions in which I ever found myself, but the most difficult, and I recognize it.'"

If M. Cavour's situation was critical, that of Francis II. was quite different. The ground was failing under his feet. He was surrounded by treason on every side. His own uncles, the Count of Aquila and the Count of Syracuse, were covenanting with his enemies, and every reform he granted was turned against his throne. The victor at Milazza, July 25, Garibaldi was master in Sicily, and would soon pass over to the mainland.

This probability keenly interested the French government. M. Thouvenel wrote to the Comte de Persigny, July 24: "Is it expedient for France and England to be entirely passive witnesses of events calculated to produce the most serious results on European order, to permit aggressions by an army composed of revolutionary and foreign ele-

ments, on a country with which we maintain regular relations, in a word, to allow the intervention of violence to make void the constitutional test to which King Francis II. has loyally subjected himself? The government of the Emperor thinks this passive attitude would befit neither the interests nor the dignity of either France or England, and I have said to Lord Cowley that it would seem desirable to me in the present condition of things that the commanders of our naval forces should be authorized to tell Garibaldi that they have received orders to prevent his crossing the strait."

England having rejected this proposition, France was unwilling to act alone. Sure of impunity, Garibaldi was free to go on with his conquests. He crossed the strait in the night of August 18, and landed very near Mileto. He seized Reggio the 21st. The Neapolitan troops disbanded, forty thousand soldiers quitting the ranks. In ten days Garibaldi dispersed four divisions, and conquered twenty towns and fortresses, which left his way open to the capital.

Treason had never been more cunningly organized. August 9, Admiral Persano had sailed into Neapolitan waters with the Piedmontese fleet. Inviolable on his ship, as the Marquis de Villamarina was in the house of the legation, he plotted quite at his ease and arranged the desertion of the officers of the Neapolitan navy. He concealed two half battalions of *bersaglieri* among his troops, ready to go ashore whenever he thought it would be useful.

The ministry, partly won over to the revolution, allowed the journals to boast of Garibaldi, the lazzaroni to sell his portraits and proclamations in the streets. Francis II. was obliged to send one of his uncles, the Count of Aquila, into exile. Another uncle, the Count of Syracuse, urged the King in writing to resign his authority, to shed no more Italian blood, and to follow the example of the Duchess of Parma. The national guard went to offer its congratulations to the Count of Syracuse. The ministers refused to exile him, and his anterooms were full of petitioners until the day when it pleased him to depart for Turin. The sailors and even the ministry opposed the King's scheme of sending the fleet to Trieste to rescue him. Unable to contend any longer at Naples against the rising tide of treason, the unfortunate monarch resolved to leave his capital and take refuge, as Pius IX. had done in 1848, at Gaëta, a strong city on the Mediterranean, seventy kilometres from Naples. The population of Gaëta was only fifteen thousand souls, but it was very well fortified, and with those of his troops who had remained faithful Francis II. could make a long and honorable resistance.

At five o'clock in the evening of September 6, accompanied by his family, some loyal adherents, and the members of the Diplomatic Corps, those of France and England excepted, he left the palace he was never again to see, passed through an indifferent crowd to gain the harbor, went aboard the Spanish

ship *Colon*, and sailed for Gaëta. A single Neapolitan vessel, the *Parthenope*, escorted him, with those of the marines who had not deserted him on board.

Garibaldi was at Salerno. In the morning of September 7, the syndic of Naples brought him "the votes of the population." The writer of the address was the minister of Francis II., M. Liborio Romano, the same who had drawn up the evening before the farewell proclamation of the sovereign to the inhabitants of his capital, and who had been congratulated by the unhappy prince on having "so well comprehended his soul." During the morning, Garibaldi, preceding his army, took an express train, and entered Naples, where the national guard was expecting him, a little after midday, attended only by a dozen officers. Riding beside the driver of a hired carriage, he went to the palace of Angri, at the end of the Via de Toledo, where he selected a sort of garret at the top of the house for himself, abandoning the rest of the palace to his staff.

The dictator encountered not the slightest trace of opposition in a city of four hundred thousand inhabitants. September 9, at five in the evening, he went to Fort St. Elmo, which opened its gates to him. An hour later, the Royal Palace and Fort Euf and the Castello Nuova made their submission.

Garibaldi declared himself an adherent of Victor Emmanuel, but the implacable enemy of Cavour. He had a letter to one of his friends published,

September 18, in the *Official Journal* of Naples, in which he announced that he would never offer his hand to a man who had humiliated the national dignity and sold an Italian province.

September 25, Francis II. addressed a protest to the European powers. He said: "Within a space of four months, Europe has looked on, surprised but impassive, while thousands of soldiers of the revolution passed through the squadrons of all the maritime nations, on vessels loaded with arms and munitions; while the ports of a nation friendly to the Two Sicilies served as an asylum and inviolable refuge to those who were to invade our territory, and the flags of the Sardinian navy protected with impunity the fleet and battalions of the chief of the revolution whose acts the Sardinian government had condemned by describing them as outrages and as usurpation. . . . The Piedmontese armies, without any legitimate motive, and without advancing any claim except that of assisting the revolution, are already invading the States of the Church. General Fanti's letter to General de Lamoricière is the most evident proof that international law and public law exist no longer."

Francis II. did not content himself with protesting. He struggled against ill fortune with much more energy and tenacity than fallen sovereigns usually do. He still had seventy thousand loyal troops, well organized, and supported by powerful artillery, occupying Gaëta and Capua, with all the

resources of a regular administration. September 30, the Neapolitans crossed the Volturno under Cajazzo. A battle took place the next day. To the Neapolitans it was a question of recapturing Naples, to Garibaldi of retaining it. When the fight began, Garibaldi had only ten thousand men, soon increased to fifteen thousand, among them the Piedmontese soldiers who for some days had been garrisoning the fortresses of Naples. The success of the battle seemed doubtful, when the Marquis de Villamarina took it on himself to send the Piedmontese to the field, where they did not arrive until evening, yet soon enough to serve some pieces of artillery and compel the retreat of the Neapolitans. The latter retired in good order and reëntered Capua, which Garibaldi was unable to besiege without the assistance of a regular army. Asserted by the officers of King Victor Emmanuel, although afterward disputed by the dictator and his lieutenants, the necessity of the Piedmontese concurrence seems beyond doubt. Garibaldi himself comprehended that if he were beaten on the Volturno or the Garigliano, and if he besieged Capua and Gaëta in vain, the unitary movement would be compromised in a possibly irreparable manner. After the fight of October 1, therefore, he was wise enough to keep on the defensive, and awaited the army of King Victor Emmanuel, lacking which one may believe that his audacious enterprise would not have come to a successful end.

CHAPTER XXXV

THE DIPLOMATIC PROTESTS

OCTOBER 4, Victor Emmanuel was at Ancona, where the Neapolitan deputations came to pay him homage. It occurred to him, just as he was getting ready to cross the frontier with his troops, that he could not any longer retain at Turin, as accredited to him, the representative of the sovereign whose States he was about to usurp. Consequently, on the 6th, Cavour notified Baron Winspeare, minister of the Two Sicilies, that the Sardinian government intended to intervene in that kingdom. M. Giacometti remarks concerning this: "That phrase *to intervene* has a very curious meaning when one reflects that it is precisely in virtue of the principle of *non-intervention* that Sardinia has been able to go armed into the Roman States in the first place, next into the State of the Two Sicilies, and to annex these countries without any opposition on the part of Europe except unsanctioned diplomatic protests."

Baron Winspeare replied as follows, October 7, to the note of Count Cavour: "The occupation of the realm of the Two Sicilies by Piedmontese troops is a fact so plainly contrary to the foundations of all law and right that it would seem almost useless to pause

here in order to demonstrate its illegality; the facts which have preceded this invasion, and the old and intimate ties of kindred and friendship which existed between the two crowns, render it so new and extraordinary in the history of modern nations, that the generous mind of my august master refused to believe it possible."

The Neapolitan diplomat added: "At this fatal hour, when a State containing ten million souls is defending by arms the last relics of its historic autonomy, it would be idle to seek to discover by whom this revolution has been fortified to the point of becoming a colossus, and how it has been enabled to effect the greater part of the ruin it had planned. The decree of that Divine Providence, whose sacred name your Excellency has invoked, will be pronounced before long, at the time of the final combat; but, whatever this definitive decree may be, the blessing of heaven will certainly not descend on those who are preparing to violate the great principles of social and moral order by setting themselves up as the executors of a mandate of God. Even public conscience, when once more free from the tyrannical yoke of political passions, will be able to assign its true character to a usurping enterprise begun by craft and accomplished by violence."

Two days later, Baron Winspeare left Turin. It was on October 9 also that the Piedmontese troops crossed the Neapolitan frontier and Victor Emmanuel addressed a proclamation to the peoples of southern

Italy. The conclusion of this manifesto was as follows: "I await with calmness the judgment of civilized Europe and that of history, because I am conscious of having accomplished my duties as a king and an Italian. My policy will perhaps not be without its value to Europe in reconciling the progress of peoples with the stability of monarchies. I know that in Italy I am putting an end to the era of revolutions."

October 15, before any vote had been taken, Garibaldi thought fit to proclaim *proprio motu* the reunion of the Two Sicilies to the kingdom of Italy; he issued the following decree, dated from San Angelo: "To comply with a wish incontestably dear to the entire nation, I decree that the Two Sicilies, which owe their redemption to Italian blood, and which have freely elected me dictator, form an integral part of Italy, one and indivisible, with its constitutional king, Victor Emmanuel, and his descendants.

"I will resign into the King's hands, on his arrival, the dictatorship confided to me by the nation.

"The prodictators are charged with the execution of the present decree."

Everybody was wondering what the great European powers would do. For an instant it was thought they would undertake the defence of King Francis II. An old and faithful client of Russia, the Neapolitan dynasty awakened deep sympathy at St. Petersburg. Nicholas I., father of the Czar, had been an intimate friend of Ferdinand II., father of the

King of Naples. The relations between the two courts had never ceased to be particularly cordial. Hence it was supposed that the Czar, so powerful in the European concert, would find some means of saving a monarch in whom he had a traditional interest.

As early as September 28, Prince Gortchakoff had addressed a despatch to Prince Gagarine, minister of Russia at Turin, vehemently protesting against the policy of King Victor Emmanuel. The chancellor expressed himself thus: "Amidst the most profound peace, without any provocation, even without making any declaration of war, the Piedmontese government has ordered its troops to cross the frontiers of the Roman States; it has openly compounded with the triumphant revolution at Naples; it has sanctioned the acts of this revolution by the presence of Piedmontese troops and that of high functionaries who have been placed at the head of the insurrection without ceasing to be in the service of King Victor Emmanuel. Finally, the Sardinian government has just rewarded this violation of international law by announcing, in the face of all Europe, its intention to accept the annexation to the kingdom of Piedmont of territories belonging to sovereigns still present in their dominions, and there defending their authority against the attacks of the revolution."

Prince Gortchakoff added: "The necessity of combating anarchy under which the Sardinian gov-

ernment claims to lie does not justify it, for it is simply keeping pace with the revolution in order to harvest its leavings, not to arrest its progress or repair its iniquities. Pretexts of this sort are not admissible. It is no longer a question of Italian interests merely, but of general interests, common to all governments. It is a question directly connected with those eternal laws without which neither order, nor security, nor peace could exist in Europe."

The Czar did not confine himself to this protest. He took the more serious step of recalling from Turin his minister and all his legation.

The conclusion of the despatch was as follows: "H. M. the Emperor deems it impossible for his legation to remain longer in a place where it must necessarily witness acts which its conscience and convictions condemn. His Majesty finds himself obliged to put an end to the functions you fulfil at the court of Sardinia. It is our master's will that on receiving these instructions you should ask for your passports and leave Turin instantly with all the personnel of the legation."

The cabinet of Berlin also passed a severe judgment on the Piedmontese policy. Prussia, destined to be the Piedmont of Germany a few years later, still had respect for treaties, and did not suspect that it was going to subject several sovereigns of the Germanic Confederation to a fate similar to that of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the Duke of Parma, the Duke of Modena, and the King of Naples.

Count Cavour had not, as yet, played the professor, and his imitator, Herr von Bismarck, still concealed his ulterior thoughts. No one yet foreboded that alliance between Italy and Prussia, of which Napoleon III. was the imprudent promoter, and whose consequence was Sadowa. The advances made in 1860 by Cavour to the Prince Regent of Prussia, the future Emperor of Germany, were more than coldly received.

The Prussian legation was not recalled from Turin, but the court of Berlin severely censured the invasion of the States of the Church and that of the kingdom of Naples. Comte Brassier de Saint-Simon, minister of Prussia at Turin, received from Baron Schleinitz, Minister of Foreign Affairs, a despatch dated from Coblentz, October 13, in which it was said: "The army which the Sovereign Pontiff had formed to maintain public order has been attacked and dispersed. And far from halting in the path which it is pursuing in contempt of international law, the Sardinian government has just ordered its army to cross the frontiers of the kingdom of Naples at several points, with the avowed object of coming to the support of the insurrection and making a military occupation of the country.

"Meanwhile, the Piedmontese chambers are considering a proposed law tending to effectuate new annexations in virtue of universal suffrage, thus inviting the Italian populations to declare in due form the downfall of their princes. Thus it is that

the Sardinian government, even while invoking the principle of non-intervention in favor of Italy, does not recoil from the most flagrant violations of that principle in its relations with other Italian States."

The Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs ended his despatch as follows: "Invited to express our sentiments concerning such acts and principles, we cannot but deplore them deeply and sincerely, and we believe ourselves to be fulfilling a strict duty by expressing in the most explicit and formal manner our disapproval both of the principles and the application it has been thought possible to make of them."

M. Giacometti has made the following reflection on this despatch, "Could any one have made Von Schleinitz believe that a day would come when a King of Prussia, Emperor of Germany, would vaunt in sounding discourses the *intangible* capital of that Italy whose measures of unification now provoked Prussian protests like these!"

In 1860, Prussia boasted of respecting time-honored law. It agreed with Russia and seemed to cling above all things to the maintenance of the treaties of 1815. This attitude of the two northern powers suggested to the Austrian government the idea of profiting by it. It wondered whether the time had not come to establish a moral and material solidarity between the monarchies which would be able to stop the encroachments of the European revolution. Would not the Italian movement be

the signal for revolts in Hungary? Might not to-morrow see the awakening of Poland? Francis Joseph thought that a conservative policy might prevail, and the dispossessed Italian sovereigns took heart when they learned that the Czar, the Emperor of Austria, and the Prince Regent of Prussia were to meet at Warsaw.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE INTERVIEW OF WARSAW

IN September, after a dinner given at Schönbrunn in honor of the Czar's name day, the Emperor Francis Joseph asked the Russian minister to express to Alexander II. his great desire for an interview. The Czar, who had not forgotten the incidents of the Crimean war, considered this proceeding of the Austrian monarch a sort of apology, and immediately replied that Francis Joseph would be welcome. It was agreed that the interview should take place at Warsaw, and that the two Emperors should meet the Prince Regent of Prussia there.

The Duc de Montebello, ambassador of France at St. Petersburg, wrote to M. Thouvenel, September 14: "The interview of the three sovereigns will make talk in Europe about a coalition and a holy alliance; nothing is further from Russia's thoughts, and the language used by Prince Gortchakoff in apprising me of it was this: 'It is the great and sincere desire of the Emperor Alexander that this interview may bring about a general understanding between the great powers, and banish the suspicions which injuriously affect the great interests of Europe. I am certain that Russia will bring to it very friendly dispositions toward France.'"

September 16, the Czar sent for the Duc de Montebello, and said to him : "You know that the Prince Regent of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria are coming to see me at Warsaw ; public opinion has been very much occupied with this interview, even before it was decided on. It surmised the germ of a coalition in it. I have wished to come to an understanding with you as to my own intentions in going there ; I need not say that they will be friendly toward France. It is not a coalition that I am going to make at Warsaw, but a reconciliation, and it pleases me to know that the Prince Regent is of the same mind. Tell the Emperor Napoleon that he can trust me."

After having declared that its object was to bring about a general understanding between the great powers, the Russian court asked the French government to let it know how far it could go toward accomplishing this result.

French diplomacy has seldom been called upon to exert itself in circumstances so delicate. It was necessary, even while censuring Piedmont, not to do so in a manner which could encourage the court of Austria in its own ideas of aggression ; and, on the other hand, to make the court of Turin understand that if it had had the slightest notion of attacking Venetia, France would not allow itself to be either intimidated or involved, and that its armies would not be at the disposal of the King of Sardinia.

M. Thouvenel drew up a memorandum dated

September 25, which had the four points subjoined : —

1. If Italy attacks Venice, the Germanic powers remaining neutral, France will lend it no support ;

2. The state of things which brought about the last war will not be restored. Lombardy will not be brought in question ;

3. Everything which concerns the territorial limits of Italy will be submitted to a congress ;

4. Nice and Savoy will not be subjects of discussion at the Congress, even though Italy should lose the acquisitions it has made since the stipulations of Villafranca and Zurich.

M. Thouvenel was arguing solely in anticipation of an aggression by Italy against Austria, apart from which supposition he could foresee no circumstance to which the bases of his memorandum would not apply.

In a despatch of October 17, addressed to the Duc de Montebello, the minister summed up the leading idea of the Emperor's Italian policy as follows : " Great questions are not solved by force alone. A material action might, no doubt, put an end to the encroachments of Piedmont ; it would not suffice to reconstitute Italy and assure the security of Europe. Were the former governments reintegrated by foreign intervention, they could sustain themselves only by means of a prolonged occupation, and experience has more than sufficiently proved the radical defects of such a system. All it

could do would be to recur to a circle recognized as vicious by all the world, and which sooner or later would again be broken."

After laying it down as fundamental that France could not recommence, under Napoleon III., in Italy, what it had undertaken in Spain, under Louis XVIII., the minister added: "Imperial France is not revolutionary. The hatred excited by it in a certain camp is sufficient proof that it is there regarded as the most redoubtable and most determined enemy of the mobocracy. But it is neither in its nature nor in its power to prevent the downfalls or the transformations which the lapse of time and the faults of men have brought about. Only malevolence and calumny can pretend that the Emperor has not seen with profound regret the development of events in the Roman States and the kingdom of Naples. We do not approve all that takes place in Italy; our conscience condemns the means employed, and, on the other hand, our reason does not permit us to champion there the régimes which have been destroyed."

The despatch concluded as follows: "What will issue from this volcano in eruption? Nobody knows, and it would be rash to lay down for one's self a fixed course of action in advance. To devote all their efforts to averting a general war, disastrous to civilization; to endeavor that the great European powers, by means of an intelligent and loyal understanding, shall provide a solution for redoubtable

problems ; that, in my opinion, is the end which the cabinets should aim at, and the work in which we are ready to concur."

The Emperor Alexander adopted the substance of M. Thouvenel's memorandum and made it, so to say, the theme of the interview of Warsaw. This lasted from the 22d to the 26th of October. The Czar, the Emperor Francis Joseph, and the Prince Regent of Prussia had brought with them their Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Prince Gortchakoff, Count von Rechberg, and Baron von Schleinitz. One might have thought the destinies of the world were to be decided in this great political conclave. But all that passed between the sovereigns was an exchange of trifling courtesies. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs held conferences, but without coming to any decision of importance. The obstacles which several months before had prevented the assembling of a Congress, had merely been increasing ever since. From the moment when it was admitted that force would not be resorted to, the resolutions of the cabinets were stricken with sterility in advance, and the world would infallibly have witnessed the twin spectacle of Europe regulating the destinies of Italy on one hand, and Italy refusing to submit to the decision of Europe on the other.

It might have been supposed that the courts of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, which had displayed such indignation against Victor Emmanuel's conduct toward the King of Naples, would make a formal

appeal to Europe in favor of the luckless sovereign. They had not even an idea of defending his rights, and confined themselves to protecting Piedmont against the chance of an intervention of the powers. Was Europe justified in censuring the Italian policy of Napoleon III. when it did not itself make the slightest move toward hindering the progress of the Revolution? What did the vehement protests of the three courts result in? Nothing at all.

The conferences of Warsaw were cut short by tidings of the fatal illness of the dowager Empress of Russia. The Czar went back in haste to St. Petersburg. The sovereigns separated without having settled anything, but that did not prevent their congratulating each other as if they had saved the world.

From the moment he attained the conviction that France would not support Sardinia in an attack on Venetia, which for him was the essential thing, the Emperor Francis Joseph easily reconciled himself to his inability to do anything for the dispossessed Italian sovereigns.

The cabinet of Berlin declared itself fully satisfied. Prince Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, president of the ministerial council of Prussia, wrote to Prince Gortchakoff, October 26: "At the moment when the august sovereigns are quitting Warsaw, I come to beg you to make yourself the organ near the Emperor Alexander of those sentiments of lively gratitude awakened in Monseigneur the Prince

Regent by the new proofs which his Majesty has just given of his profound solicitude for the maintenance of the peace of Europe and for the consolidation of that confidence which ought to preside over the relations of the powers. In this respect an important result has been obtained by the communication of a document in which are expressed the ideas of the Emperor of the French on the Italian question, and the exchange of ideas to which this communication gave rise."

The sovereigns of the North separated October 26. The next day England, which had not been represented at the interview of Warsaw, began to speak. Lord John Russell, chief of the Foreign Office, addressed to Sir James Hudson, minister of England at Turin, a sensational despatch to be communicated to Count Cavour, or rather to all Italy, and which was a noisy, enthusiastic approval of the entire Piedmontese policy. Lord John Russell cited the famous jurist Vattel, who had affirmed as legitimate the intervention of the Prince of Orange to support the English revolution and dethrone James II. "What is there astonishing," added the minister, "about the fact that in 1860 the Neapolitans, distrustful and full of resentment, drive out the Bourbons, as in 1688 England drove out the Stuarts?" According to Lord John Russell, "the Italian revolution was conducted with a rare and singular moderation. The venerated forms of constitutional monarchy were associated to the name of

a prince representing an ancient and glorious dynasty." The English minister concluded as follows: "The government of the Queen can see no sufficient motive for the severity with which Austria, Prussia, and Russia have censured the acts of the King of Sardinia. The government of her Majesty prefers to fix its attention upon the agreeable spectacle of a people erecting the edifice of its liberty, and consolidating the work of its independence, surrounded by the sympathies and sincere good-wishes of Europe."

The same Lord John Russell, ardent apologist as he was of the invasion of the Marches, Umbria, and the Two Sicilies, considered as sacred the rights of Austria over Venetia, and would have described as a violation of international law any attempt to deliver it. For all that, his memorable despatch had an immense success at Turin. Without risking anything, spending anything, or making any outlay beyond that of phrases, England had substituted itself for France in the gratitude of Italy. Mazzini's predictions were being realized. In a letter from Florence, September 20, 1859, he had written to Victor Emmanuel, "Diplomacy is like a midnight ghost; a menacing giant to the sight of those that fear it, it melts like a fine mist before those who resolutely go to meet it." The secret of all the successes of Piedmontese policy was to have had the conviction that diplomatic remonstrances were to be considered null and void so long as force was not their base and sanction.

CHAPTER XXXVII

VICTOR EMMANUEL AT NAPLES

VICTOR EMMANUEL had nothing further to fear from the great powers. Sure of impunity, he could go straight to his object. While the inhabitants of the Two Sicilies were voting the plébiscite, he crossed the Neapolitan frontier and went by short day's marches toward Naples. Garibaldi came to meet the sovereign. They met near Teano, October 26. The King was at the head of two Piedmontese divisions. Making use of a lorgnette, he recognized Garibaldi at a distance, and spurred his horse to meet him the sooner. Garibaldi did the same. At this moment, some officers having exclaimed, "Long live Victor Emmanuel!" he added, taking off his hat, "King of Italy!" At this phrase, Victor Emmanuel raised his hand to his cap, and then held it out to the conqueror of the Two Sicilies, saying, "Thanks." They rode on, holding each other's hand for about a quarter of an hour. A halt was made at Teano, a town some twenty kilometres from Capua. The King made his troops defile in front of Garibaldi, and then reviewed the Garibaldian troops in person. October 29, the dictator resigned his powers to the sovereign.



GARIBALDI.

The Neapolitan troops still held out at Capua, some twenty-eight kilometres from Naples, and the Garibaldians were unable to dislodge them. This was the work of the Piedmontese army. The city did not surrender until November 2, after a siege which had lasted forty-eight days. All that Victor Emmanuel now had to do was to make his triumphal entry into the capital of the kingdom. This was effected on November 7. The Piedmontese troops and the national guard formed the line. The Garibaldian army took no part in the ceremony. A few officers in red jackets alone witnessed it from a balcony. Maxime du Camp describes it thus : —

" It is raining in torrents. A strong east wind blows across the city in incessant squalls. The vessels in the harbor rock so that their yards dip into the sea. The bad weather has prevented the completion of the preparations. The headless statues stretch across the inundated streets symbolic hands, empty of flags. The triumphal arches are mere skeletons. The painted hangings, snatched off by the wind, beat against the uncovered scaffoldings. An immense crowd throngs the city from the railway station to the Palais-Royal. It is like an immense forest of umbrellas."

It is ten o'clock in the morning. The cannon roar from the forts. The King makes his entry. He goes first to the cathedral, accompanied by Garibaldi ; then he gets into a carriage to reach the Palais-Royal. On his right sits Garibaldi, his red

soldier's jacket covered by a gray mantle. On the front seat of the royal carriage one sees M. Pallavicino, prodictator of Naples, in a black coat, and M. Antoine Mordini, prodictator of Sicily, in a red shirt. The crowd is pleased with the latter for having retained the Garibaldian costume; for, as M. Maxime du Camp says, it is really the red shirt, that is to say Italian independence by the revolution, which ought to do the honors of the city of Naples to Victor Emmanuel. Cries of 'Long live Garibaldi!' are still more numerous than those of 'Long live the King!'"

Victor Emmanuel offered the collar of the Annunciade to Garibaldi and to M. Pallavicino. Garibaldi refused it and received unwillingly the title of generalissimo, equivalent to the rank of marshal. He was also offered an appanage for his eldest son, a position as aide-de-camp to the King for his second son, a dowry for his daughter, his choice among all the royal châteaux, and a steamship. He refused everything. What he had asked for was the title of lieutenant general of the King in the Two Sicilies for a year, with unlimited powers. As it was known that, in this situation, his sole idea would be to organize an expedition against the Pope, Victor Emmanuel responded to this request by the single phrase, "That is impossible."

Garibaldi was greatly affected by this refusal. "You know what they do with oranges," said he to Admiral Persano; "they squeeze out the juice and

then throw them into a corner." In the little island of Caprera he owned a small estate, his sole possession, which brought him a yearly income of about fifteen hundred francs. Thither he retired while awaiting the time when he could reappear on battle-fields.

November 8, he bade adieu to his companions in arms by a proclamation dated from Naples. "Providence," said he, "makes a gift of Italy to Victor Emmanuel. Every Italian ought to join him, to rally round him. Beside the Re Galantuomo all disputation should vanish, all rancor disappear. Once more I repeat to you my cry: To arms! all! all! Poor liberty, poor Italian land, if in March, 1861, there are not found a million of Italians under arms! Oh! no; far from me be a thought which disgusts me like a poison! The month of March, 1861, if need be that of February, will find us all at our post. Italians of Catalafimi, of Palermo, of Ancona, of Castelfidardo, of Isernia; and with us every man of this land who is not cowardly, not servile, all thronged about the glorious soldier of Palestro, we shall give the last shock, the last blow at a decaying tyranny."

At daybreak, November 9, Garibaldi got into a small boat which he himself unfastened, and rowed out to the steamer *Washington*, placed at his disposal for his voyage to Caprera. He took with him only his three old and faithful friends, — Basso, Giusmaroli, and Froccinati. Of the enormous sums

which he had just been handling, all he carried away was ten piastres (ten dollars), and a sack of beans which he proposed to cultivate in his hermitage of Caprera until the day when he should march to the deliverance of the "brothers still slaves of the foreigner."

While Victor Emmanuel was installing himself at Naples, all that remained to the unfortunate Francis II. was the little city of Gaëta, situated on the Mediterranean, seventy kilometres from Naples. His conduct there, and that of his queen, merited the admiration of his adversaries themselves. Supported by faithful troops, the dispossessed king displayed an unexpected energy at Gaëta. Possibly he was building hopes on the sentiments of France, which not merely disregarded the blockade declared by the Piedmontese government, but sent into the harbor of that fortified city the evolutionary squadron commanded by Vice Admiral Barbier de Tinan. This was simply a last illusion for the partisans of Francis II. Napoleon III. wished to give the King of Naples a mark of his personal friendship by saving him the painful necessity of owing his liberty to a capitulation; but he had no thought of serious intervention in his favor.

M. Thouvenel wrote to Admiral de Tinan, October 30, that the Emperor meant to protect the dignity of King Francis II. in his final moments of trial, but had no intention of encouraging him to continue a struggle which had become too unequal.

M. Thouvenel added : "The Neapolitan people has been summoned to cast a vote which must for the moment destroy the hopes of the court of Gaëta as to a change in public opinion. This being the situation, it is permissible to inquire whether King Francis II., now that his honor is safe, ought not to accommodate himself to circumstances, and avoid shedding in vain the blood of the soldiers who have remained faithful to him. Whenever you have a chance, the Emperor authorizes you to let King Francis II. understand that he has prolonged his resistance as far as the dignity of his crown required and the desertion of his subjects permitted."

Francis II. did not follow this advice. He resisted for two and a half months longer.

Listen once more to Maxime Du Camp, who sailed past Gaëta on his return to France after Garibaldi's departure for Caprera : "At nightfall," says he, "we arrived before Gaëta. The French fleet had kindled its fires ; lights gleamed in the city. All the passengers on deck were looking toward the ramparts, whose dark mass could hardly be distinguished against the profound darkness of the sky. They were talking about Francis II. Would he resist? Would he surrender? He is right ; he is wrong ! Every one gave his opinion. I kept silence, and I thought : As a man, he is absolutely wrong to prolong a resistance which cannot save him in any case ; as a king, he is right, not because it safeguards his honor, but because he is giving the

kings by divine right a chance to declare themselves and rescue him, under pain of abandoning to the chances of revolutions the principle in virtue of which they reign. Governments which issue from the same stock are jointly and severally responsible for each other. . . . If the absolute kings of Europe do not save this member of their family who is fighting for the common principle, they are lost ; some day they will be abandoned as they are now abandoning. In falling, Francis II. can turn to those who call him brother and say, *Hodie mihi, cras tibi.*"

The European sovereigns did not disturb themselves about what Maxime Du Camp calls their solidarity. They lent the unhappy King of Naples a purely illusory support, but with the natural progress of events they did not interfere. Yet there was one among them, the Empress Eugénie, who took the Italian matter keenly to heart. Devoted to Pius IX., her son's godfather, and a great admirer of the heroism displayed at Gaëta by the young Queen of Naples, she had longed to see France render efficient aid to both the Holy Father and Francis II. Saddened and disappointed by her lack of influence, and still a prey to the melancholy which had weighed upon her since the death of her sister, the Duchess of Alba, she suddenly resolved upon a long journey which might divert her from her sorrow. This she determined to make incognita, travelling as a private person, without pomp or

ceremony. It was a sort of apprenticeship to the still more painful journeys fate held in reserve for her. Feeling that the more brilliant aspects of nature would but increase or irritate her chagrin, she avoided Italy and Spain, and set out for England and Scotland, whose mists and fogs were more in harmony with the melancholy of her heart.

November 14, at six in the morning, the Empress left the Château of Saint-Cloud, accompanied by her equerry, the Marquis de Lagrange, and two of her ladies, Madame de Saulcy and the Comtesse de Montebello. On arriving at Paris, she went directly to the Gare du Nord, where the equerry bought the tickets necessary for her and her suite. She had been unwilling to reserve a carriage, and entered the ordinary train under the name of the Comtesse de Pierrefonds. Neither the Comte de Persigny nor any member of the embassy came to meet her on her arrival in London. Nor did any one recognize her as she passed through the city.

The Emperor left Saint-Cloud, November 22, for the Tuileries. The 27th he went to Compiègne with his son. Here he hunted for three days and returned to Paris with the Prince Imperial, on the last day of the month, accompanied by the Comte de Morny, the Comte Bacciochi, and General Fleury.

Meanwhile the Empress was continuing her journey in England and Scotland. She did not long succeed in preserving her incognita, and wherever she was recognized, the people gave her a hearty

welcome. That she received in Manchester, where her coming had been unexpected, was all the more significant on that account. At Windsor she was received by the Prince Consort on alighting from the train, and taken in a court carriage to Windsor Castle, where the Queen was awaiting her. There she was received by her British Majesty, accompanied by the Princess Alice, Prince Alfred, and the ladies and gentlemen on duty. The Duke of Cambridge, Prince Louis of Hesse, Lord Granville, the Duke of Newcastle, and Lord Palmerston came to pay their respects to the august visitor. The Duchess of Kent had also come to Windsor. After a visit of two hours, the Empress returned to London amidst acclamations. During the whole time of her stay at Windsor, the bells of St. John's had been ringing in her honor. Fortunate or unfortunate, the Empress Eugénie has always been treated like a sister by Queen Victoria.

The journey of the Empress, from which she returned December 13, in much improved health, had lasted just a month. During her absence the Emperor had taken a grave resolution. By the decree of November 24 he had entered upon a liberal career.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE DECREE OF NOVEMBER 24

LIKE the commercial treaty with England, the decree of November 24 was a surprise, a dramatic stroke. The old opposition found itself without its weapons. Silence reigned around imperial institutions. No one was expecting reforms, when the Emperor, acting *proprio motu*, issued this decree, which introduced profound modifications in the régime : —

1. The Senate and the Corps Législatif were called upon to vote a reply to the speech from the throne every year at the opening of the session, and, at the time of the debate on this address, the government commissioners were to give the Chambers all necessary explanations of internal and external policy.

2. Ministers without portfolio were instituted for the purpose of defending governmental projects of law in concert with the president and members of the Council of State.

3. Legislative debates were reproduced in full.

4. Exercise of the right of amendment was guaranteed to the Corps Législatif.

The *Constitutionnel*, the semi-official journal, pub-

lished a long article, believed to be drawn up by the Emperor, which was considered an explanation of the decree. It said: "Attentive to some symptoms which might pass unperceived by others, the Emperor has recognized that the action of the great bodies of State in his government, although so efficacious, is not made sufficiently evident to the people. He has desired that the concurrence of the Senate and the Corps Législatif, which is of so much utility, may be better appreciated by the country."

The writer of the article was not sparing of criticisms on the existing state of things before the decree. "The condition of things which has just been changed had revealed certain defective sides. The government had not sufficient means to manifest its own mind and learn that of the country. The debates carried on in the Chambers were assuredly very serious, and sometimes brilliant, but they were hampered by too narrow restrictions. Politics, which ought never to be stifled in a French assembly, were only reproduced in an abnormal manner, and almost as if contraband. Having no valve, they made their way out through fissures. The Senate and the Corps Législatif suffered from this false situation. Even the government had nothing to gain by it. Frequently calumniated at home and abroad, it could not authoritatively defend itself, and even when it raised its voice within the legislative precincts it was scarcely understood in the country. We think this situation will be altered for the bet-

ter by the new arrangements which the Emperor has deemed necessary and opportune."

The partisans of the parliamentary system were not mistaken. They comprehended at once that the decree of November 24 was only a commencement, a prelude of the liberal Empire. At first glance, the system of ministers without portfolio, orator ministers, — and ministers with portfolio, acting ministers, — seemed rather odd, and people wondered how this double cabinet, formed behind the curtain of ministers who managed matters without explaining or defending them in legislative deliberations, and on the stage of ministers who did nothing, but who came there to expound and defend the acts of their colleagues, could work freely. Perspicacious minds divined that the system was only a transition. A prudent man, M. Eugène Forcade, who edited at the time the Fortnightly Chronicle of the *Revue des Deux-Mondes*, wrote December 1: "For our part, we should not be surprised if this system necessarily resulted in ministerial responsibility and the formation of cabinets under the lead of a prime minister. Our conclusion may possibly seem paradoxical; we think it may be justified from now on. The existing Constitution has not yet recognized ministerial responsibility, and it is to that circumstance we owe, in all probability, the transitional institution of acting ministers and speaking ministers."

At bottom, the chronicler of the *Revue des Deux-Mondes* was very well satisfied. "This is still very

little," said he, "if attention is paid only to the positive stipulations of the decree; it is a great deal, it may be everything, if one considers solely the direction taken." Chanting victory, he recalled with irony "the time when certain persons who thought themselves clever and profound made themselves the publicists of servitude and vaunted their cowardly school of political literature. . . . The parliamentary régime was then the abomination of desolation. There was more than insolence, there was effrontery in mentioning the name of it; one might have supposed it a sort of political obscenity." Pitiless toward the former apologists of absolute power, M. Forcade added: "While waiting for these prudes of yesterday to tune up their instruments for to-day's concert, — which will not take long, — we may be permitted to draw the dividing line between us and them. Let us force them to recognize that we have the one advantage over them to which they should be the most sensitive: we have estimated the force of circumstances more correctly than they, and appreciated more justly the mind and character of the Emperor."

The liberal publicist well expressed the sentiment of his political co-religionists when he concluded thus: "Changes in human affairs are always so rapid and sometimes so sudden that one can never say, at the moment when their aspect is the most unfavorable, that, on the contrary, the most decisive good opportunity has not just arrived. It is in this

sense that those whom ill fortune has neither wearied nor corrupted, have á right to claim part in victories which circumstances far more than their own efforts unexpectedly procure for their cause."

The liberals had just taken a first step ; they were determined not to halt on the way.

In the imperialist camp satisfaction was far from general. Many of the most devoted adherents of the Emperor considered the Constitution of 1852 as excellent, and were altogether unwilling to see that parliamentarism spring up again which, in their view, was a source of discords and revolutions. According to them, it was not to the interest of a strong government like that of Napoleon III. to allow itself to be discussed, and the control which it was creating would soon become a yoke. These adepts of absolutism said one should not disturb what is at rest, *quieta non movere*, and that the Emperor was his own enemy in wantonly stirring up difficulties and embarrassments which would always go on increasing. So that among the imperialists themselves there was already a right and a left. As to the old parties, legitimists, Orleanists, republicans, they were all determined to employ against the Empire the concessions which the Empire granted.

To sum up, the believers in authority thought the decree of November 24 useless, even dangerous ; the liberals considered it tardy and incomplete. In the sovereign's own mind, it was an honest and loyal experiment. The Emperor wished to accustom

France to liberty by degrees, in order to see whether it would be able to make a fruitful and reasonable use of it. The experiment would determine him either to limit the reforms or to go on with their development.

Various changes in ministerial persons and functions coincided with the decree of November 24. The ministry of Algeria was suppressed and replaced by a general government with its seat at Algiers, which was intrusted to Marshal Pélissier, Duc de Malakoff. The ministry of the Emperor's household was separated from the ministry of State, and the incumbent of it became the Marshal Comte Vaillant. The Comte Walewski was appointed Minister of State to succeed M. Fould, resigned, and the Beaux-Arts were attached to his ministry. The Marquis de Chasseloup-Laubat became Minister of the Navy and the Colonies. Finally, the Comte de Persigny and M. de Forcade La Roquette replaced each other, the one in the Interior, the other in the Finances, and MM. Billault and Magne were appointed ministers without portfolio.

Five days after the decree of November 24, public attention was suddenly directed to the extreme East. The *Moniteur* of the 29th announced the victories of Chang-Kia and Palikao, and that of December 20 the triumphant entry of Pekin by the allies, and the conclusion of peace.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE FORTS OF TAKU

GENERAL DE MONTAUBAN had arrived at Hong-Kong early in March, preceding the Jamin and Collineau brigades which formed his army corps. The English troops were commanded by General Grant. After occupying the island of Chinan without encountering resistance, the allied generals proceeded to the Gulf of Pe-Chi-Li, where they arrived July 6. Leaving Chi-Fu the 26th, the French found themselves at the mouth of the Peh-Tang River on the 28th, simultaneously with the English. There were forts there which it was necessary to reduce in order to open the way to the Pei-Ho. A successful attack was made August 2. The Chinese retired in disorder, and after taking the city of Peh-Tang-Chu, the allies resumed their march August 12. On the 15th they were at Sin-Ko, where the Emperor's fête-day was celebrated in the French camp, and where an attack was planned on the four very solidly built forts of Taku, which dominate the mouth of the Pei-Ho. The 21st of August was chosen by the chiefs of the allied armies for an attack on these redoubtable defences.

An enormous fort rises on either bank at the

mouth of the river, commanding the sea and the approaches to the barricades. Farther up the stream is a second one, covering the first with its fires and protecting the river. To safeguard the whole system, a vast intrenched camp extends to the extremity of the lagoons and the mainland. Here it was that in 1859 France and England had sustained the defeat it was now their intention to avenge.

The plan of the allies was to seize the first fort on the north, some six hundred yards from Tang-Ko; next to attack the second one, lower down the left bank, with the aid of gunboats; this bank once entirely occupied, to clear the stream during the night of adjacent obstacles so that the boats might pass up behind the forts of the south, and from there combine their action with that of the troops sent later up the right bank, if necessary.

The attack will not be an easy one. Built in European fashion, all the forts are furnished with artillery and defended by very numerous troops. Glacis, talus, bastions, curtains, redans, demilunes, nothing is lacking. The allies intend in the first place to attack the first on the left bank, which is the nearest. To reach it, they must cross an abattis of trees, two ditches full of water, three yards deep by eight wide, and two formidable enclosures made of bamboos, close-set and sharpened. After passing these obstacles, they will set up the ladders they have used as bridges, against the parapet.

August 21, 5 A.M. — The Collineau brigade debouches from Tang-Ko, approaches the left bank of the river, and takes position at the right of the English corps. The Chinese artillery at once opens fire. The small squadrons commanded by Rear Admirals Page and Jones move toward the left bank, tracing their furrow in the mud, and establish themselves near the bridge chosen by Vice Admiral Charner.

At six o'clock fighting is general by land and sea. At seven, an immense cloud of smoke, shot through with flames and carrying up with it formless black masses, rises with a frightful detonation above the first fort on the left bank. "There goes the powder magazine," cries General de Montauban. "Go tell Collineau to march at once." The field pieces take position five hundred yards from the fort.

7.30 A.M. — The assaulting columns under General Collineau rush forward. The ditches are crossed, the palisades hacked down. Ladders are set up, and in spite of the furious resistance of the enemy and their rain of stones and bullets, some intrepid men succeed in scaling the wall. The French flag is planted on the escarpment by drummer Fachard, the remainder of the column climb the parapet of the glacis, leap into the enceinte of the fort, and make a dash with their bayonets. The Chinese still resist with great bravery. After firing their last shot, they catch up stones and projectiles of every description and throw them at their assailants. Then they fight hand to

hand with redoubled energy and fury. But the supporting companies which come to the assistance of the assaulting column, and the arrival of some English troops, force them to abandon the fort. The French have had about two hundred men killed or wounded; the English loss is about the same.

2 P.M. — After a short halt, the allies move toward the second fort of the left bank, some two kilometres distant, situated on the seashore. The sight of a white flag floating on the staff rising from the bastion of this second fort takes them by surprise. Placing their ladders, the allies climb the walls, expecting some trap. An unlooked-for spectacle awaits them: three thousand Tartars, their weapons laid aside and in the attitude of suppliants, asking mercy in the interior of the fort. Not merely are their lives granted, but there being no means of keeping or of feeding them, they are set at liberty and allowed to disperse in the fields.

At this moment a storm breaks which has been threatening all the morning. The marshy soil is soaked in an instant. The cannon sink to their axles in mud. The Comte d'Hérisson, one of the combatants, has written: "If this rain had arrived a few hours sooner, our brilliant victory might have been transformed into an actual defeat. How many times in history has a mere inclemency of the weather made game of all strategic combinations!" General de Montauban exclaims, "Decidedly, we are in luck!"

The two forts on the right bank of the Pei-Ho are still intact. Several heralds with a flag of truce cross the river on a junk and summon the leaders to surrender. After some hesitation they decide to do so, and hand over to the allies all the works and the material. At dawn, August 22, the whole course of the Pei-Ho is open. The defeat of 1859 is avenged.

That same day, the English admiral, Hope, without notifying the French, and hence in violation of his instructions, takes three gunboats and goes up stream as far as Tien-Tsin. Annoyed, Admiral Charner follows him with all speed, but comes in only second. Both admirals are speedily rejoined by the ambassadors of France and England, Baron Gros and Lord Elgin, who meet the imperial commissioner, Kwei-Liang, to negotiate peace. At first, agreement seems easy. Kwei-Liang consents to all that is demanded. The ultimatum of March 8 is accepted. It is agreed that the treaty of 1858 shall be fully carried into execution, and that the ambassadors of France and England shall repair to Pekin, with a suitable escort, to exchange ratifications. Hence the object seems to be attained, but all of a sudden the Chinese commissioner alleges that he has not the necessary powers, and refuses to sign the preliminaries of peace. The negotiations were nothing but a trap. The Chinese had simply been working against time.

Meanwhile, the bad weather is approaching, and

in the neighborhood of Pekin winter is scarcely less severe than in Siberia. General de Montauban recognizes the danger the allies, who are but a handful, will incur in the midst of an empire of four hundred millions of inhabitants. They can be saved only by the startling rapidity of military movements. The least weakness, the slightest hesitation, the shortest delay, would ruin all.

Baron Gros and Lord Elgin refuse to be deluded by the tricks and evasions of Kwei-Liang. September 7, they notify him that the allies are about to move toward Tung-Chau, a city four leagues from Pekin. There only, they add, the negotiations may be resumed if the Chinese government sends commissioners duly provided with the needful powers to treat definitively. Kwei-Liang tries to keep the allies at Tien-Tsin by promising that within three days he will give them satisfaction. His request is denied, and the troops march in the direction of Pekin.

Baron Gros and Lord Elgin have barely started when despatch after despatch reaches them, forwarded by two new Chinese commissioners, Prince Tsaï, a relative of the Emperor, and Meh, Minister of War, who entreat them to wait their coming at Tien-Tsin to sign the peace there. On their refusal, the Chinese commissioners ask to have the allied troops halted six miles from Tung-Chau, and that French and English delegates may be sent to that city to confer with the commissioners and prepare

the treaty of peace to be signed afterward by the ambassadors and ratified at Pekin. "We give our adhesion," said the Chinese plenipotentiaries, "to all the articles of the convention. We extremely desire that after so many evidences of good-will our wish to conclude peace may not be balked, and we like to believe that the same sentiment animates your Excellencies."

Could one believe that such protestations were only a new snare? In spite of the suspicions inspired by Chinese duplicity, the ambassadors thought themselves entitled to hope that the Chinese would not, within a few days, repeat a comedy which had not succeeded, since the allied troops were now marching toward Pekin. Therefore it was agreed that the troops should halt near the city of Chang-Kia, eight kilometres from Tung-Chau, and that the English and French delegates should repair to the latter city to take the necessary measures before the conclusion of peace. All seemed to be arranged, when the ambush of the 18th of September occurred.

CHAPTER XL

THE AMBUSH OF TUNG-CHAU

THE French delegates who started from the bivouac of Hosihou for Tung-Chau at five in the morning of September 17, were the Comte Léon de Bastard, secretary of embassy to Baron Gros, and M. de Méritens, interpreter of the embassy, each followed by a native scholar, domestic, and groom.

At the same hour, General de Montauban, at the head of the expeditionary column, left the camp of Hosí-Wu for the purpose of establishing himself that evening at Matau, four or five leagues from Tung-Chau, a large city of four hundred thousand inhabitants.

After leaving the column behind, MM. de Bastard and de Méritens met on the road Intendant Dubut, Colonel Grandchamp of the artillery, the Abbé Duluc, interpreter of the commander-in-chief, Captain Chanoine of the staff, an orderly, and two army accountants, who, with an escort of eight men, were likewise going to Tung-Chau, with instructions concerning the provisioning and encampment of the troops. M. d'Escayrac de Lauture, charged with a

scientific mission in China, was also going to Tung-Chau, followed by one of the literati and a secretary.

A short distance beyond Chang-Kia, a village forty-eight hundred metres from Tung-Chau, the French delegates observed a great number of Tartar tents. On the road, as well as in the fields, they had often seen groups of horsemen going in different directions, but without drawing unpleasant inferences from the fact. At Tung-Chau they found the English delegates, Mr. Norman and Mr. Parkes, the one secretary and the other interpreter of the embassy. They were accompanied by Colonel Walker, chief of the cavalry staff, Lieutenant Anderson, Mr. Loch, Lord Elgin's private secretary, and Mr. Bowlby, correspondent of the *Times*. Nineteen Hindoo horsemen acted as their escort.

M. Bastard thus describes his conference with Prince Tsaï, in a report addressed to Baron Gros: "According to your instructions, M. le Baron, I put a precise question to Prince Tsaï, through M. de Méritens, as to whether he were furnished with full powers; he replied in the affirmative, though not without displaying keen annoyance that he who said he had never told a lie, whose authority was superior to that of all the plenipotentiaries, and whose signature carried as much weight as that of the Emperor, should have been subjected to such a question." He afterward examined the draught of the convention prepared at Tien-Tsin, the Chinese

text of which I left in his hands. Such objections as he made were purely for the sake of form, and he promised to have all needful preparations made to facilitate your Excellency's journey to Tung-Chau and Pekin, and also for the establishment of the necessary measures for provisioning the army, which was to camp the very next morning, a hundred yards beyond Chang-Kia, as had been agreed."

At daybreak, September 18, MM. de Bastard and de Méritens, believing that their mission had been successfully accomplished, and with them Captain Chanoine, quitted Tung-Chau, leaving in that city Intendant Dubut, M. d'Escayrac de Lauture, Colonel Grandchamp, MM. Ader and Gagey, army accountants, and their orderlies. On the road they learned that the Tartars were occupying in force the ground intended for the encampment of the French expeditionary corps, and they were lucky in crossing their lines undisturbed, and getting back safely to General de Montauban.

There was no further room for doubt. What had just taken place at Tung-Chau on the part of the Chinese was a mere farce preceding a horrible tragedy. The thirty or forty thousand Tartars assembled at Chang-Kia were there simply for the sake of enticing the allied troops into an ambush, and crushing them under the weight of numbers. The two commanders did not hesitate for a moment. The 18th, at the very instant when they ascertained the perfidy of the Chinese, they took the offensive by

marching toward Chang-Kia to meet the Tartar army. This audacious move succeeded.

Two villages lay between the allies and the front ranks of the Tartar army. They were raided at the double quick by Colonel Poujot with the men of the 101st and 102d of the line and a company of engineers. The artillery followed the movement closely, and after passing the villages, was established by order of Colonel Schmitz, chief of staff, on a little eminence, from which it began to rake the enemy.

At the same moment General de Montauban, who was directing the ensemble of the operations, turned to the English Colonel Foley, attached to his staff, and said: "Colonel, I put you in command of that squadron of Sikhs yonder. Charge at the head of your men." And he added, addressing his escort of spahis: "Go with the Colonel, gentlemen. Forward!" The charge, during which Lieutenant de Damas was fatally wounded, buried itself like a wedge in the mass of Chinese. The artillery took on the slant the sixty bronze cannon which the enemy had placed in battery on the dike of the imperial canal. General de Montauban moved to rejoin the English in square, while the Tartars, disconcerted and demoralized, were fleeing in the direction of Pekin. It was two o'clock. The allies had been on the march or in action since five in the morning, each man carrying six days' provisions in his knapsack, under a burning hot sun.

The Comte d'Hérisson, who took part in the charge of the Sikhs and spahis, had good reason to say, "Probably no army placed under such conditions of numerical inferiority and physical fatigue ever displayed so much calmness or gave more convincing proof of those two primary qualities of the soldier, obedience and courage." The prestige of the generalissimo, Sang-Ko-Lin-Sin, famous for his victories over the rebels, was destroyed. The "tigers," soldiers of the guard in black-striped uniforms, strewed the scene of action with their dead bodies. The allied troops, whose losses were as few as those of the Tartar army were considerable, had thoroughly beaten an enemy ten times their number.

It was supposed at first that the Chinese negotiators were in ignorance of the ambush, and that the initiative of it was to be attributed to Sang-Ko-Lin-Sin, who was reputed the head of the war party. But an imperial edict published September 20, showed that the Chinese government was far from disapproving the recent act of treason. According to this curious document, "The revolted barbarians, in order to satisfy their pride, have come to threaten Tung-Chau with an army, expressing also the wish to bring their troops to the capital, and to see us there. If so foolish a claim had been conceded, how could we have dared to present ourself before our peoples? Therefore we have been obliged to give the strictest orders to the various commanders of

troops to bring horsemen and foot-soldiers from every quarter, and to fight with fury."

The imperial proclamation ended as follows: "However, if the barbarians come to repent and to recognize their crime, they must be allowed to enjoy in the different ports the freedom of commerce which had been previously conceded to them, so as to thoroughly establish in this way that we are a generous and benevolent emperor. If, on the contrary, they persevere in their revolt, let my people make every effort to annihilate them all, and we hereby swear that this abominable race, if it will not admit its crimes, shall be wholly exterminated. Let this edict be made known to all and be respected by all!"

The Chinese government persisted in its perfidy. We have seen that on September 17 a certain number of Frenchmen and Englishmen went to Tung-Chau, and that on the 18th only some of them returned. The others — thirty-five probably — were held as prisoners. Among these were Colonel de Grandchamp, the Abbé Duluc, Mr. Loch, Mr. Parkes, and the correspondent of the *Times*, Mr. Bowlby. For a brief period the allies hoped that the Chinese, frightened by their defeat at Chang-Kia, would consent to return the captives. September 19 Mr. Wade, second interpreter of the English embassy, was given the dangerous mission of going to Tung-Chau with a flag of truce to ask for their surrender. The mandarins pre-

tended not to understand what was wanted. "The Europeans," said they, "left Tung-Chau some time before the battle, and we do not know what has become of them." This lie did not deceive the allies, who felt the greatest uneasiness, unfortunately too well founded, concerning the fate of the unhappy victims of the treachery. After the victory of Chang-Kia they had not entered the city, but left it half a league behind on their right. The commanding generals concluded to continue the march on Pekin and to attack Palikao, the Tartar camp under Sang-Ko-Lin-Sin.

CHAPTER XLI

THE BATTLE OF PALIKAO

AT a distance of five kilometres beyond the bivouacs the allies had occupied at Chang-Kia is the city of Tung-Chau, connected with Pekin by a road twelve kilometres in length, built by former dynasties. At the village of Palikao this road crosses the canal which unites Pei-Ho to the capital by means of a solid stone bridge with large arches. Beyond and behind this bridge, on ground long studied and made ready in advance, the Chinese generalissimo had disposed his troops, amounting apparently to between fifty and sixty thousand men.

The French had at their disposal five thousand bayonets, some escorting cavalry, and a very little artillery. The English had about the same number of effective men, rather fewer foot-soldiers, but more cavalry. Such was the little phalanx which, but for the superiority of its armament and the perfection of its fire, could not have maintained a struggle so unequal in point of numbers.

September 21, at half-past five in the morning, the allied troops left their bivouacs at Chang-Kia, and marched in the direction of Palikao to attack the Tartar army. A small column under command

of General Collineau took the lead. General Jamin followed the movement. General de Montauban and his staff marched at the French right. Next came the English.

The plan of the battle was this: The French were to attack the Palikao bridge, while the English, spreading out to the left, should try to find their way to a wooden bridge three kilometres above the stone one, cross it, turn back, and take the enemy in the rear.

Fighting began at seven in the morning. When they got within four kilometres of the stone bridge, the French saw the enormous mass of Tartar cavalry, forming an immense curve, coming toward them at a jog-trot. Not a word of command was heard in its ranks. Tartar evolutions are indicated by flags which are lowered, like marine signals. The advance squadrons come up at a trot to within fifty yards of the French tirailleurs, who rout the first rank of cavalry. If a single battalion were broken through, the allied army would at once be surrounded on all sides. But the Chinese generalissimo makes his cavalry charge in a body, and unsuccessfully. In the centre, the charge, several times renewed with savage yells, is repelled by the rocket-gunners, a battery of the 12th, and the light infantry. On the left, it is broken by General Collineau's little command, and driven back by the English cavalry, which has just entered the field of battle. On the right, it is repelled by the 101st of

the line, skilfully drawn up and handled with coolness by its commander, Colonel Pouget. Taken on the oblique by the artillery of Colonel de Bentzmann, the Tartar cavalry commences to retreat.

Seeing that his troops had come out victorious from the circle which threatened them, and having no more fears for the position of his left, now that the English army had arrived, General de Montauban sent for General Collineau's little corps and ordered it to outflank the village of Palikao by a wheel to the right, gaining the bank of the canal, while General Jamin was attacking the village in front. It was taken in spite of the sharp resistance of the Chinese infantry, which defended it inch by inch, but in vain, on account of the inferiority of their equipment.

The taking of the village did not end the fight. The next thing was to seize the Palikao bridge, the principal object of the battle. While General Collineau, arriving on the bank, takes the bridge on the oblique with his artillery, the commander-in-chief orders Colonel de Bentzmann to send forward the rocket-gunners and the 12th battery to sweep it with a raking fire, and aim at the gunners serving the ten cannon by which it was defended. Fortunately for the French, the Chinese had very defective artillery, and their balls went over the heads of the assailants.

The conduct of the Chinese leaders was none the less worthy of great praise. On the causeway of

the bridge, their gorgeous costumes making them splendid targets for death, they wave their standards and reply in the open by an ineffective fire to that of the French musketry and cannon. It is the élite of the army which immolates itself to protect a precipitate retreat. The gunners serving the ten cannon let themselves be killed at their post by the infantry of the 2d battalion. The fight is won. General Collineau crosses the bridge and enters the road to Pekin on the right, in the direction taken by the fugitives. The commander-in-chief follows with the remainder of his troops. It is noonday. Fighting has been going on for five consecutive hours.

Justly proud of his subordinates, especially of his son, a future general, decorated on the battle-field in the Crimea six years before, who had now been fighting bravely, the victor was radiant with joy. Let us again quote M. d'Hérisson, whose *Journal d'un Interprète en Chine* is so vivid a description of this almost incredible expedition: "Montauban, surrounded by all his officers and greeted by the acclamations of his soldiers, passed in front of the lines, wiping his forehead. His soldierly and severe countenance was lighted by an honest smile of satisfaction. Was he fancying that under the glowing sun of victory he saw Renown coming through the air to bring him military honors, the medal of the soldier and commander-in-chief, the grand cross of the Legion of Honor, a seat in the Senate, and that title

of Chinese count which resembled the surnames given by the Romans to their victorious generals? I cannot say. But certainly he did not forebode, nor did any of us forebode, all the calumnies, the mean and contemptible jealousies by which he would be assailed on his return home, and that incredible ingratitude of a parliament which did not even recall his victories until the country was beyond saving."

The results of the battle of Palikao bordered on the miraculous. While the enemy had more than twelve hundred men disabled, the French had but three killed and eighteen wounded, and the English two killed and twenty-nine wounded. A large number of cannon, a stack of bows, arrows, quivers, thousands of matchlocks, a lot of banners, among others the grand imperial banner of Sang-Ko-Lin-Sin, fell into the hands of the victors. That night they slept under the abandoned tents of the vanquished, twelve kilometres from Pekin.

Wonder has been expressed because the allied armies did not profit by their success to advance at once to the ramparts of the capital. The reason is that the hasty marches of the last few days and the two battles of Chang-Kia and Palikao had nearly exhausted their food and ammunition. The French infantry had no cartridges left, and the artillery only cannon-shot enough for forty-seven discharges a-piece. The provisions were nearly gone. The English were in a similar condition. The commanding generals deemed it imprudent to present them-

selves yet before a city of two million inhabitants. They decided to summon all their forces and to remain in their encampment at Palikao until they had received all that Tien-Tsin could furnish in men, munitions, and provisions. The halt was to last from September 22 until October 5.

Baron Gros and Lord Elgin each received a Chinese despatch September 24. It was from Prince Kung, younger brother of the Emperor. The prince announced that Tsaï and Meh had been dismissed for mismanagement of affairs, and that he, a prince of the blood, had been appointed imperial commissioner with the amplest powers to treat and conclude a peace. Hence he asked the two ambassadors to put an end to hostilities, but mentioned neither the events of the day nor the prisoners of Tung-Chau, who had just been transferred to Pekin. Baron Gros and Lord Elgin replied that before suspending hostilities or entering into a parley, the prisoners must be returned to their respective camps. Prince Kung having declined to deliver them except as a consequence of the conclusion of peace, the two ambassadors put matters into the hands of the commanding generals, who decided that the allied troops should resume their forward march on October 5.

CHAPTER XLII

THE SUMMER PALACE

THE allied armies have completed their forces while in camp at Palikao. The 102d of the line, a company of engineers, a battery, and 270 men of the marine infantry have rejoined the French army, which now numbers 4000 men, with three batteries. The English army amounts to about the same. General de Montauban leaves a company at Chang-Kia, two others at Palikao and Tung-Chau, and takes with him a light ambulance column and five days' provisions.

The two armies leave Palikao October 5, and begin their march toward Pekin. That evening they establish themselves five kilometres from the capital, in a village whose houses are grouped around a dozen immense brick-kilns. From the top of one of these the roofs of Pekin are visible on the horizon. Marching is renewed October 6. The two armies separate, and are soon out of each other's sight.

During the day, the French learn that the Tartar army withdrew in the direction of Yuen-Ming-Yuen, the Summer Palace, a magnificent imperial residence some kilometres to the northwest of the capital. They conclude to pursue it. At seven in the even-

ing they pass through the village of Hai-Tien, whose amazed inhabitants hastily shut up their houses. They cross a magnificent bridge thrown over a canal, and advance by a road paved with granite to an esplanade planted with large trees set in squares, like a chess-board, and bearing some resemblance to the place of arms at Versailles. At the farther end of this esplanade appears the Summer Palace. The entrance to it is closed by a very solid door in the middle, and by gates to right and left.

Possibly the Tartar troops are massed in the court and gardens. The commander-in-chief sends Lieutenant de Pina, of the navy, with a company of marine infantry to reconnoitre the position. On arriving at the great door, M. de Pina summons the warders to open it. On their refusal, he sends for a ladder and climbs the wall, followed by M. Vivenot, second lieutenant. Several Tartars fire on the audacious officers, both of whom are wounded. But their men come to their assistance, and the Tartars take flight. The door is opened. General Collineau occupies the first court of the palace with a part of his brigade, and remains in that situation until the next day. It would be dangerous to attempt to enter the immense buildings of the palace in the darkness.

The Summer Palace, favorite dwelling place of the Emperor Hien-Fung, who prefers it to his residence in Pekin, where he never goes except to preside at the annual ceremonies, suspasses in splendor

and gorgeous oddity all that an Oriental imagination could devise. The barricaded gates are cleared during the night and opened the next morning. September 7, General de Montauban, accompanied by Generals Jamin and Collineau and Colonel Schmitz, enters the marvellous residence, abandoned by the Chinese sovereign since yesterday. "It is impossible," said the commander-in-chief in his report, "to describe the magnificence of the numerous constructions which succeed each other over an extent of four leagues, and which are called the Summer Palace ; a succession of pagodas containing all the gods in gold, silver, or bronze, of gigantic dimensions. For instance, a single bronze divinity, a Buddha, is about seventy feet high, and all the rest is in proportion, — gardens, lakes, and curiosities amassed for centuries in buildings of white marble, covered with dazzling tiles, — to which may be added views of an admirable extent of country."

What an enchanting scene ! What a mass of riches ! What an accumulation of wonders ! Separated by lakes, bridges, artificial eminences, the innumerable pleasure houses, whose grouping constitutes what is known as the Summer Palace, seem to be scattered broadcast in an immense park designed in rectangle and surrounded by walls. The buildings occupied by the Emperor are superb. Nothing could be more majestic than the throne room. It is fifty yards long by twenty wide and fifteen high. In the oratory, the walls, ceilings,

tables, seats, pedestals, are all of gold enriched with precious stones. In the State apartments, as in the smallest rooms, there is a prodigious accumulation of objects of art and precious things; candelabras, crystals, porcelains, censers, fabulous divinities, objects in Oriental jade, in gold, silver, lacquer, ranged on shelves as they are in European museums. Near the buildings occupied by the Emperor are magazines filled with silks, furs, provisions, everything required for the support of his military household, which was composed of not less than ten thousand persons. The Jesuits who came to China in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and were then in great favor with the court of Pekin, doubtless gave advice as to the construction of this Versailles of the Farthest East, this Versailles far more spacious than that of Louis XIV.

The park, whose very lofty walls are not less than fourteen kilometres in circumference, is not less extraordinary than the palace. Here are deep grottos, filled with statues of gods and beasts. Yonder is the great lake with the wharf for the imperial barks, and the sovereign's fishing-boat. Here, too, is an exact miniature copy of the tower of Nankin, with its innumerable stories. Everywhere pavilions and pagodas, streams and islands, thickets and labyrinths, observatories and kiosques. One goes from surprise to surprise, from one dazzling splendor to another.

As he passes through on his tour of inspection,

General de Montauban places sentinels and confides to two officers, MM. de Brives and Schoelcher, artillery captains, the care of keeping everything intact until the arrival of the English, no news of whom has yet been obtained, although for the last hour a cannon has been discharged every five minutes on the esplanade opposite the palace, in order to apprise them of the whereabouts of the French army. The two captains perform their tasks scrupulously. Not a thing is stolen while their surveillance lasts. Unfortunately, this was not the case afterward.

At half-past eleven the English army at last arrives. Sir Hope Grant and Lord Elgin enter the Summer Palace. Commissioners are at once appointed to relieve the two captains and collect the most precious objects, an equal share of which is to be given to each army. The division is made between the allied chiefs that very evening in the throne room. General de Montauban has a selection of the most remarkable objects set aside to be offered to Napoleon III., the Empress Eugénie, and the Prince Imperial. (They are those afterward exhibited in the palace of Fontainebleau, in a room called, on that account, the Chinese Museum.) A similar collection is destined for the Queen of England.

A renewed search on the following day, October 8, leads to the discovery of quantities of gold and silver bullion, which is distributed as prize money in a regular manner, proportionately to the different

ranks. Private soldiers and sailors get about 180 francs apiece.

Until now all rules of discipline have been strictly maintained. Things will not continue so throughout the day. It is suddenly learned that the Chinese of the neighborhood have entered the park, then that they have set up ladders against the palace walls and begun to plunder. Word comes at the same time that attempts are being made to burn portions of it. A first sound of the bugle calls the men to duty. A company in arms is summoned to punish the Chinese thieves. A second call is sounded. Unarmed soldiers with canteens and buckets are required to form a chain and prevent the ravages of fire.

Then ensues a violent, irresistible thrusting and pushing at the guarded gàtes. The sentinels are shoved aside. Everybody enters along with the armed company and the laborers demanded. Each takes whatever he can lay his hands on. "With all his energy," writes M. d'Hérisson, "Montauban could no more prevent his troops from passing through the great gate of the Summer Palace than Napoleon, for all his prestige as a demi-god, could have held his armies at the moment of the *sauve-qui-peut* of Waterloo. . . . There were troopers with their heads buried in the red lacquer coffers of the Empress, others half hidden by piles of brocades and silks, still others filling their pockets, their shirts, their caps, with rubies, sapphires, pieces of rock

crystal, and thrusting great pearls into their breasts. . . . It was like a hasheesh-eater's dream." The English stole as the French did, but more methodically.

The allies quitted the Summer Palace October 9, and turned toward Pekin. During the day some of the victims of the treachery of Tung-Chau returned, the Chinese government, after treating them most horribly, having at last concluded to release them. These were Mr. Parkes, Mr. Loch, M. d'Escayrac de Lauture, one English and four French soldiers. Colonel de Grandchamps, Intendant Dubut, accounting-officer Ader, three French soldiers, Mr. Norman, Lieutenant Anderson, Mr. Bowlby, and thirteen soldiers had died under torture. The Chinese government sent them back in coffins. Three prisoners — the Abbé Duluc, the English captain, Brabazon, and a soldier, his compatriot — were not returned either dead or alive.

When they learned the details of the abominable cruelties committed by the Chinese, the allied armies felt deep indignation. It was no longer permissible to deceive them, and it was at Pekin itself that the victors were to dictate terms to the vanquished.

A proclamation in the Chinese tongue was addressed, October 18, by General de Montauban to the inhabitants of the capital and the surrounding country. In it was said: "The French and English troops are to-day before Pekin. Their flag is floating on the walls; the city is in their power, and

it is through good-will toward the inoffensive inhabitants it contains that the allies have been unwilling to occupy the interior." After having stigmatized "the act of perfidy and cruelty committed against the prisoners with a barbarity unparalleled in history," the commander-in-chief added: "New conditions of peace are offered to Prince Kung by the ambassadors of France and England. If the imperial government rejects these propositions, or if it leaves them unanswered, the commander-in-chief will not be responsible for the misfortunes which the Chinese authorities will have brought upon the city. This proclamation is addressed to the inhabitants of Pekin and the surrounding country out of good-will toward them. Done at the French headquarters, on the ramparts of the city, at the Nganking gate, October 18, 1860."

That same day, the English, more vindictive and implacable than the French, thought it necessary to strike a great blow by a terrible example. Lord Elgin had all that remained of the Summer Palace razed to the ground and burned. Baron Gros and General de Montauban sought in vain to make him comprehend that this would be a deed without profit and without glory, which might put an end to the negotiations by deciding Prince Kung to take to flight. The ambassador was inflexible. He sent an English division which went methodically at the business of incendiarism. The palace, the pagodas, museums, magnificent libraries, were given to the flames. Nothing was left but cinders.

CHAPTER XLIII

THE TREATY OF PEKIN

THE *dénouement* was approaching. Winter would soon cover with snow and ice the roads, the canals, and the Pei-Ho. Lord Elgin in vain expressed his wish to winter the allied troops in Pekin. General de Montauban told him that he would not permit the French army to remain before Pekin after November 1, under any pretext. At the moment when Prince Kung was still hesitating about coming to terms, and when it was to be feared that he might take to flight, as the Emperor his brother had done, thus bringing everything to a standstill, General Ignatieff, Russian Minister in China, interposed his good offices. The Prince seemed to be dreading, on his own account, a treachery similar to that of which the prisoners of Tung-Chau had been the victims. The general reassured him, and, according to the account of the *Marine Magazine*, went so far as to propose becoming in person a hostage in the Tartar camp while the ratifications of the treaty were being exchanged between the Prince and the ambassadors of England and France. We may add that, on October 18, the flames which were devouring the Summer Palace, and which could be

seen from the ramparts of Pekin, hastened the conclusion of peace. Fearing a bombardment of the capital, Prince Kung gave way before the ultimatum sent him, and the allied powers were able to obtain all that they asked.

The clauses of the treaty concluded at Tien-Tsin, June 27, 1858, were all confirmed. The Chinese government formally expressed its regret for the attack on the flags of France and England at the mouth of the Pei-Ho, June 25, 1859. It paid France eight millions of taels (sixty millions of francs), and as much to England. The religious establishments confiscated from the Christians during the persecutions to which they had been subjected, were restored. Peaceable exercise of religion and full liberty for missionary work was granted throughout the extent of the Empire. The port and city of Tien-Tsin were opened to foreign commerce. The diplomatic agents of the two allied powers might repair to Pekin whenever an important affair required their presence. Two indemnities of 1,500,000 francs each were granted to France and England for the victims of the Tung-Chau treachery and their families. The signing of the treaties and the exchange of ratifications took place at Pekin, in the palace of Li-Pu (Tribunal of Rites), October 24 for the English, and October 25 for the French.

October 24. — The cortege of Sir Hope Grant and Lord Elgin is composed of a hundred of the Queen's

dragoons in very handsome uniforms, fifty mounted Sikhs, two regiments of English infantry of five hundred men each, and a detachment of Sikhs on foot. Lord Elgin makes his entry in a palanquin surrounded by sixteen elegantly costumed bearers. Toward Prince Kung he displays a studiously haughty demeanor, as if to convey the impression that signing the treaty is a mere act of good nature on the part of the English, who might have overthrown the dynasty if so they had chosen.

October 25. — At eleven o'clock in the morning, General de Montauban and Baron Gros begin their march to the palace of the Tribunal of Rites, where Prince Kung is awaiting them. All the troops of the expeditionary corps are represented in their escort: spahis with scarlet mantles and new saddlecloths; African chasseurs, their helmets adorned with sky-blue turbans; a complete squadron of mounted artillery in uniforms made at Shanghai to replace those lost on the vessel called *The Queen of Clippers;* marines and infantry in field uniform.

The bugles and drums of the entire French army, accompanied by the band of the 101st of the line, open the march. Then comes Baron Gros, a veteran of diplomacy, aged sixty-seven. The standards of the 101st, the 102d, and that of the marine infantry precede his palanquin, which is borne by eight coolies in livery, their hats adorned with tricolored fringe. The ambassador has on a black coat, his uniform having vanished in the shipwreck

of the *Isère*. But the members of his embassy, grouped around him on horseback, are all in uniform. The treaty of Tien-Tsin and the seals of the embassy are carried in front of him by four non-commissioned officers.

Next comes General de Montauban, in grand uniform, a white plume in his chapeau, and riding a superb horse. In spite of his sixty-four years, he has the bearing of a young man. He is followed by Generals Collineau and Jamin, Colonels de Bentzmann and Schmitz, Commander Campenon, Captains de Montauban and de Bouille, and all his staff.

Behind the general march the troops of escort. The artillery squadron closes the line. At the city entrance fifteen mounted mandarins, in full dress, receive and pay their respects to the ambassador, and conduct him to the Tribunal of Rites.

The weather is magnificent. A population more numerous than that of Paris on holidays throngs the line of the procession without showing the least ill-will. There is no disorder. Mandarins of every grade cause the crowds to circulate in such a manner as to leave open the middle of the streets thirty yards wide at the points passed through. The procession takes more than an hour and a half to cross three-quarters of the city, although it does not make a single halt. At last it arrives in front of the Tribunal of Rites.

The ambassador enters the court in his palanquin. Seeing Prince Kung with all his suite rise to come

toward him, he makes his porters set him down, and meets the Prince on foot before the latter crosses the threshold of the hall. Baron Gros bows, and takes the hand extended by the Prince, saying: "I thank your Imperial Highness for kindly sending mandarins to meet me at the city gates. It pleases me to come and sign a peace which, I sincerely hope, may never again be disturbed; and I merely express the sentiments of his Majesty the Emperor of the French in forming the most earnest wishes that this may be." The Prince again offers his hand to the ambassador, and shows him to the arm-chair placed for him at his own left (in China the left is the place of honor). General de Montauban is on the left of Baron Gros. The officers of his staff and of the army occupy the left side of the hall. MM. de Bastard and de Vernouillet, secretaries of the embassy, and the two interpreters are between the Prince and the ambassador. A crowd of mandarins, with buttons of all colors, fill the right side of the hall. Like the Prince himself, all of these are in robes of ceremony, with their double chaplets of amber about their necks.

The Prince is the first to sign the four Chinese texts of the treaty of Pekin, and the ambassador the four French ones. When the signatures have been made and the seals affixed to the eight copies, Baron Gros says to the Prince, that peace having been happily restored between the two Empires, the French artillery will fire a salute of twenty-one volleys.

Thereupon, Prince Kung, who is a young man of twenty-two, very distinguished in appearance and manners, observes that he came with full confidence, unattended by a single soldier, either Chinese or Tartar, to place himself in the midst of a French army. Baron Gros replies, "This confidence proves that your Imperial Highness knows the loyalty of the sovereign whom I have the honor to represent."

Next comes the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty concluded at Tien-Tsin, June 27, 1858, of which the treaty of Pekin is the complement.

Before withdrawing, the ambassador presents the prince with photographs of the Emperor, the Empress, and the Prince Imperial. After thanking Baron Gros, Prince Kung shakes hands with General de Montauban, and compliments him on his military talents and the bravery of his soldiers. It is nightfall when the ceremonies are concluded. As the procession leaves the Tribunal of Rites, a splendid illumination of lanterns fills the whole city with light.

There was at Pekin a Catholic cemetery which had been conceded to Portuguese missionaries two centuries before. It had been closed for twenty years, but had not been desecrated by the Chinese, who have a respect for graves. In it lay the remains of several famous Jesuit missionaries, Gerbillon, Ricci, and Shaal, who had been first the preceptor and afterward the minister of a Chinese

Emperor. This cemetery had just been restored to Monseigneur Mouly, Bishop of Pe-Che-Li and of Pekin. It was decided that the six French victims of the ambush should be buried there. The funeral ceremonies took place October 28. The army and the embassy were present. Each body was borne upon an artillery wagon, covered with a black velvet cloth, with a white cross. Sir Hope Grant and his staff joined the procession, which was awaited at the cemetery by General Ignatieff, Minister of Russia, who had so loyally assisted France in all circumstances. The last prayers were recited over the graves by Monseigneur Mouly and the Abbé Trogaro, first chaplain of the army.

The next day, October 29, a most imposing ceremony took place, the fitting crown of an expedition which ended like a crusade. After an interruption of thirty-five years, the cathedral of Pekin was restored to Catholic worship. Constructed in 1657, rebuilt in 1707, restored after a fire in 1757, this edifice had presented a very sorry aspect since it had been abandoned. The iron cross surmounting it had been torn down in 1853, and everything — pictures, stalls, altars, confessionals — stolen. Nothing but the bare walls was left. The front was clogged with briers and brambles. All was put in order within a few days by the engineer corps, assisted by soldiers of all arms, and by Chinese and French priests. Remembering the church of their childhood, where they had been

baptized and made their first communion, they worked with prodigious activity, as if to thank God for having protected them in this distant war. All traces of devastation disappeared. Pictures, chandeliers, and candles were brought by Chinese Christians. The choir was hung with blue and white cotton stuffs, amidst which rose a large canopy whose curtains surrounded the altar. Sheafs of tricolored flags completed the decoration. The iron cross had been found and replaced on the top of the edifice.

The solemnity of October made all hearts throb with emotion. Tears stood in many eyes. The solemn chants to which they had been accustomed in France obliterated in an instant the six thousand leagues which separated the French army from its native land. Military bands took the place of an organ. The Irish of the British army joined their French co-religionists. When, surrounded by missionaries and Chinese Catholic priests, the venerable Bishop of Pekin, who had been facing martyrdom in China for twenty-eight years, ascended the altar and celebrated Mass, the congregation were profoundly affected. At the elevation, the drums beat the general, the trumpets sounded, officers and soldiers bent the knee, and the French colors, never carried so far before, bowed down before God. After Mass the *Domine salvum fac Imperatorem* was chanted. Then the *Te Deum* was intoned as an act of thanks-

giving. Seldom had Christianity obtained such a triumph.

The allied army left Pekin November 1. It was about to return to Europe after one of the most marvellous expeditions recorded by history.

CONCLUSION

IN a single year the flag of France had floated at Rome, at Beyrout, and at Pekin. Had the Syrian and Chinese expeditions occurred at a period when there was complete accord between the Holy See and France, what hymns of thanksgiving would have resounded throughout the Catholic world, with what effusion the Sovereign Pontiff would have expressed his gratitude to the new Charlemagne, defender of the Cross, and Eldest Son of the Church! But since Pius IX. had lost a part of his States and found himself in danger of losing the rest, he had no more confidence in Napoleon III. The godfather of the Prince Imperial was no longer the friend of the Emperor.

The Empress, at the close of 1860, was evidently much preoccupied by the aspect which affairs were taking in Italy. The misfortunes of two women, in whose fate she was interested, had affected her painfully. One of these was the Duchess of Parma, the other the Queen of Naples.

Daughter and widow of two princes, both of whom had been assassinated, sister of a proscribed sovereign, mother and guardian of a child despoiled of his inheritance, the Duchess of Parma inspired deep

sympathy in the Empress, who greatly respected the legitimist party, and who thought it would be a noble and chivalric action in the Emperor to defend the sister of the Comte de Chambord. She had made great efforts to save the throne of the young Duke of Parma, and nevertheless that throne had fallen. Was there no portent for herself in this?

Nor could the Empress be consoled for her inability to assist the heroic Queen of Naples, who was behaving like an amazon at Gaëta and sharing all her husband's dangers. The time was approaching when the French fleet, in spite of the remonstrances of Prussia, which asked to have it remain in the harbor of Gaëta, was to be recalled in order to please England, and when Francis II. would be obliged to capitulate after a long and honorable resistance. The Empress was of the same mind as the Duc de Gramont, who wrote at the time to M. Thouvenel: "We are looking on at the last efforts of this unfortunate King of Naples, who will perish within a few hours, the victim of the most odious act of which it is possible to form a conception! You cannot imagine how extremely painful it is to see one's self involved in the sufferings of this death agony, willingly or not, refusing an end of rope to a man just going under the water, or rather, dangling one too short for him to catch hold of just above his head."

So, too, the Empress might have signed her own name to this other letter of December 29, in which

the same ambassador said to M. Thouvenel: "I think that Italy *one* is a detestable thing for France, and that if, unhappily, the Emperor lends himself to this combination, France will some day call him and those who may coöperate with him to a severe account. Now, the existence of the Pope at Rome as a temporal power prevents the unity of Italy. For that reason, even if for no other, we ought to sustain him there. Moreover, the Emperor cannot desert this temporal power without perjuring himself in face of the whole world, and that is a possibility which I cannot induce myself to discuss. One thing is certain, and that is that I shall protest with all my conscience against such a solution." That is what the Empress was going to do. Up to the close of her reign she was to employ all her influence over the mind of her husband to defend the cause of the Holy See. She became a female politician, a new rôle destined to be filled with bitterness for her. The year 1860 had been the beginning of her trials, and her task became every day more difficult. Already she foreboded that the enchantments of the early days of her reign were but the prelude to terrible tragedies. But in 1860 the Empress was probably the only woman of the court who had any apprehensions about the future. Most of the others, carried away by the social whirl, dazzled by the splendors of life in Paris, took an untroubled pleasure in the prosperity of France. Even the Empress herself, after a period of retirement and

sadness which lasted several months and suppressed for that year the customary fêtes at Compiègne, was to resume in 1861 all her representative duties and all the splendors of her brilliant life as sovereign.

As to the Emperor, he felt satisfied, on the whole, when he recapitulated the events of the year. He rightly considered the annexation of Savoy and Nice as the greatest success of his reign. Far from diminishing, his sympathies with the Italian cause went on increasing day by day, and because his uncle had been Emperor of the French and King of Italy, he believed that he also had two countries in which he was equally interested. Pursuing the current of his cosmopolitan schemes and humanitarian policy, he dreamed of a moral and material solidarity between all nations, a sort of European federation, and fancied himself called to realize — thanks to the principle of nationalities — the visions of the *Memorial from Saint-Helena*. To his mind, the private interests of France came second to the general interests of mankind at large. The great agglomerations which might take form beside his empire did not alarm him. The republicans almost without exception, and several great organs of the public press with Orleanist tendencies, such as the *Journal des Débats* and the *Revue des Deux-Mondes*, encouraged him in his condescension toward Italy and Prussia. He fancied that he would never have anything to dread at the hands of these two powers, and believed that in the court of Berlin he would

find a useful auxiliary for that emancipation of Venice which would complete his unfinished programme of 1859: "Italy free from the Alps to the Adriatic."

Apostle of the principle of nationalities, Napoleon III. was doomed to be its martyr. To this cause he was to sacrifice the most precious of all his friendships — that with Russia. And yet he ought not to have forgotten that without this power he could not have obtained his successes in 1860. It was Russia which had balked the coalition schemes by which England had attempted to prevent the annexation of Savoy and Nice to France. It was also Russia which had baffled English intrigues by facilitating the Syrian expedition and taking no umbrage at the glorious part assumed by France. It was Russia which, by means of the good offices of General Ignatieff, had contributed in the most effacious manner to the successful conclusion of the treaty of Pekin. In spite of the so-called English alliance, Napoleon III. had met nothing but hindrances at London. At St. Petersburg, on the contrary, he had found nothing but good-will and sympathy. So long as he remains loyal to the Stüttgart compact, he will be sure to avoid all catastrophes. But he will sacrifice to the principle of nationalities, to the cause of Poland, that one of all his alliances which might have been to him the most useful, the most durable, the most fruitful. It is also for the principle of nationalities, for the deliverance of Venice, that

Napoleon III. will become the chief promoter of that accord between Turin and Berlin which will result in Sadowa and Sedan.

In 1860, the Emperor foresaw nothing of all this. He did not suspect the bitter disillusions which his personal policy wás preparing for him ; and, where his internal policy was concerned, he could not imagine that his adversaries would employ against him the liberal concessions he had made with such spontaneous generosity. Devoted to free-trade ideas, he thought that by the commercial treaty he had sown seeds from which immense and beneficent harvests would be reaped. For humanity, he dreamed of the cessation of the age of iron and the coming of the age of gold. As everything had succeeded with him from the beginning of his reign, he believed that his eagles soared above the lightning. Happy husband, happy father, happy sovereign, he peacefully enjoyed a situation so widely different from the painful trials of his childhood and youth. He looked forward to the future with confidence, and believed more than ever in his star.

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